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INTRODUCTION 
Congress passed the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") in 1990 
and it became effective in 1992. 1 The statute prohibits discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities by employers, state and local govern-
ments, and public accommodations. With more than two years experience 
under the statute, an assessment of the effectiveness of the dispute 
resolution procedures is appropriate. This Article begins with a brief 
overview of the statute, including an analysis of the dispute resolution 
procedure under each title. 2 The report then discusses the effectiveness of 
existing dispute resolution procedures.3 Finally the report makes recom-
mendations for improving the dispute resolution procedures, including a 
specific recommendation for adoption of a mediation program,4 in order to 
effectuate the purposes of the statute. 5 
I. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
With the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress 
extended protection against disability discrimination to large segments of 
the population not previously protected. The preexisting Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 banned disability discrimination by the federal government, 
government contractors, and recipients of federal funds.6 The reach of that 
I. President Bush signed the ADA, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327-378 (1990) 
on July 26, 1990. Title I became effective July 26, 1992 for employers with 25 or more 
employees and two years later for employers with 15 or more employees. S. REP. No. 116, 
IOlst Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1989). Titles II and Ill became effective 18 months after 
enactment. Id. at 3. 
2. See infra Sections I and II. 
3. See infra Section III. 
4. See infra Sections IV and V. 
5. As specifically set forth in the statute, the ADA's purpose is as follows: 
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; 
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; 
(3) to ensure that the [f]ederal [g]overnment plays a central role in enforcing the 
standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and 
( 4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce 
the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major 
areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities. 
42 U.S.C. § 1210l(b) (Supp. V 1993). 
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793-95 (1994). 
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statute, however, left much disability discrimination untouched by federal 
law. Congress detennined that additional federal legislation was necessary 
to eliminate discrimination against the estimated 43 million Americans with 
disabilities, discrimination which costs billions of dollars by fostering 
unnecessary dependency and nonproductivity. 7 Much of the statutory 
language in the ADA is based on the Rehabilitation Act and the regulations 
issued pursuant to that Act. 
Disability under the ADA is defined as "a physical or mental impainnent 
that substantially limits one or more of [an individual's] major life activities 
•••• "
8 Major life activities are those that the average person can perfonn 
with little or no difficulty.9 Individuals who have a history of disability or 
are perceived to have a disability, even if they do not, also meet the 
statutory definition of disability. 10 
The ADA contains five titles, the first four dealing with specific aspects 
of discrimination and the fifth containing miscellaneous provisions. 11 Title 
I covers employment discrimination, Title II covers discrimination in public 
services, Title III covers discrimination in public accommodations and 
services operated by private entities, and Title IV covers telecommunica-
tions services for individuals with hearing and speech impainnents. 
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9)(Supp. V 1993); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 1, at 16-
18 (noting that discrimination is costly to society because disabled individuals must rely on 
social welfare programs for economic survival rather than contributing to the economy 
through productivity). 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993). While the term physical or mental 
impairment is not defined in the statute, the legislative history indicates that the term 
includes: 
( 1) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical 
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; neuromus-
cular; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; 
reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; 
or (2) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic 
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 
S. Rep. No. 116, IOI st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989). The statute expressly eliminates certain 
conditions from the definition of disability including homosexuality, bisexuality, compulsive 
gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, disorders resulting from current illegal drug use, 
"transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders 
not resulting from physical impairments or other sexual behavior disorders .... " 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1221 l(b)(l) (Supp. V 1993). 
9. These include walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, learning, working, caring for 
oneself, and participating in community activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1995). 
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(B)-(C) (Supp. V 1993). 
11. 42U.S.C.§§ 12111-12117;42U.S.C.§§ 12131-12165;420.S.C.§§ 12101-12189 
(Supp. V 1993). 
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Notable among the provisions of Title V are section 506, which requires 
the agencies primarily responsible for administration of the statute to 
provide technical assistance to covered entities, individuals with rights 
under the statute, and other federal agencies,1 2 and section 513, which 
encourages the use of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") where 
appropriate and authorized by law. 13 
A. Title I - Employment 
Title I prohibits discrimination against "a qualified individual with a 
disability because of the disability . . . in regard to job application 
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment."14 This provision covers employers with fifteen or more 
employees. 15 
Three key concepts in the employment provisions are: (I) what 
constitutes a disability; (2) who is a qualified individual with a disability; 
and (3) what is discrimination.'6 First, the determination of disability as 
discussed above is the same for all titles of the ADA. Second, to bring a 
claim of discrimination, an individual must establish that she is a qualified 
individual with a disability, i.e., she can perform the essential functions of 
the job with or without reasonable accommodation. 17 
"Essential functions of the job" and "reasonable accommodation" are 
both terms of art under the statute. The essential functions of the job are 
those duties that are fundamental rather than marginal. 18 Reasonable 
accommodations may include, but are not limited to, making facilities 
accessible, job restructuring, modifying work schedules, reassigning the 
employee to a vacant position, acquiring or modifying equipment or 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12206(c)(l) (Supp. V 1993). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. V 1993). 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12ll2(a) (Supp. V 1993). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12lll(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993). 
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1993) (defining disability); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(8) (Supp. V 1993) (defining qualified individual with a disability); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112 (Supp. V 1993) (specifying unlawful discrimination). 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12lll(8) (Supp. V 1993). 
18. 29 C.F.R. § l 630.2(n) (1995). The determination of whether a function is essential 
is based on the employer's judgment, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on 
the function, the experience of the employees in the same or similar jobs, the terms of any 
collective bargaining agreement, and the consequences of not requiring the employee to 
perform the functions. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
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devices, or providing readers or interpreters. 19 The employer must make 
the accommodation(s) necessary to allow a disabled employee or applicant 
to perfonn the essential functions of a job, unless the accommodation(s) 
would create undue hardship.20 Undue hardship is established by demon-
strating that making the accommodation(s) would require significant 
difficulty or expense.21 
Discrimination barred by Title I includes: (1) intentional discrimination; 
(2) use of standards, criteria, methods of administration, or tests that have 
the effect of discrimination; (3) participating in a relationship that causes 
employees or applicants to be subjected to discrimination; (4) discrimina-
tion based on an employee or applicant's relationship with an individual 
with a disability; and (5) failure to reasonably accommodate a qualified 
individual with a disability.22 Title I provides several defenses to a claim 
of discrimination. An employer may justify the use of job qualifications, 
selection criteria, or tests that have a discriminatory impact by establishing 
that they are job-related and consistent with business necessity.23 In 
addition, an employer may require that an individual not "pose a direct 
threat to the health or safety" of others in the workplace.24 As noted 
above, an employer may refuse to reasonably accommodate a disabled 
individual if the accommodation would impose undue hardship. Addition-
ally, an employer may defend against an ADA claim by proving that an 
individual is not disabled, not qualified for the position, or not discriminat-
ed against because of the disability.25 
Along with the other prohibitions on discrimination, the ADA directly 
limits inquiries by a covered entity about disability and medical examina-
tions. An employer may make inquiries about an applicant's ability to 
perfonn the job, but not about the applicant's disability.26 The employer 
can require an applicant to take a medical exam only after an offer of 
employment is made.27 The offer may be conditioned on the results of the 
exam only if all new employees in the same job category are subjected to 
the exam, the medical infonnation is kept confidential, and any disqualifica-
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. V 1993). 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (Supp. V 1993). 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 l(lO)(A) (Supp. V 1993). 
22. 42 u.s.c. § 12112(b)(l)-(7). 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (Supp. V 1993). 
24. 42 u.s.c. § 12113(b). 
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 1993) (barring discrimination against qualified 
individuals with disabilities because of disability). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (Supp. V 1993). 
27. Id. 
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tion resulting from the exam is based on criteria that are job-related and 
consistent with business necessity.28 Employers may make inquiries of 
employees about disabilities and require medical exams of employees only 
if the inquiries and exams are "job-related and consistent with business 
necessity. "29 
B. ntle II - Public Entities 
Title II of the ADA proscribes discrimination against qualified individu-
als with disabilities by public entities.30 In addition to the broad prohibi-
tion against discrimination, Title II specifies that qualified individuals with 
disabilities cannot "be excluded from participation in or be denied the 
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity."31 
Employment discrimination actions against public entities may be brought 
under Title I or Title 11.32 
C. Tiile Ill - Public Accommodations 
Title III of the ADA bans discrimination by public accommodations if 
their operations affect commerce.33 The definition of public accommoda-
tion is quite broad, including restaurants, hotels, theaters, retail establish-
ments, auditoriums, schools, museums, libraries, public transportation 
stations, service establishments, social service agencies, and recreational 
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ l2l l2(d)(3)(A)-(C) (Supp. V 1993). 
29. 42 U.S.C. § l2l l2(d)(4) (Supp. V 1993). 
30. Public entities include: (I) state and local governments; (2) departments, agencies, 
special purpose districts or other "instrumentalities of a State or States or local govern-
ment[ s] ;"and (3) passenger railroads. 42 U.S.C. §§ l213I(l)(A)-(C) (Supp. V 1993). 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. V 1993). Title II also contains detailed requirements that 
public transportation systems must meet to avoid violation of the discrimination prohibitions. 
42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12150, §§ 12161-12165 (Supp. V 1993). 
32. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 ( 1995); Petersen v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 818 
F. Supp. 1276, 1278-79 (W.D. Wis. 1993) (finding that employment discrimination against 
public entity may be brought under Title I or Title II). 
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7), 12182(a). The new construction and alterations provisions 
of Title III, see infra note 41 and accompanying text, apply to commercial facilities as well 
as places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (Supp. V 1993). Commercial 
facilities are facilities intended for nonresidential use with operations that affect commerce. 
42 U.S.C. § 12181(2) (Supp. V 1993). Additionally, Title III contains specific provisions 
directed at public transportation supplied by private entities. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), 12181(10) (Supp. V 1993). See42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(B)-(D); 
12184 (Supp. V 1993) (barring discrimination on fixed route transportation systems, demand 
responsive transportation systems and over-the-road bus systems, and specifying what 
constitutes such discrimination). 
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establishments.J4 A public accommodation, which includes the owner, 
lessor, lessee, or operator, cannot discriminate on the basis of an individu-
al's disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.J5 Title III not only 
requires that an establishment be accessible, but also requires access to 
services and facilities in an integrated setting.J6 The ADA requires that 
public accommodations modify practices and procedures to ensure access 
for individuals with disabilities, unless the changes would fundamentally 
alter the nature of the services or facilities.J 7 Also, a person with a 
disability cannot be denied services because of the absence of "auxiliary 
aids or services," including interpreters, readers, or equipment or devices 
that would enable communication with those who are hearing or visually 
impaired, unless use of such aids would fundamentally alter the nature of 
the services or impose an undue burden.J8 
Public accommodations must remove architectural and communication 
barriers where removal is "readily achievable."J9 If removal of a barrier 
is not readily achievable, access to the services or facility must be made 
available through readily achievable alternative means.40 In addition to the 
barrier removal requirements, the statute specifies that new construction and 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (Supp. V 1993). Prohibited discrimination includes the use 
of eligibility criteria that screen out individuals with disabilities from full and equal 
enjoyment of goods, services, or facilities unless such criteria are necessary to the provision 
of the goods, services, or facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1993). 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993). 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(l)(B) (Supp. V 1993). This requirement would prevent a 
public accommodation from isolating individuals with disabilities in separate accommoda-
tions. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.203(a)-(b) (1995). 
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1993). 
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii), 12102(1) (Supp. V 1993). 
39. This is defined as "easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much 
difficulty or expense." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(9), 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (Supp. V 1993). The 
legislative history of these provisions suggests that accessibility of every part of every 
facility is not necessarily required, but the ADA "contemplates a high degree of convenient 
accessibility" of parking, routes to and from the facility, entrances, restrooms, water 
fountains, public areas, work areas and service areas. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 1, at 69. 
Readily achievable alterations would include, for example, small ramps, raised letter and 
braille markings on signs and elevator controls, grab bars, flashing alarm lights, and lower 
telephones. Id. at 66. 
40. See42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v)(Supp. V 1993). Readily achievable alternative 
means would include such change as curb service or assistance to retrieve items in an 
inaccessible location where access is not readily achievable. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 
I, at 66. 
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substantial alterations to existing facilities must comply with distinct 
specific guidelines for accessibility.41 
D. ntle JV - Telecommunications 
Title IV amends Title II of the Communications Act42 and is designed 
to ensure the availability of communication by wire or radio for individuals 
with speech or hearing impairment in a manner "functionally equivalent to 
the ability of an individual who does not have a hearing impairment or 
speech impairment .... "43 The Federal Communications Commission 
("FCC") was authorized to use its enforcement authority under the 
Communications Act to ensure that both interstate and intrastate communi-
cation services are available within three years of enactment of Title IV.44 
Pursuant to this authority the FCC has mandated that "each common carrier 
providing telephone voice transmission services" provide telecommunica-
tions relay services for intrastate and interstate communications.45 These 
services must be provided at rates no greater than those paid for compara-
ble voice communication services.46 
II. ADA ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES 
A. Tiile I 
Title I, banning employment discrimination, adopts the enforcement 
mechanisms of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.47 Accordingly, 
exhaustion of administrative remedies through the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is required as a prerequisite to filing suit 
alleging a violation of Title I. First, a charge must be filed with the EEOC, 
which investigates to determine whether "there is reasonable cause to 
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(l) (stating newly constructed facilities must be readily 
accessible in accordance with regulations issued under Title Ill); 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2) 
(specifying that substantially altered facilities or portions of facilities must be readily 
accessible to the maximum extent feasible). As noted earlier, see supra note 33, these 
requirements apply to commercial facilities as well as public accommodations. 
42. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (Supp. V 1993). 
43. 47 U.S.C. § 225(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993). 
44. 47 U.S.C. § 225(c) (Supp. V 1993). 
45. 47 C.F.R. § 64.603 (1995). 
46. 47 C.F.R. § 64.604(c)(3) (1995). 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 12 l l 7(a); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9 
(l 994). 
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believe that the charge is true. "48 If the EEOC finds cause, then the 
agency is required to "endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful 
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and 
persuasion."49 The EEOC may file suit based on the charge, if concilia-
tion efforts fail, 50 or alternatively, the EEOC may decline to do so, 
notifying the complainant of its determination. 51 If the EEOC finds no 
reasonable cause, it also notifies the complainant of its determination.52 
Regardless of the cause finding, the complainant has ninety days from 
receipt of the EEOC's notice to file a judicial action.53 In addition to its 
enforcement authority, the EEOC has authority to issue regulations to carry 
out Title I and has done so.54 
B. ntle II 
Title II, barring discrimination by public entities, adopts the procedures 
of section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act for enforcement. 55 The legislative 
history indicates Congress's intent that enforcement follow the model under 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which applies to federal fund 
recipients. 56 The Department of Justice is authorized to file suits for 
enforcement of Title 11.57 In addition, individuals with disabilities have a 
private right of action under Title II and need not exhaust federal 
administrative remedies as a prerequisite to suit.58 
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994). 
49. Id. 
50. In the case of a governmental respondent, the Commission must refer the case to 
the Attorney General for filing of a civil suit. Id. 
51. Conciliation is a prerequisite to a suit filed by the Commission or Attorney General, 
but a suit by the charging party is not barred by the Commission's failure to conciliate. 
MACK A. PLAYER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 667 (1990). 
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b),(f). 
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). The complainant may file suit after receipt of the notice 
regardless of whether the Commission found reasonable cause or no reasonable cause. Id. 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 12116; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-1630.16 (1995). Effective July 26, 1992, 
the EEOC issued substantive regulations to carry out the ADA, accompanied by interpretive 
guidance. 29 C.F .R. § 1630.1-1630.16 ( 1995). 
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (Supp. V 1993); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). 
56. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 1 Olst Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1990) (stating that administrative 
enforcement should parallel section 504 ). Section 505 contains enforcement procedures for 
both section 504 actions and section 501 actions. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a (l994)(containing 
enforcement procedures for sections 501 and 504). Section 501 covers employees of the 
federal government. See 29 U.S.C. § 791 (requiring affirmative action by federal agencies). 
57. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 56, at 98. 
58. Id. 
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Although filing a complaint with the enforcement agency is not a 
prerequisite to suit, an individual may file a complaint alleging a violation 
of Title II. Investigation of complaints is handled by various agencies, 
including the Department of Justice, as designated in the regulations. 59 All 
complaints must be filed within 180 days from the date of the alleged 
discrimination.60 The regulations require the appropriate agency to 
investigate the complaint and attempt informal resolution.61 If no informal 
resolution is reached, a Letter of Findings is issued to the complainant and 
the public entity. When the agency finds that the entity is not in compli-
ance with the statute, the agency attempts to negotiate an agreement for 
voluntary compliance.62 If no agreement is reached, the case is referred 
to the Attorney General for "appropriate action."63 
If the public entity is a federal fund recipient, which is probable, it is 
also covered by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.64 Termination and 
suspension of funding are available remedies under section 504.65 Prior 
59. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.170 - 35.178, 35.190 ( 1995) (setting forth complaint 
procedures under Title II and designating agencies for investigation of particular types of 
complaints). The Department ofTransportation handles complaints relating to transportation, 
including highways, public transportation, traffic management, automobile licensing and 
inspection, and driver licensing. Id.§ 35.190(b)(8) (1995). The agency's authority as an 
investigating agency under the regulations is identical to that of the other seven agencies 
designated to handle specific types of complaints, and distinct from its regulatory and 
enforcement responsibility under Title II, Part B dealing with public transportation by public 
entities. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.190 ( 1995) (designating investigation agencies); 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12141-12165 (Supp. V 1993) (establishing statutory nondiscrimination requirements for 
public transportation). 
60. 28 C.F.R. § 35.170(b) (1995). 
61. 28 C.F.R. § 35.172 (1995). The appropriate agencies are the Department of 
Agriculture for programs and services related to farming; the Department of Education for 
programs and services related to education; the Department of Health and Human Services 
for programs and services related to health care and social services; the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development for programs and services related to housing; the Depart-
ment of the Interior for programs and services related to lands and natural resources; the 
Department of Justice for programs and services related to law enforcement, public safety, 
and administration of justice; the Department of Labor for programs and services related to 
the work force; and the Department of Transportation for programs and services related to 
transportation. 28 C.F.R. § 35.190 (1995). 
62. 28 C.F.R. § 35.173 (1995). 
63. 28 C.F.R. § 35.174 (1995). 
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994) (barring discrimination by programs receiving federal 
financial assistance). 
65. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2) (1994) (adopting remedies ofTitle VI of the Civil Rights 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)(l)); MACKA. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 609 
(I 988)(stating statutory remedy under section 504 is found in Title VI-withdrawal of 
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to tennination or suspension of funding, the entity is entitled to a 
hearing.66 
The Secretary of Transportation has the authority to issue regulations to 
carry out Parts I and II of Subtitle B of Title II, which deal with public 
transportation provided by public entities.67 The Attorney General has the 
authority to issue regulations to carry out the remainder of Title 11.68 The 
regulations must be consistent with those issued pursuant to section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act. 69 Regulations under both subtitles have been 
promulgated. 10 
C. Title Ill 
Individuals subject to discrimination under Title III prohibiting 
discrimination by public accommodations can sue for injunctive relief, but 
not damages.71 Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required. 
Available injunctive relief includes orders to alter facilities, provide 
auxiliary aids, modify policies, or provide services or goods by alternative 
methods.72 
Title III authorizes the Attorney General to file a civil action when 
discrimination raises an issue of "general public importance" or where there 
is reasonable cause to believe that a person "is engaged in a pattern or 
practice of discrimination."73 In cases brought by the Attorney General, 
federal financial assistance). 
66. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.5 (1995) (requiring each enforcement agency under the 
Rehabilitation Act to establish an enforcement system which includes the enforcement and 
hearing procedures adopted for Title VI); 34 C.F.R. § 100.8 (1995) (Department of 
Education regulations under Title VI requiring hearing); 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.125, 27.127 ( 1995) 
(Department of Transportation regulations requiring hearing under the Rehabilitation Act). 
67. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12149, 12164 (Supp. V 1993). The regulations must be 
consistent with accessibility guidelines promulgated by the Architectural and Transportation 
Barriers Compliance Board in accordance with section 504 of Title V of the ADA. See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12149(b), 12163 (requiring consistency) and 42 U.S.C. § 12204 (requiring 
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board to issue guidelines for 
accessibility). 
68. 42 u.s.c. § 12134. 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b),(c). 
70. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101-35.190 (Department of Justice regulations implementing 
Title II of ADA); 49 C.F.R. §§ 37.1-37.169, 38.1-38.179 (Department of Transportation 
regulations implementing Titles II and III of ADA). 
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) (Supp. V 1993). 
72. Id. 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(l)(B). 
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compensatory damages and civil penalties are available.74 The Attorney 
General has investigation responsibility for alleged violations of Title III as 
well as responsibility for periodic compliance reviews.75 Finally, after 
public hearing and in consultation with the Architectural and Transportation 
Barriers Compliance Board, the Attorney General is authorized to certify 
that state laws, local building codes, or other ordinances that establish 
accessibility mandates meet the requirements of Title III.76 The certifica-
tion provides rebuttable evidence of compliance with the Act.77 
The Secretary of Transportation issued regulations for the transportation 
provisions of Title 111.78 The Attorney General issued regulations for the 
remaining provisions of Title III. 79 Congress specified that the regulations 
must be consistent with accessibility guidelines promulgated by the 
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board in accordance 
with Title V of the ADA.80 
D. Title IV 
The FCC issued regulations for implementation of Title IV, dealing with 
telecommunications, to ensure compliance with the requirements of the 
statute.81 The Commission is authorized to certify state compliance 
programs which meet the requirements for federal certification.82 
Complaints alleging violation of Title IV are filed with the FCC or with a 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2). 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(l)(A)(i). While the statutory language states that the 
Attorney General "shall investigate" alleged violations ofTitle III, the Department of Justice 
has taken the position that investigation of Title III cases is discretionary, while investigation 
of Title II cases is mandatory. Meeting with representatives of the Department of Justice, 
Public Access Section, March 28, 1994. 
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(l)(A)(ii). 
77. Id. 
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(a) (Supp. V 1993) (authorizing Secretary ofTransportation 
to issue regulations); 49 C.F.R. §§ 37.1-37.179, 38.1-38.179 (regulations issued by Secre-
tary). 
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (authorizing Attorney General to issue regulations); 28 
C.F.R. §§ 36.101-36.608 (regulations issued by Attorney General). 
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring consistency); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12204 (requiring the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board to issue 
guidelines for accessibility); 28 C.F.R. Part 36, Appendix (accessibility guidelines issued by 
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board). 
81. See 47 U.S.C. § 225(d) (Supp. V 1993) (authorizing FCC to issue regulations); 47 
C.F.R. §§ 64.601-64.608 (regulations issued by FCC). 
82. 47 U.S.C. § 225(f). 
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certified state program if it involves intrastate services in such a state.B3 
The Commission must resolve complaints of violations of Title IV by final 
order within 180 days of filing.B4 If a state does not resolve a complaint 
within 180 days, jurisdiction over the complaint reverts to the FCC.B5 
E. Title V 
Title V contains a number of miscellaneous provisions. Section 513, 
which deals with alternative dispute resolution, provides: "[w]here 
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative 
means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, 
facilitation, mediation, factfinding, mini-trials, and arbitration, is encour-
aged to resolve disputes arising under this chapter."B6 Having reviewed 
the basic anti-discrimination provisions of the statute, this Article's analysis 
now moves to the current dispute resolution provisions. 
III. CURRENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE ADA 
A. Title I 
The EEOC has an increasing backlog of cases which was only 
exacerbated by enactment of the ADA.B7 In the first two quarters of fiscal 
1994, 8,669 ADA charges were filed, an increase of 38% from the previous 
year.BB Parties who deal with the agency are increasingly frustrated at the 
length of time that it takes to investigate complaints and issue determina-
tions.B9 The immense caseload and the inability to achieve quick resolu-
83. 47 C.F.R. § 64.604(5) (1994). 
84. 47 U.S.C. § 225(e) (Supp. V 1993). 
85. 47 C.F.R. § 47.604(5) (1994). 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. V 1993). 
87. See EEOC, Civil Rights Commission Chiefs Make Case to Congress for Budget 
Increases, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 57 d20 (Mar. 25, 1994); House Labor Subcommittee 
Approves Bill Consolidating Federal EEO Authority, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 17 d6 
(Jan. 27, 1994). By the end of the second quarter of fiscal 1994, the number of pending 
cases was 85,212, an increase of21,547 cases over the previous year. EEOC Struggles with 
Caseload, 45 LAB. L.J. 432 (1994). By late 1994, the backlog was over 90,000 cases. See 
EEOC Chair to Address Agency Problems, 147 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 404, 405 (Nov. 28, 
1994). 
88. EEOC Struggles with Caseload, supra note 87, at 432. This increase occurred 
before July 26, 1994, when the threshold for ADA coverage dropped from 25 employees to 
15 employees, which is expected to generate significant additional ADA cases. Id. 
89. See EEOC Official and Attorneys Discuss Challenges Posed by Record Charge 
Rate, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 54 d16 (March 22, 1994); Letter to Frances M. Hart 
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tions of cases frustrate agency personnel.90 Despite the increasing backlog, 
Congress recently voted to reduce the EEOC' s budget, which will further 
exacerbate the problem.91 
The backlog problem is somewhat mitigated by the procedure that 
permits a charging party92 to request the EEOC to issue a notice of right 
to sue if 180 days have passed since the filing of a charge without 
completion of the investigation.93 An individual who desires to litigate 
can wait the 180 days, request the notice, and file suit. This provision does 
not aid less sophisticated individuals, those without lawyers, or those who 
hope for agency action on the charge, however. 94 In addition, the 
congressional goal of encouraging informal resolution of the charge through 
the conciliation process is frustrated. 95 
from Jeffrey A. Norris, Comments of Equal Employment Advisory Council in Response to 
EEOC 's Request for Comments on Alternative Dispute Resolution 2 (Sept. 16, 1993). 
90. See EEOC Official Discusses Record Charge Rate, 145 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 381 
(Mar. 28, 1994); Latest EEOC Data Show Record Charges, Sharp Increase in Inventory of 
Pending Cases, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 152, d5 (Aug. 10, 1993) (Although the agency 
increased its resolution of charges in 1993, the number of charges awaiting resolution also 
increased by almost 32% generating significant concern on the part of the agency). 
91. CongressApproveslegislationCuttingEEOC Budget, 146 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 
558 (Aug. 29, 1994). The EEOC received virtually no increase in funding or staffing when 
ADA cases were added to its enforcement responsibilities, despite the fact that ADA cases 
now constitute about 20% of the agency's caseload. David R. Sands, Charges of Bias on 
the Job Rising Fast, THE WASH. TIMES at D5 (Apr. 2, 1994); EEOC Must Begin to Deal 
With its Growing Workload, 143 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 495 (Aug. 16, 1993). The EEOC 
has 559 fewer staff members than in 1980 despite the additional workload generated by the 
ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. EEOC, Civil Rights Commission Chiefs Make Case 
to Congress For Budget Increases, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 57, d20 (Mar. 25, 1994). 
92. The terms charging party and complainant are used interchangeably throughout the 
report for individuals who file charges with the various agencies alleging violations of the 
ADA. The party charged with the violation is referred to as the respondent. 
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (stating if no civil action filed or conciliation 
agreement reached within 180 days the Commission shall notify the charging party who can 
file a law suit); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) (1995) (stating that right to sue letter will be issued 
upon request after 180 days or if investigation cannot be completed within 180 days). 
94. These individuals do not take advantage of the opportunity to litigate either because 
of lack of knowledge, lack of representation, or lack of resources. 
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (requiring the Commission to attempt to eliminate 
unlawful practices by conciliation); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24 (describing the conciliation 
procedure). See also Departing EEOC General Counsel Sees Need/or New Direction at 
Overwhelmed Agency, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 111 d3 (June 11, 1993) (Departing 
General Counsel noted that backlog of charges and failure to fund agency to provide for 
voluntary resolution of disputes as contemplated under Title VII have intensified problems 
in administering Title VII). 
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Because of the backlog, among other factors, the number of cases 
litigated under the employment provisions of the ADA is extremely small 
in relation to the number of charges filed. From the effective date of the 
statute through December 31, 1994, the total number of ADA charges filed 
was 39,927.96 As of that date, the EEOC had filed 48 cases in court 
alleging ADA violations.97 In addition to EEOC lawsuits, suits have been 
filed by employees or applicants. Of the 154 ADA cases published in 
BNA's Americans with Disabilities Act Cases in 1993 and the first half of 
1994, 58 were employment cases.98 While the number of cases litigated 
increased in 1994 and can be expected to increase further as more cases are 
investigated and knowledge about the statute expands, these figures 
illustrate the significance of the backlog, and demonstrate that the private 
right of action for plaintiffs is not moving many cases from the investiga-
tion backlog to the courts. The overwhelming majority of ADA employ-
ment cases are simply awaiting investigatory action, and few of them will 
ever be litigated by the agency regardless of the outcome of the investiga-
tion. 
There is ongoing consideration of how to resolve the EEOC's tremen-
dous backlog problem, including changes in the agency's structure, 
priorities, funding, dispute resolution mechanisms and the use of ADR.99 
96. Telephone Conversation with Peggy Mastroianni, Director of ADA Policy, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (Jan. 23, 1995). 
97. Id. In the first two years under the statute, the EEOC filed 23 cases, while the 
number of charges filed was 29, 720, a litigation rate of less than one tenth of one percent. 
EEOC Has 23 Pending ADA Complaints; Many Involve Charges of AIDS Bias, 1994 Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) 133d11 (July 14, 1994). The litigation rate increased slightly in the later 
half of 1994. 
98. ADA: Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990 Special Report, 146 Lab. Rel. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 14, at 8 (Aug. 1, 1994). Fourteen of the 45 cases in 1993 were employment 
cases and 44 of the 79 cases in the first half of 1994 were employment cases. id. Thus, 
employment cases increased as a percentage of reported cases. Because the BNA data 
included all cases, there may be some overlap between the 48 EEOC cases and the 58 
employment cases in the BNA sample. 
99. See EEOC Chair to Address Agency Problems, 147 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 404 
(Nov. 28, 1994) (discussing new EEOC Chair's ideas to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the agency); Oversight Hearing on the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission Before the Subcomm. on Select Education and Labor of the House Committee 
on Education and Labor, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-7 (July 26, 1994) (hereinafter Oversight 
Hearing) (discussing various proposals to improve the effectiveness of the EEOC). See also 
Fact Finding Report Issued by the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela-
tions, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 105, d34 at 97-118 (June 3, 1994) (hereinafter Dunlop 
Commission Fact Finding Report) (discussing the current system of employment regulation, 
litigation and dispute resolution, and considering alternative methods of handling 
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This consideration is not limited to the ADA, but concerns all of the 
statutory responsibilities of the agency. 
With respect to the use of alternative dispute resolution, the EEOC 
attempts to settle cases through negotiation whenever possible. 100 In cases 
in which the EEOC finds reasonable cause, the statute expressly requires 
the EEOC to conciliate prior to litigation. 101 
In addition, the EEOC recently completed a pilot mediation program in 
which 267 of a contemplated 300 meditations were conducted. 102 The 
program included Title I ADA cases, among others, but was limited to 
cases involving discharge, discipline, or alleged discrimination in terms and 
conditions of employment. 103 The agency contracted with the Center for 
Dispute Settlement to conduct mediation upon agreement of the parties. 104 
The cases were assigned for sixty days to a mediator, who was unconnect-
ed with the agency. 105 Eighty-seven percent of the charging parties 
agreed to mediation, but only forty-three percent of employers agreed. 106 
Assessments of the pilot project indicated that employers were reluctant to 
mediate discharge cases, perhaps because they saw no ground for 
compromise. 10' Agreement was reached in 52% of the mediated cases. 108 
The pilot project did not include reasonable accommodation cases under 
the ADA. 109 Nevertheless, agency representatives and others have 
employment-related disputes including alternative dispute resolution, a unified administra-
tive agency, and a unified labor court). See also infra notes 124-39 and accompanying text 
(discussing EEOC's most recent efforts to address the backlog). 
100. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20. The EEOC considers its normal efforts to settle cases as a 
form of ADR. 
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994). 
102. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
Pilot Program 1-3 ( 1994) (hereinafter EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program); EEOC Official 
Discusses Record Charge Rate, 145 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 381 (Mar. 28, 1994). 
103. EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 2. 
104. See id. at 1-2. 
105. EEOC Official Discusses Record Charge Rate, supra note 102, at 381. 
106. EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 3. 
107. Information from representatives of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. The final report indicated that only 39% of respondents agreed to mediate in 
the cases where the employee was terminated, but 70% agreed where the employee had 
resigned and 48% agreed where the employee remained employed. See EEOC Report on 
ADR Pilot Project, supra note 102, at 4. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 2. The EEOC decided to exclude reasonable accommodation cases for several 
reasons. The agency had a strong interest in reducing the backlog of discharge cases, the 
largest category of cases at the EEOC. Also, the ADA was a new statute with no existing 
precedent regarding remedies. Unlike discharge cases, the EEOC did not have experience 
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suggested that reasonable accommodation cases are precisely the type of 
cases that should be mediated. One of the benefits of mediation is that it 
enables parties to resolve disputes and maintain continuing relation-
ships.110 In reasonable accommodation cases, the parties can work out an 
accommodation that enables the employee to retain employment, thus 
preserving the relationship. 
The parties to meditations in the pilot project reflected generally high 
satisfaction levels-ninety-two percent believed that the mediation was fair 
and eighty percent would try it again. 111 Reviews given by the agency's 
supervisory personnel were mixed, with the negative assessments reflecting 
both a concern that mediation would weaken the agency's law enforcement 
image and a concern for the time taken by the program. 112 The mediation 
process took far less time than a full investigation, 113 but those cases that 
were not settled moved back into the investigation process, perhaps adding 
to overall processing time. 114 The agency compared settlement agree-
ments reached in mediation and those reached through the normal agency 
resolution techniques, and found no major differences in the remedies 
with reasonable accommodation issues under other statutes. While there are reasonable 
accommodation requirements for religion under Title VII, see TWA Inc. v. Hardison, 432 
U.S. 63, 81 (1977), and for employees with disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act, most 
of the statutory claims within EEOC's administrative responsibility have no such require-
ment. Furthermore, Congress indicated that it did not intend for the interpretation of Title 
VII's reasonable accommodation requirement for religion to govern the ADA See H.R. 
REP. No. 485, supra note 67, at 68; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 1, at 36. Given these 
factors, there was concern about setting a standard for settlements in reasonable accommoda-
tion cases through outside mediation. Information from Peggy Mastroianni, Director of 
Policy EEOC, Donna Swanson, EEOC and Edna Povich, Center for Dispute Settlement. 
110. See infra note 274 and accompanying text. 
111. EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 5. One fairness concern 
was expressed by both parties. When either party appeared with unexpected representatives, 
the good faith of that party was questioned. Id. 
112. See id at 6-7. 
113. The average time for completion of the mediation process was 67 days, id. at 4, 
while the average processing time for cases outside the mediation project was 293 days in 
1994. EEOC Struggles with Caseload, supra note 87. 
114. Supervisors believed that the pilot project added time to the process. EEOC Report 
on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 6. The report did not recite data that would 
enable any definitive conclusion on the issue, however. Also, the time from filing to 
resolution was far shorter for mediated cases, 67 days, than for cases settled outside the pilot 
project, 247 days. Id. This difference may be attributable, in whole or in part, to the fact 
that mediated cases were forwarded to mediation immediately upon agreement of the parties, 
while the settlement negotiations outside the pilot project "proceeded in accordance with 
docket order scheduling." Id. at 6. 
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achieved except for slightly higher monetary benefits in the agency-settled 
cases. 115 The outside evaluator of the project found that in situations 
where the mediators believed that discrimination occurred, few settlements 
were reached-a finding that warrants some concern. 116 
In addition to the pilot project, the EEOC and the Department of Justice 
funded training in both the ADA and the use of ADR for four hundred 
individuals with disabilities who were associated with disability groups. 117 
In the second phase, one hundred people received advanced training, which 
included intensive training in ADA and ADR. Twenty-five of the 
individuals were invited to Washington for a one week mediation training 
session, at the end of which they were certified as trained mediators. 118 
Some of these individuals have been involved in training mediators who 
will be participating in the Department of Justice pilot mediation project 
discussed below. 119 Others have conducted training in their communities 
which has led to voluntary compliance by some businesses. 120 
In July 1993, in order to develop a policy statement on ADR, the EEOC 
requested comments from the public about the use of alternative dispute 
resolution in "l) formal and informal adjudications, 2) rulemakings, 3) 
enforcement actions, 4) contract administration, and 5) litigation brought by 
or against the Commission."121 The comments generally reflect support 
115. See id. at 6. 
116. See id. at 5. This raises a question about the value of mediation which will be 
addressed later in this Article. 
117. Information regarding these training sessions was obtained from representatives of 
the EEOC, Department of Justice, Disability Rights Section, and the Disability Rights 
Education and Defense Fund (DREDF). See also American Bar Association Commission 
on Mental and Physical Disability Law and Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, 
Targeting Disability Needs: A Guide to the ADA Dispute Resolution Programs 9 (published 
by The American Association of Retired Persons for the National Institute for Dispute 
Resolution Dec. 1994) (hereinafter Targeting Disability Needs) (describing training); Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, Request for Comments on the Use of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and Negotiated Rulemaking Procedures, 58 Fed. Reg. 39023 (July 21, 
1993) (describing training). 
118. Information from Peggy Mastroianni, ADA Policy Director, EEOC. 
119. The Community Board Program, Proposal to Demonstrate the Application of 
Mediation to Achieve Voluntary Compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act: A 
National Model(submitted to the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division May 7, 1993) 
(hereinafter Community Board Proposal). 
120. Press Releases from the Department of Justice on the Fourth Anniversary of the 
ADA detailing voluntary compliance resulting, in part, from ADA training conducted by the 
Department of Justice and the EEOC. 
121. EEOC Request/or Comments on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1993 Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) 134 d27 (July 15, 1993). 
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for ADR, although many expressed reservations with respect to particular 
uses of ADR or concerns relating to the way in which ADR might be 
implemented. 122 While the EEOC staff considered ADR informally in 
addition to soliciting comments from the public, the long delay in 
appointing a Chair for the Commission and other commission members 
postponed specific consideration and implementation of ADR projects. 123 
In December 1994, the recently appointed Chair of the Commission, 
Gilbert Casellas, announced formation of an ADR Task Force to study and 
recommend to the Commission appropriate uses of ADR. 124 The task 
force report led to adoption of four motions relating to ADR on April 25, 
1995 }25 The first motion directed the Chair to take actions necessary to 
develop an ADR program with the following elements: 1) informed and 
voluntary participation; 2) confidential deliberations in the ADR process; 
and 3) use of neutral facilitators. 126 The Second Motion directed the 
Office of Legal Counsel to draft a proposed policy statement on ADR by 
May 30, 1995 for consideration by the Commission. 127 The policy 
122. See, e.g., Comments on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Letter from Richard T. 
Seymour to Frances M. Hart, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law (Sept. 
20, 1993) (supporting ADR, but urging that some investigation precede use of ADR); Letter 
from Jeffrey A. Norris to Frances M. Hart, Equal Opportunity Employment Advisory 
Council (Sept. 16, 1993) (supporting ADR, but criticizing the EEOC's position that internal 
ADR procedures must be continued after an employee files an EEOC charge); Women 
Employed Institute, Comments in Response to EEOC Request for Comment on Use of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Negotiated Rulemaking Procedures (Sept. 20, 1993) 
(supporting ADR, while urging training for EEOC staff in ADR and urging renewal of 
initiation of large class action lawsuits with savings resulting from ADR) (all comments on 
file with the author). 
123. Information from representatives of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, Conference Call with Nicholas Inzeo, Associate Legal Counsel for Legal 
Services, J.C. Thurmond, and Sharon Rennert (Aug. 19, 1994). See EEOC Chair to Address 
Agency Problems, 147 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 404, 405 (Nov. 28, 1994) (Commission 
expected to consider expansion of ADR); EEOC Said to Have to Expand Role of ADR, 14 7 
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 214, 215 (Oct. 17, 1994) (EEOC Commissioner Silberman supports 
expandedADR); CasellasApprovedAsChairmanofEEOC, 147 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 174, 
175 (Oct. 10, 1994) (Clinton administration took almost two years to make appointments to 
EEOC). 
124. Report and Recommendations of the Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations, reprinted in 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 6, d55 (Jan. 10, 1995) 
(hereinafter Dunlop Commission Final Report). 
125. Kevin P. McGowan, EEOC Votes to Offer Voluntary Mediation as Option in Job 
DiscriminationClaims, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 80 d3 (Apr. 26, 1995). 
126. Motions Proposed by the ADR Task Force, Commission Meeting of the Task Force 
on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Motion I (Apr. 25, 1995) (hereinafter Motions). 
127. Id., Motion I. 
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statement should reflect the "basic principles and conclusions of the ADR 
Task Force Report: that ADR furthers the EEOC's dual mission of 
vigorously enforcing federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination 
and resolving employment disputes."128 When the policy statement is 
approved, the Chair will request proposals from EEOC district offices 
desiring to participate in the ADR program and will select proposals for 
implementation, giving priority to mediation proposals. 129 The target date 
for implementation is fiscal year 1996. 130 The contemplated ADR pro-
gram applies broadly to cases within the EEOC's jurisdiction, including 
ADA cases, and includes monitoring and enforcement by the EEOC. 131 
The fourth motion directed the Legal Counsel to prepare and submit a 
proposed policy statement supporting employer efforts to develop voluntary 
internal ADR programs, reiterating the Commission's opposition to 
conditioning employment on agreement to mandatory binding arbitration of 
discrimination disputes, and confirming the Commission's determination to 
accept and process charges regardless of any employer-sponsored ADR 
program. 132 
Chairman Casellas has issued various directives pursuant to the 
Commission's action. 133 He directed consultation with "internal and 
external stakeholders" for assistance in developing and implementing the 
programs. 134 Casellas requested that District Directors contact dispute 
resolutions organizations, bar associations, colleges and universities, and 
other organizations to determine the availability and cost of qualified 
mediators, and particularly whether pro bono services are available. 135 He 
solicited both plans for training agency personnel and outside mediators, 
and development of educational materials about ADR for agency personnel, 
charging parties, respondents and the general public. 136 Casellas is also 
exploring the feasibility of hiring ADR coordinators in each district 
office. 137 Thus, the EEOC is now moving rapidly to institute an ADR 
program. 
128. Id., Motion 2. 
129. McGowan, supra note 125, Motion 3. 
130. See Motions, supra note 126, Motion 3. 
131. Id., Motion 4. 
132. See McGowan, supra note 125. 
133. Motions on Alternative Dispute Resolution Adopted by EEOC April 25, 1995, 1995 
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In addition to the ADR recommendations, the EEOC adopted other 
recommendations to improve the charge processing system in April 
1995. 138 These recommendations include adopting a more flexible 
approach to charge processing, which prioritizes charges based on the level 
of investigation necessary; developing a National Enforcement Plan that 
identifies priority issues and guides enforcement; eliminating detailed "no 
cause" letters when discrimination is not found; encouraging settlement at 
all stages of the process; and delegating litigation decisions in individual 
disparate treatment cases under Title VII and the ADEA to the General 
Counsel. 139 Like the ADR procedures, these changes are designed to 
speed case processing and reduce the existing backlog. 
B. ntles II and Ill 
1. Department of Justice 
The Department of Justice, which has only seventy-five staff members 
to handle its ADA enforcement responsibilities under Titles I, II and 
III, 140 also is overwhelmed with cases. 141 As of September 1994, 2,902 
complaints alleging violations of Title II had been filed, and for 1,326 of 
the complaints, the Department of Justice was the investigating agency. 142 
For the same time period, 2, 796 complaints alleging violations of Title III 
had been filed, and the Department of Justice opened an investigation in 
1,634 of those. 143 The Department of Justice has resolved 100 Title II 
138. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Commissioners Adopt Task 
Force Recommendations to Strengthen and Streamline Agency Charge Processing Systems, 
News Release, (Apr. 21, 1995). 
139. Id. 
140. Meeting with representatives of the Department of Justice, Public Access Section 
(Mar. 28, 1994 ). President Clinton's 1995 budget provides for twenty-one additional staff 
members. Illustrative of the scopeofJustice'sresponsibilities is that there are approximately 
30,000 government bodies covered by Title II alone. Effective March 1, 1995, the ADA 
functions of the Department of Justice were reorganized and centralized into the Disability 
Rights Section. Letter from John Wodatch, Chief, Public Access Section, Civil Rights 
Division, Department of Justice (Feb. 22, 1995); Telephone conversation with Eve Hill, 
Disability Rights Section, Department of Justice (Mar. 9, 1995). 
141. As of April 1994, about 4000 complaints had been filed with the Department of 
Justice. The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, Transcript #4899 (Apr. 4, 1994), Interview with 
John Wodatch (available on Lexis). Fifteen lawsuits had been filed and 200 investigations 
had concluded with voluntary settlements as of that time. Id. 
142. Information from the Department of Justice, Public Access Section, Meeting (Sept. 
27, 1994). 
143. Id. 
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cases infonnally, 22 cases through fonnal settlement agreements, and issued 
33 letters of findings, four of which found noncompliance. 144 As of 
September, 1994, the department had completed 300 investigations of Title 
III cases and 177 cases were resolved with increased accessibility. 145 
BNA' s Americans with Disabilities Act Cases reported 3 7 judicial decisions 
in Title II cases and 25 in Title III cases through mid-1994. 146 
While there is no specific time period for case processing under Titles 
II and Ill, individuals are not required to exhaust administrative remedies 
under these titles. 147 Thus, any delays in investigation due to the number 
of cases do not preclude a complaining party from filing suit. Nevertheless, 
when parties wait long periods of time for agency action, even where not 
required to do so, the effectiveness of the statute is reduced. Respondents 
are not relieved of the threat of litigation where cases are not meritorious, 
nor is rapid resolution of meritorious cases accomplished. Furthermore 
individuals who do not have the resources to undertake private actions are 
injured by the delay. 
With respect to ADR, the Department of Justice, like the EEOC, 
attempts to settle cases informally through negotiation. In addition, the 
Department of Justice has funded a pilot mediation project through a grant 
to the Community Board Program in San Francisco. 148 The project 
anticipates mediation of 200 Title III cases utilizing private mediators 
trained in ADA mediation in five targeted cities. 149 The Community 
Board Program will perform an analysis to detennine whether mediation is 
an appropriate tool for resolution of cases under Title IIl. 150 
144. Telephone Conversation with Eve Hill, Department of Justice, Public Accesss 
Section (Sept. 28, 1994). 
145. Id. The resolutions include formal and informal settlements, consent decrees, and 
litigation. 
146. ADA: Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Special Report, 146 Lab. Rel. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 14, at 10 (Aug. 1, 1994). 
147. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 56 at 98 (exhaustion not required under Title II); 
42 U.S.C. § 12188 (specifying enforcement and remedies under Title III)); 28 C.F.R. 
§ 36.501 (1995) (authorizing private suits under Title III). 
148. See Community Board Proposal, supra note 119, at 4, 6; Targeting Disability 
Needs, supra note 117, at 42. 
149. See Community Board Proposal, supra note 119, at 2, 3, 4; Targeting Disability 
Needs, supra note 117, at 42. Cases are referred to the mediators by the Department of 
Justice upon agreement of the parties. 
150. See Community Board Proposal, supra note 119, at 7-8. The analysis will focus 
on successful resolution of cases mediated, the maintenance of the mediated agreements, and 
qualitative assessments of both the process and outcomes based on information supplied by 
Department of Justice personnel, mediation program directors, and mediation participants. 
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Interim analysis of the project revealed some difficulties in execu-
tion.151 Referrals of cases are limited by the geographic area in which the 
project is taking place. As a result of the geographic limit and the failure 
of the parties in many of the referred cases to agree to mediation, few 
meditations have occurred. The Department's initial practice was to close 
the cases referred to mediation, indicating to the parties that the Department 
would take no further action on the case. 152 This practice, which since 
has been changed, may have contributed to the reluctance of respondents 
to agree to mediation by appearing to remove the threat of government 
action. 153 The contractor has been unable to educate potential parties about 
the benefits of mediation because of limitations in the Privacy Act on 
releasing their identities without agreement. 
The Department of Justice recently awarded an additional grant for 
an ADA education and pilot project for professional mediators. 154 The 
goal of the grant program is: 
to train a select number of professional mediators nationwide about Title III of the 
ADA, refer Title III cases to these mediators for mediation, monitor the outcome 
of mediation efforts, and evaluate and disseminate the evaluation of the project to 
mediators and other interested parties nationwide, so that the project can be 
effectively replicated in other areas of the country. 155 
The Department of Justice decided to limit mediation under the grant to Title III cases 
because it would be easier to evaluate a limited pilot. In addition, Title II cases frequently 
are more complex, and often more expensive because they involve an entire government 
entity as the defendant. Meeting with Department of Justice, Public Access Section (Sept. 
27, 1994); Telephone conversation with Eve Hill, Attorney, DepartmentofJustice, Disability 
Rights Section (March 9, 1995). 
151. Data regarding the initial results of the mediation project were received from the 
Department of Justice, Public Access Section, Meeting (Sept. 27, 1994). 
152. Meeting with Department of Justice, Public Access, Disability Rights Section (Sept. 
27, 1994). The Department did retain the ability to open the case for investigation if 
mediation failed. Letter from John L. Wodatch (Feb. 22, 1995) (on file with author). 
153. As a result of interim analysis of the program, the Department has decided to keep 
cases open pending mediation and evaluate whether to pursue an investigation after 
mediation has been completed. Letter from John L. Wodatch (Feb. 22, 1995). Some 
complainants are also reluctant to mediate, preferring to have the Department handle the case 
rather than becoming extensively involved in the process. Meeting with Department of 
Justice, Public Access Section (Sept. 27, 1994). 
154. See 59 Fed. Reg. 29160, 29165 (June 3, 1994) (request for proposal); Department 
of Justice, Justice Department Awards JO Grants to Promote the Americans with Disabilities 
Act 3 (Oct. 5, 1994) (hereinafter Press Release) (press release announcing the grant award 
to the Key Bridge Foundation). 
155. 59 Fed. Reg. at 29165. The Department of Justice has not ruled out mediation of 
Title II cases under this grant, and may refer some Title II cases to mediation. Telephone 
1996] DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER ADA 1031 
The project will train 90 professional mediators on the ADA and develop 
a procedure for referring ADA complaints to the mediators. 156 In 
addition, a consumer guide to mediation services and a mediator's guide to 
mediating ADA complaints will be produced. 157 The grantee anticipates 
mediating 650 complaints. 158 
The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has been 
reorganized since the appointment of a new Assistant Attorney General for 
Civil Rights. 159 Further plans regarding ADA enforcement and the use of 
ADR await completion of a strategic plan for the Division. 160 
2. Department of Transportation 
In addition to issuing regulations regarding transportation, 161 the 
Department of Transportation handles Title II complaints involving 
transportation. 162 Complaints regarding transit agencies are handled by 
the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), while the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) handles complaints relating to roads and 
highways. 163 The agency has limited staff to handle ADA complaints. 164 
There are only five professional employees involved in compliance 
conversation with Department of Justice attorney Eve Hill (Mar. 9, 1995). 
156. Press Release, supra note 154, at 3. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Information from representatives of the Department of Justice, Public Access 
Section, Meeting (Sept. 27, 1994); Letter from John L. Wodatch (Feb. 22, 1995). 
160. Id. On April 6, 1995, Attorney General Janet Reno signed Order OBD 1160, to 
promote broader use of ADR by the Department of Justice. Order OBD 1160. l (Apr. 6, 
1995) at l. The order sets a goal of September 11, 1995 for completing dissemination of 
ADR guidance. Id. at 2. In addition, the order requires ADR training for civil attorneys 
and the creation of the position of Senior Counsel for Alternative Dispute Resolution. Id. 
at I. Thus, like the EEOC, the Department of Justice appears to be moving toward greater 
use of ADR. 
161. In issuing the ADA regulations, see supra note 67, 78. The Department of 
Transportation did not use negotiated rulemaking, but did involve interested groups in the 
rulemaking process through an advisory commission. Federal Transit Administration, 
Telephone Interview with Susan Schruth, Acting Director Office of Civil Rights, Sept. 22, 
1994 (hereinafter Information from the FT A). 
162. 28 C.F.R. § 35.l90(b)(8) (1995). 
163. Information regarding the complaint procedures was received from the Federal 
Transit Administration and Federal Highway Administration respectively. See also 28 
C.F.R. §§ 35.170-35.178 (1995). 
164. The Federal Transit Administration and the Federal Highway Administration are the 
two agencies within the Department of Transportation with significant ADA responsibilities. 
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activities at the FTA. 165 The FHWA received no additional staff to 
handle ADA responsibilities and there are no employees working exclusive-
ly on ADA matters. 166 Since the effective date of the statute, the FTA has 
received about 380 complaints under Title Il. 167 About 290 complaints 
are still pending. 168 The FHWA has received about 180 complaints, the 
investigations of which are currently pending in the field offices. 169 
The FTA investigates complaints received and notifies the complainant 
whether it finds a violation of the statute. 170 If a violation is found, the 
FTA requires the transit agency to establish a remedial plan. If the agency 
fails to do so, the FTA can refer the case to Justice for litigation or, where 
the agency is a recipient of federal funds, seek to terminate a hearing from 
an ALJ funding under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 171 
In its compliance process, the FTA attempts to resolve disputes 
informally. 172 The FTA has established a specific informal compliance 
process for complementary paratransit service and key station accessibili-
ty.173 If the FTA has reasonable cause to believe that a transit agency is 
not in compliance with these portions of the ADA, it will attempt to 
negotiate a voluntary compliance agreement with the agency, which will 
establish a plan for compliance. 174 The FTA then monitors compliance 
with the plan until compliance with the statute is achieved, and for at least 
two years thereafter. 175 
165. Information from the FTA, supra note 161. 
166. Information from Morris, infra note 176. 
167. Information from the FTA, supra note 161. 
168. Id. (as of September 1994). 
169. Information from Morris, infra note 176 as of September 1994. This number does 
not include complaints relating to driver licensing which also come under the jurisdiction 
of the Federal Highway Administration. Id. 
170. The FT A has taken the position that an isolated incident of noncompliance with the 
regulations does not constitute discrimination. See 49 C.F.R. Part 37, App. D. This position 
has resulted in some dissatisfaction among complainants. Information from the FT A. 
171. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.125, 27.127 (1995). 
172. Information from the FT A, supra note 16 l. When the FT A performs an on-site 
review which is triggered by multiple complaints at one transit property, it will meet with 
disability groups as well as the transit officials and attempt to achieve informal resolution 
of compliance disputes. 
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The FHWA handles complaints relating to roads and highways. 176 The 
complaints are forwarded to the field offices for investigation, where 
warranted. Complaints against subrecipients177 are referred to recipients 
for investigation since recipients are required to have a complaint procedure 
by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.178 Where possible, com-
plaints will be resolved informally by agreement with the entity charged 
with a violation. 179 Where a recipient or subrecipient of federal funds is 
involved, the FHWA has the ultimate sanction of funding termination for 
noncompliance. 180 Prior to taking such action, however, the FHWA must 
attempt to resolve the complaint through negotiation. 181 Complaints 
against nonrecipients which are not resolved must be referred to the 
Department of Justice for litigation where warranted. 182 The FHWA 
anticipates that most valid complaints under the ADA will be resolved 
informally, like complaints under other civil rights statutes have been 
resolved. 183 The FHWA has provided training and information to state 
and local highway administrations and Indian tribal governments regarding 
the ADA, and anticipates additional training, including information about 
ADR.1s4 
C. Title IV 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) received only six 
complaints alleging violations of the ADA telecommunications provisions 
as of September 1, 1994.185 One complaint, which involves a petition for 
176. Telephone Interview with Edward W. Morris, Jr., Director, Office of Civil Rights, 
FHWA (Oct. 4, 1994) (hereinafter, Information from Morris). 
177. Recipients refers to entities that receive federal funding directly. Subrecipients 
receive such funding indirectly through a recipient. See 49 C.F.R. § 27.5 (1995) 





183. Information from Morris, supra note 176. 
184. Id. 
185. Except where otherwise noted, all information regarding FCC complaints was 
provided by Lynda Dubroof, Senior Staff Attorney, Federal Communications Commission, 
Common Carrier Bureau. (hereinafter Dubroof). Four involved intrastate communication 
and therefore, were forwarded to the appropriate state for resolution. Id. All were resolved 
within 180 days. Id. One complaint involved interstate communication and that was 
resolved by final order of the Commission. Id. 
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decertification186 of an entire state program, is still pending before the 
agency, while others have been resolved. 187 The FCC has not yet 
gathered data regarding complaints filed directly with the states and 
resolved by the states, but plans to do so in the future. 188 The FCC is 
open to using ADR procedures in ADA matters, but has not yet done 
so. 189 The Commission has adopted an "Initial Policy Statement and 
Order" encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution190 and has 
used negotiated rulemaking with some success in other areas. 191 A staff 
member in the agency's General Counsel's office is trained in ADR and 
provides training for other FCC personnel as needed. 192 
D. Summary of Existing Dispute Resolution 
Congress clearly contemplated judicial litigation as the primary 
enforcement mechanism under the ADA. 193 In the more than two years 
since the effective date of the statute, few cases have been litigated relative 
to the number of complaints filed, however. 194 There are several explana-
tions for this result. Under Title I exhaustion of administrative remedies 
is required and, given the EEOC's backlog, most complaints remain in the 
investigatory stage. While a complainant can request a right to sue letter 
before completion of the investigation, many complainants clearly have not 
done so, either because they do not know this possibility exists or because 
they do not have the legal representation and resources to file suit. Many 
Title II and III complainants also are apparently waiting for the investigat-
ing agency to act. 195 A further explanation for the limited number of 
litigated cases may be the crowded trial dockets of the district courts, 
delaying decisions in those cases that have been filed. In addition, the 
186. See 47 U.S.C. § 225(f)( 4) (describing procedures for revocation and suspension of 
certification). 
187. Dubroof, supra note 185. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.18 (1994). 
191. Dubroof, supra note 185. 
192. Id. 
193. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117 (Supp. V 1993) (Title I enforcement provisions), 12133 
(Supp. V 1993) (Title II enforcement provisions), 12188 (Supp. V 1993) (Title III 
enforcement provisions). 
194. See supra notes 96-98, 141-46 and accompanying text. 
195. Unlike the first three titles of the statute, Title IV has not generated a large number 
of complaints and those filed have been resolved in a timely manner. 
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enforcement agencies do not have the resources to litigate more than a 
small number of ADA cases. 196 
Congress certainly contemplated a high level of voluntary compliance 
resulting from the litigation of a small number of cases by the agencies. 197 
More time for assessment is necessary before determining whether that 
result will be achieved. Some informal resolutions are occurring as 
contemplated by the statute, but again, the number is not large in 
comparison to the number of complaints filed. 
With respect to the alternative dispute resolution methods encouraged by 
the statute, their use thus far is limited. All agencies appear to be using 
negotiations to settle cases and achieve compliance. Three pilot mediation 
projects have been undertaken, one completed, one in process, and a third 
just beginning. Further use of alternative dispute resolution may occur, but 
consideration and implementation have been delayed by changes and 
contemplated changes at the enforcement agencies. 
Evaluation of the effectiveness of dispute resolution under the statute 
must be made in light of these existing enforcement efforts. 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO EXISTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS 
In evaluating alternatives to existing dispute resolution methods, it is 
useful to identify some elements of effective dispute resolution. With the 
exception of Title IV cases, a primary problem with existing dispute 
resolution mechanisms is the large backlog of cases at the investigative 
stage. Any change in dispute resolution procedures should have, as one of 
its goals, a reduction in the investigative delays. Another goal should be 
effective enforcement of the statute. 198 In addition, a third goal is quicker 
and more efficient resolution of disputes, which includes cost effectiveness 
and preferably actual reduction in costs for the government and the parties. 
196. Under Title III, the Attorney General is directed to litigate cases involving a pattern 
and practice of discrimination or issues of general public importance. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12188(b)(l)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
197. The technical assistance provisions of the statute evidence Congress' belief in 
voluntary compliance. See 42 U.S.C. § 12206 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); S. REP. No. 116, 
supra note I, at 43. (requiring agencies to provide technical assistance and indicating an 
expectation that EEOC will provide training and other technical assistance to employers 
seeking to comply with statute). 
198. See infra notes 256-59 and accompanying text (discussing values encompassed in 
goal of effective enforcement, including justice, statutory intent, procedural fairness, and 
finality and enforceability of result). 
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While no one change may achieve all of these goals, any proposed change 
in dispute resolution under the statute should be tested against them. 199 
In enacting the ADA, Congress decided to rely on both private and 
public enforcement. While the administrative agencies are authorized and 
expected to file enforcement actions in some cases,2°0 private enforcement 
was clearly contemplated as well. By limiting appropriations for ADA 
enforcement, Congress has placed much of the enforcement burden on 
individuals with disabilities. A litigation-based approach is costly for an 
individual, particularly when the potential for monetary recovery is 
limited. 201 Where the potential recovery is not large, many private 
199. While the focus of this report is the administrative process, resolution of disputes 
in the administrative process will assist in reducingjudicial backlogs by reducing the number 
of cases filed in court. In recent years, employment discrimination cases have increased at 
a rate several times faster than the remainder of the civil caseload in the federal courts. See 
John J. Donohue, III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimina-
tion Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 985 (1991); Dunlop Commission Fact Finding 
Report, supra note 99, at 103-04, n.29, Exhibits IV-3, IV-4. These figures predate the ADA 
which added to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In 1994, the number of suits brought 
by the EEOC under the ADA increased significantly. See EEOC Attorneys Filed 373 
Lawsuits in 1994, 147 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 538, 539 (Dec. 26, 1994). Reducing the case-
load of the federal courts is the goal of the Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, which has recommended, inter alia, limiting the right of 
employment discrimination plaintiffs to file suit. See Major Changes in Federal Court 
System Are Urged, 147 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 507, 508 (Dec. 19, 1994). The ADR 
proposals infra address this problem indirectly, without limiting plaintiffs' right to a federal 
forum for redress of discrimination complaints. 
200. With respect to entities that receive federal funds and are thereby subject to section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act as well as the ADA, in addition to filing suit the government 
may enforce the statute by suspending or terminating funding or threatening to do so. See 
29 U.S.C. § 794a (adopting remedies of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I which include withdrawal of 
funding). Most state and local governments and transit agencies fall into this category. 
20 I. Under Title III, damages are not available in private actions, and punitive damages 
are not available at all. 42 U.S.C. § 12188. Compensatory and punitive damages, where 
appropriate, are available for intentional discrimination under Title I, along with back pay. 
42 U.S.C. § 12117; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2). In reasonable accommodation cases, however, 
where the employer makes a good faith effort to find an accommodation, damages are not 
available. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3). It is not clear whether compensatory damages are 
available in actions under Title II. See Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360, 1373-74 
n.29 (D. Neb. 1993) (noting confusion among circuit courts regarding availability of 
damages under section 504 but finding based on section 504 precedent in 8th Circuit that 
such damages are available in Title II action). Title II remedies are based on remedies under 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and courts have disagreed on whether damages are 
available under section 504. Id. See also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1020 n.24 
( 1984) (recognizing confusion in circuit courts about the availability of damages under 
section 504); Eastman v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 939 F.2d 204, 
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attorneys are reluctant to accept cases for litigation. 202 Accordingly, 
numerous individuals may be relying on the government agencies for 
litigation assistance which will not be forthcoming. These facts raise the 
question of whether there is a better enforcement model. In considering 
this question, any proposed modofication must consider the fact that 
enforcement for Titles II and III is patterned after, and in the Titles I and 
IV is a part of, existing enforcement models. Accordingly, modification 
may impact other statutory enforcement efforts, reduce efficiency resulting 
from common enforcement methods, or treat individuals with disabilities 
differently from other civil rights plaintiffs. 
A. Administrative Litigation 
1. The Fair Housing Act System 
One possible change in ADA dispute resolution would be the creation of 
an enforcement mechanism using internal administrative litigation, similar 
to the current system for enforcement of the Fair Housing Act (FHA).203 
As a result of 1988 amendments, spurred by perceived ineffectiveness of 
the prior enforcement system, the FHA contains a comprehensive 
enforcement mechanism which gives the parties the option of administrative 
or judicial litigation.204 Complaints filed are investigated by the Secretary 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), who is required to engage in 
conciliation efforts.205 The Secretary determines whether there is reason-
able cause to believe that a violation of the Act has occurred, issuing a 
charge of discrimination in cases of reasonable cause and dismissing the 
complaint where no reasonable cause is found. After a formal charge of 
207-9 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding section 504 does not permit award of damages). 
202. See Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary 
Guidelinesand Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 467 (1992) (private attorneys reluctant 
to take even strong cases on contingency basis because of high litigation costs unless 
potential damages are significant). 
203. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612-3614 (1994). The National Labor Relations Act provides 
a similar enforcement mechanism, but without the election option available in the Fair 
Housing Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 154, 160 (1994). 
204. See Leland Ware, New Weapons for an Old Battle: The Enforcement Provisions of 
the 1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act, 10, 11 (Administrative Conference of the 
United States 1992), reprinted in 7 ADMIN. L.J. 59 (1993). Information about the Fair 
Housing Act amendments was taken from the Ware study unless otherwise noted. 
205. See id. at 15. The amendments continue to provide a role for handling of 
complaints by state and local agencies with rights, procedures and remedies that are 
substantially equivalent to those under the Fair Housing Act. Id. 
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discrimination is issued, either party may elect to have the case adjudicated 
in federal district court by the Attorney General. If no such election is 
made, the case proceeds to hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) pursuant to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure 
Act.206 
The parties to the administrative hearing are HUD, represented by the 
Office of General Counsel, and the respondent. 207 The statute requires 
that the proceedings be expeditious and that both discovery and the hearing 
process be inexpensive.208 The proceedings are less formal than a trial in 
federal district court. Decisions of the ALJ are directly reviewable in the 
Court of Appeals using the substantial evidence standard, and are 
enforceable in the Court of Appeals as well.209 Remedies available 
include compensatory damages, injunctive and other equitable relief, and 
civil penalties.210 
The Attorney General retains the authority to bring civil actions in 
pattern and practice cases and cases which raise general issues of public 
importance, authority parallel to that in Title III ADA cases. Furthermore, 
the amendments do not affect an individual's private right of action, which 
can be filed in federal district court without exhausting administrative 
remedies.211 
Evaluations of the enforcement procedures are mixed, although the 
consensus seems to be that the procedures are an improvement over 
preexisting enforcement efforts.212 A primary concern with the FHA 
206. Id. at 17. 
207. The complaining party may intervene and be represented by counsel. 
208. Available discovery methods include interrogatories, depositions, requests for 
production of documents and requests for admissions, and sanctions are provided for failure 
to cooperate in discovery. See Ware, supra note 204. Discovery is conducted on an 
expedited basis. Id. 
209. Id. at 18. In addition, the Secretary has discretion to review the ALJ's decision, 
although the applicable regulations indicate that such review will be undertaken in 
extraordinary cases only. Id. 
210. Id. 
21 l. See Ware, supra note 204, at 19. Punitive damages and attorneys fees and costs 
are available in private actions. Id. A private action cannot be initiated if an administrative 
proceeding is pending, however. Id. 
212. See Ware, supra note 204, at 30-31 (amendments improved enforcement but HUD 
needs to encourage more use ofadministrative adjudication to increase enforcement); United 
States Commission on Civil Rights, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The 
EnforcementReport, 221-25 (1994) (hereinafter CRC EnforcementReport)(finding adminis-
trative adjudication reasonably effective but recommending some enforcement changes); 
JOHN P. REI.MAN, FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT UNDER PRESIDENT BUSH: AN 
ASSESSMENT AT MID-TERM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE in LOST 
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process is the backlog of complaints at the investigation stage.213 While 
there is a time deadline for investigation of complaints, the time deadline 
frequently is not met.214 The FHA caseload is about 6,000 per year,215 
much smaller than the EEOC's caseload in Title I cases although larger 
than that under Titles II and III. The percentage of cause findings is also 
small, only 3% in 1992, while the percentage of no cause findings is 
20%.216 
In about 60% of FHA cause cases, at least one party elects litigation in 
the federal district court.217 Desire for a jury trial, the availability of 
punitive damages in court, or the attorneys' greater familiarity with the 
0PPORTIJNITIES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD OF TIIE BUSH ADMINISTRATION MID-TERM 
105-06, 117-18 (Susan M. Liss & William L. Taylor, eds., 1991) (hereinafter RELMAN I) 
(although significant problems remain, enforcement has improved under amended proce-
dures); JOHN P. RELMAN, FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT: THE BUSH RECORD AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEW AoMINISTRA TION in NEW 0PPORTIJNITIES: CIVIL RIGHTS 
AT A CROSSROADS 92-94 (Susan M. Liss & William L. Taylor eds., 1993) (hereinafter 
RELMAN II) (amendments started more effective enforcement but HUD has not processed 
and prosecuted complaints effectively in the last two years of the Bush administration); 
Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 71 (Testimony of John P. Reiman, Washington 
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs) (HUD has had limited success in 
enforcement but the amendments, including administrative litigation are still a major 
improvement over prior efforts); Telephone Interview with Judge Alan Heifetz, Chief 
Administrative Law Judge, Department of Housing and Urban Development (July 21, 1994) 
[hereinafter Information from Judge Heifetz] (Judge Heifetz' analysis is reported infra) 
(enforcement has improved under amendments). 
213. See Ware, supra note 204, at 28-30 (detailing extensive investigatory delays); 
RELMAN I, supra note 212, at 108 (noting continuing inability to complete timely investiga-
tions resulting in large backlog); RELMAN II, supra note 212, at 88; CRC Enforcement 
Report, supra note 212, at 223 (noting large backlogs in many HUD offices). 
214. Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 71-3 (Testimony of John P. Reiman, 
Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs) RELMAN II, supra note 
212, at 88 (in 1990, HUD failed to meet its deadline in 64% of its cases); Ware, supra note 
204, at 28 (in most cases investigation deadlines are not met). 
215. Information from Judge Heifetz, supra note 212 (from 1989-1994 over 30,000 cases 
filed with HUD); RELMAN II, supra note 212, at 88 (4,457 cases in 1990). 
216. OversightHearing, supra note 99, at 76 (Testimony of John P. Reiman, Washington 
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs) A large number of cases have 
been administratively closed, leading to criticism of HUD's enforcement. See RELMAN II, 
supra note 212, at 88 (between March 1989 and July 1992 HUD administratively closed 
44% of its cases). Administrative closure occurs where the complaint is withdrawn, the 
complainant cannot be located, or HUD has no jurisdiction. Id. The EEOC has been 
similarly criticized. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 4 (Testimony of Alfred W. 
Blumrosen) (criticizing the EEOC for the large number of administrative closures). 
217. See CRC Enforcement Report, supra note 212 at 57 (through November 1993, 
parties in 309 of 514 cases elected a judicial forum). 
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district courts are possible explanations.218 Cases tried before the ALJs 
are resolved relatively quickly, however, with seven to seven and one half 
months from charge to ALJ decision.219 While punitive damages are 
available in district court and some large awards have been granted by the 
courts, damage awards of the ALJs are relatively comparable to those in 
Department of Justice actions in federal courts.220 Larger damage awards 
have been obtained in private actions than in Department of Justice actions 
in the federal courts or in ALJ decisions.221 
2. Analysis of Administrative Litigation 
Use of ALJs provides certain advantages. A corps of ALJs dedicated to 
ADA cases has the potential to develop a level of expertise in the subject 
matter that federal judges may be unable to develop because of the wide 
range of cases that are within their jurisdiction.222 A consistent interpre-
218. Information from Judge Heifetz, supra note 212. There has been no systematic 
study of the reasons for this election. See Enforcement Report, supra note 212, at 232 
(recommending such a study). This election has placed a heavy burden on limited resources 
of the Housing Section of the Justice Department, which has been forced to obtain assistance 
from local U. S. attorneys. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 80 (Testimony of John 
P. Reiman, Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs); RELMAN 
I, supra note 212, at 97 (number of election cases has increased reducing Justice's ability 
to litigate pattern and practice case). 
219. Information from Judge Heifetz, supra note 212. See Oversight Hearing, supra 
note 99, at 80 (Testimony of John P. Reiman, Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil 
Rights and Urban Affairs) (ALJ adjudication has provided speedy relief); RELMAN II, supra 
note 212, at 88 (cases have been tried and decided within the statutory time limits). 
220. OversightHearing,supranote 99, at 77 (Testimony of John P. Reiman, Washington 
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs) (although awards not comparable 
in early years of the ALJ system, the ALJ awards have risen steadily in recent years); CRC 
Enforcement Report, supra note 212, at 61-64 (noting the difficulty of making such 
comparisons because of the number of variables but concluding generally that damages in 
the two forums are comparable excluding punitive damages). Information from Judge 
Heifetz, supra note 212 (damage awards relatively comparable). 
221. See RELMAN II, supra note 212, at 88, 91 (ALJ damage awards are low compared 
to private damage awards with the exception of two cases decided by Judge Heifetz and 
although damage awards in cases tried in federal court by Justice are improving, they 
compare unfavorably to those in privately litigated cases). 
222. Information from Judge Heifetz, supra note 212. The advantage of expertise might 
be offset by the cost to establish and administer the ALJ system and concerns about 
impartiality when ALJs are hearing cases that arise from the agency in which they work. 
See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Unified Corps of Al.ls: A Proposal to Test the Idea at the Federal 
Level, 65 JUDICATURE 266, 274 (1981) (recommending a pilot program to test the idea of 
unified group of ALJs hearing various federal administrative cases) (hereinafter Lubbers, 
Unified Corps}. Under the ADA, ifthe ALJs heard cases under various titles, the concern 
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tive body of law might develop more quickly than in the diverse federal 
courts.223 In a system that provides for optional administrative litigation, 
however, two bodies of law are developing, one in the courts and one in 
the administrative body, and they may or may not be consistent. Moreover, 
the administrative determinations may have less precedential import, 224 
hindering the goal of development of the law, which is particularly 
important for a relatively new statute. 
If the experience of HUD ALJs is a guide, speedier resolution might 
result from an ALJ system.225 HUD ALJs have successfully used the 
about agency bias might be minimized, but a structure would have to be created to employ 
ALJs handling cases from various agencies. Such a system has been utilized, pursuant to 
recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the United States, by the Federal Bank 
Regulatory Agencies. See Recommendation 87-12: Adjudication Practices and Procedures 
of the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies, in Administrative Conference of the United States, 
Recommendations and Reports, Vol. I, at 70 (1987); Michael P. Malloy, Adjudication 
Practices and Procedures of the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies, in Administrative 
Conference of the United States, Recommendations and Reports, Vol. 2, 1216 (1987). For 
further discussion regarding use of common ALJs to decide cases from various agencies, see 
Lubbers, Unified Corps, supra (proposing a pilot program to test the use a use of a unified 
corps of ALJS); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Agency Adjudications: Trying to See the Forest 
and the Trees, 31 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 383 (1984) (discussing the proposal for a unified 
corps of ALJs in the context of the history and practice of administrative adjudication); 
Victor W. Palmer & Edwin S. Bernstein, Establishing Federal Administrative Law Judges 
as An Independent Corps: The Heflin Bill, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 673 (1984) (analyzing 
and supporting legislation to establish a unified corps of ALJs); Michel Levant, A Unified 
Corps of AdministrativeLaw Judges-The Transition from A Concept to an Eventual Reality, 
6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 705 (1984); Norman Zankel, A Unified Corps of Federal 
AdministrativeLaw Judges is Not Needed, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 723 (1984) (analyzing 
and opposing legislation to establish a common corps of ALJs). 
223. Information from Judge Heifetz, supra note 212. See Lubbers, Unified Corps, 
supra note 222, at 274 (noting that a unified corps of ALJs could dilute expertise); Zankel, 
supra note 222, at 736 (citing the efficiency of separate groups of ALJS who can develop 
expertise in the subject area from which their cases are drawn). ALJs working in the same 
subject area have the opportunity to consult with one another and discuss difficult issues of 
law in a collegial atmosphere, which should improve consistency and quality of 
decisionmaking. Information from Judge Heifetz, supra note 212. If the corps of ALJs is 
large, however, because of the volume of cases, consistency may not result. See Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Organizing Adjudication: Reflections on the Prospect for Artisans in the Age of 
Robots, 39 UCLA L. REV. I 055, I 059-60 ( 1992) (discussing the high level of inconsistency 
among Social Security Administration ALJ decisions). Inconsistency is also more likely to 
be a problem when the cases are largely fact-based. Id. 
224. Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil 
Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482, 562 (1987). 
225. See Ware, supra note 204, at 28 (noting HUD ALJ proceedings are expeditious). 
An ALJ system does not guarantee quicker decisions, however. The Social Security hearing 
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concept of settlement judges to assist in resolving cases when agreed to by 
the parties, a process which might be useful in ADA cases also.226 
The FHA enforcement model might be applied to ADA cases under any 
or all of the four titles. The FHA model, with its election of enforcement 
mechanisms, is more appropriate than the model of the National Labor 
Relations Act, which limits charging parties to the administrative forum and 
denies them any litigation forum if the General Counsel determines that the 
complaint has no merit.227 Since Congress clearly contemplated private 
enforcement of the ADA and the private right of action preexists any 
administrative litigation forum, any change eliminating that right seems 
politically unlikely. Moreover, since other civil rights groups are not 
limited to an administrative forum, it seems inappropriate to limit 
individuals with disabilities. Also, in cases where punitive and compensato-
ry damages are available, such as intentional discrimination cases under 
Title I, the constitutionality of restriction of litigation to the administrative 
forum is questionable.228 Additionally, the low rate of cause findings by 
the EEOC makes that agency more analogous to HUD than to the NLRB.229 
process is marked by long delays and there are concerns about delays in decisionmaking by 
NLRB ALJs as well. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 180 (Testimony of Janice 
Goodman, Vice-President, National Employment Lawyers Association) (stating that attorneys 
who appear regularly before the NLRB confirm that ALJ proceedings are neither faster nor 
necessarily more efficient than judicial proceedings). 
226. Information from Judge Heifetz, supra note 212. The use of settlement judges is 
a form of ADR in which an ALJ other than the one assigned to try a case meets with the 
parties to help them resolve the dispute. Administrative Conference of the United States, 
Recommendation 88-5: Agency Use of Settlement Judges in Recommendations and Reports 
21-28 ( 1988); Daniel Joseph & Michelle L. Gilbert, Breaking the Settlement Ice: The Use 
of Settlement Judges in Administrative Proceedings, in Administrative Conference of the 
United States, Recommendations and Reports 282, 292 (1988); Morell E. Mullins, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion: Settlement Judges and Simplified Proceedings, 5 ADMIN. L. J. 555, 560-61 (1991). 
The settlement judge may increase the prospects of settlement by previewing the case, i.e. 
pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of each party's position, based on his or her 
judicial expertise. Id.; Joseph & Gilbert, supra at 296-97. 
227. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1994) (setting forth administrative hearing procedure under 
the NLRA); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) (NLRB General Counsel has 
unreviewable discretion to decline to litigate unfair labor practice charges). But see Oversight 
Hearing, supra note 99, at 172-74 (Testimony of Lawrence Z. Lorber) (recommending an 
NLRB-type system for discrimination claims). 
228. See Ware, supra note 204, at 13-14 (discussing constitutional issues raised by 
eliminating the right to jury trial in action for damages). The concern for constitutionality 
led to the compromise of an optional administrative litigation in the FHA. Id. 
229. HUD found cause in 3% of its cases and no cause in 20% in 1992. See supra note 
185. In fiscal 1992, the EEOC found cause in 2.4% of cases, while finding no reasonable 
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At this point in time, there is little reason to consider altering the dispute 
resolution mechanism under Title IV. The number of complaints has been 
extremely low and they are handled efficiently through the existing 
complaint resolution mechanism of the FCC. While the FCC's administra-
tion of the statute has not proceeded without criticism, the primary focus 
of the criticism has not been dispute resolution.230 Provision of an 
alternative administrative enforcement mechanism for cases under Titles I, 
II and III merits further consideration, however.231 
In considering administrative litigation, one question that arises is 
whether a common corps of ALJs should be used for cases arising under 
the three titles. Use of separate groups for cases under each title would 
increase the administrative costs, 232 but permit more agency supervision 
over the ALJs.233 Given the overlap in types of cases and in certain 
cause in about 61%. See EEOC's Performance in Handling Caseload Criticized by Wit-
nesses at House Hearing, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 143 d3 (July 28, 1993). Other data 
indicate that between 1989 and 1993, in cases where the EEOC made a cause finding, 95% 
were "no cause" while only 5% were "cause." See Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 13 
n.6 (Testimony of Alfred W. Blumrosen, Thomas A. Cowan Professor of Law, Rutgers 
University). These figures include all cases, and since the ADA became effective in July 
1992, the number of ADA cases included in the total is presumably small. In 1990, the 
NLRB found cause in approximately 43.9% of cases filed against employers and 25.4% of 
cases filed against unions. Dunlop Commission Fact Finding Report, supra note 99, at pp. 
81, 83. While the low rate of cause findings may indicate that many nonmeritorious charges 
are filed with the EEOC, critics of the agency point to the number of "no cause" cases 
successfully litigated by the charging parties through private counsel. Oversight Hearing, 
supra note 99, at 13 n.6 (Testimony of Alfred W. Blumrosen, Thomas A Cowan Professor 
of Law, Rutgers University). 
230. See Karen Peltz Strauss, THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION: CIVIL RIGHTS 
OF PERSONS WHO ARE DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING in NEW OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 
212, note at 146-48 (criticizing the FCC's administration of Title IV in several respects). 
231. In cases where both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act apply, a hearing before 
an ALJ is required in any event prior to termination of federal funding under the 
Rehabilitation Act. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.125, 27.127 (1994) (requiring hearing before 
terminating federal funding and detailing the hearing procedures). 
232. Use of a combined group of ALJs would save on administrative costs. See Palmer 
& Bernstein, supra note 222, at 686, 702 (consolidation of administration would reduce 
administrative costs by eliminating duplication). 
233. Whether agency supervision is an advantage or a disadvantage is a matter for 
debate. See Malcolm C. Rich, The Central Panel System and the Decisionmaking 
Independence of AdministrativeLaw Judges: Lessons for a Proposed Federal Program, 6 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 643, 646-49 ( 1984) (agency supervision may improve administrative 
effectiveness in implementing policies, but also may reduce public confidence in the 
administrative system because of pro-agency bias or appearance of such bias); Palmer & 
Bernstein, supra note 222, at 693-703 (agency supervision may result in pressure on ALJs 
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issues, a common group of ALJs is a sensible approach. 234 Title II cases 
will frequently involve common issues with Title I and Title III cases, such 
as employment discrimination or access to buildings and programs.235 
Moreover, knowledge about various disabilities and their effects, and 
accommodations that can be made to enable individuals with such 
disabilities to participate fully in society transcends all the titles. Develop-
ment of expertise in these areas is one advantage of an ALJ system. 
Establishment of an ALJ system would add significant administration 
costs to the enforcement process.236 ALJs would have to be hired and an 
administrative structure would be required to support the system.237 Costs 
would also increase if more cases were litigated as a result of the 
administrative litigation option.238 These additional costs might be offset 
in part by a reduction in costs for judicial enforcement.239 Costs to the 
parties might be less in an administrative litigation process as a result of the 
reduced formality of the process.240 This would benefit the parties, but 
to decide cases in favor of the agency, but a common corps of ALJs may reduce efficiency 
as agencies lose control over their docket); Zankel, supra note 222, at 733-35, 742 (judicial 
independence problems are limited and can be addressed by means other than a consolidated 
corps). 
234. The ALJ pool used by the federal bank regulatory agencies could serve as a model. 
See Recommendation 87-12, supra note 222, at 71, 73 (recommending use ofa pool of ALJs 
to handle all bank regulatory agencies formal adjudications). 
235. To the extent that there is a group of cases that is relatively unique, it is 
transportation cases under Titles II and III. 
236. Because the number of ADA cases potentially subject to administrative litigation 
greatly exceeds those under the FHA, a larger corps of ALJs would be necessary. As of 
1984, the cost to maintain an administrative law judge was $125,000 per year for salary and 
support. Levant, supra note 222, at 712. The cost is certainly significantly larger ten years 
later. See ihfra note 237 for current salary figures. 
237. The annual salary for administrative law judges ranges from 65% to 100% of the 
pay for level IV of the Executive Schedule, which is $115,000. 5 U.S.C. §§ 5332, 5372 
( 1994 ). Overhead costs such as office space and hearing rooms would be necessary, as well 
as travel costs for the judges from their home base to the hearing locations. The primary 
costs of an ALJ system are the "payroll, physical facilities and travel." Palmer & Bernstein, 
supra note 222, at 702. 
238. Litigation of additional cases is not necessarily a negative, however, as it may 
improve enforcement of the statute. 
239. The agency's cost of litigation would increase in an administrative system because 
the agency must pay for the system or, in the case of common ALJs, a part of the system. 
While the ADA increased the workload of the federal courts, no additional federal judges 
were added solely as a result of the ADA. 
240. See Silver, supra note 224, at 562. As Silver notes, however, costs of litigation are 
still substantial. Id. 
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would reduce agency costs only slightly, certainly not enough to offset the 
costs of establishing the system. 
The HUD model requires administrative litigation by the HUD General 
Counsel or judicial litigation by the Department of Justice when there is 
reasonable cause to believe a violation has occurred. Neither the EEOC nor 
the Department of Justice is required to litigate a case whenever reasonable 
cause is found; the agencies can leave the case to private litigation. If the 
HUD model were followed, additional agency resources would have to be 
committed to litigation in all cause cases. Such a change would benefit 
individuals with strong cases that have low dollar value, for those 
individuals might be unable to find private counsel. Additionally, agency 
litigation may lead to enforcement in cases where the individual would not 
pursue the case with private counsel, improving enforcement.241 
Litigation of all reasonable cause cases would use agency resources for 
individual cases that might be better spent on impact litigation involving 
pattern and practice cases, however. 242 The value of a system with 
several litigation options is the provision of alternatives to parties with 
different preferences regarding dispute resolution. The wider the range of 
alternatives available, the more likely that parties will be satisfied. 
Nevertheless, these alternatives come at a cost, both to the parties and to 
the government, in a time of shrinking resources and increased pressure to 
reduce government spending. 
The significant resource infusion necessary to create an ALJ system 
might be better used in other ways, such as reducing the backlog of cases 
awaiting investigation, 243 increasing the judicial litigation of impact cases, 
and/or funding an alternative dispute resolution system. Another possible 
use of such resources would be tax credits to encourage voluntary 
compliance. 
One additional difficulty with altering the ADA's enforcement procedure 
is that the ADA adopts the enforcement procedures of other statutes. This 
241. If individuals were required to litigate in the administrative forum without agency 
assistance, the addition of the administrative forum would not increase enforcement activity 
but might reduce litigation costs slightly and resolve cases more quickly. 
242. For a criticism of agency use of resources for individual cases to the detriment of 
systemic cases, see Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 5 (Testimony of Alfred W. 
Blumrosen, Thomas A. Cowan Professor of Law, Rutgers University). Litigation of 
systemic cases may benefit more people with fewer resources. Id. For legal and financial 
reasons, the private bar may be less likely to litigate systemic cases, at least without agency 
support. Id. 
243. Addition of an administrative litigation option would have no impact on the 
substantial backlog of cases at the investigation stage. 
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is particularly problematic with respect to Title I. Creation of an ALJ 
option for Title I cases would require separation of those cases from 
employment discrimination cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.244 Such separation 
is not impossible, but it conflicts with the view, strongly held by many, that 
parity in civil rights claims involving different groups is desirable. 
Moreover, using the existing system for enforcement achieves some 
efficiency by using personnel previously trained in employment discrimina-
tion cases.24s 
Testing the adoption of an administrative litigation option against the 
goals of any change in dispute resolution procedure recited earlier leads to 
the conclusion that the benefits may not justify the allocation of resources 
necessary for the system. The change would not impact the investigation 
backlog. It would impact effective enforcement of the statute only if more 
valid cases are litigated due to the change, thus reducing discrimination. 
The change should provide an option for resolution which is quicker and 
perhaps less expensive for the parties. The cost to the government would 
be significant, however. As will be demonstrated in the remainder of the 
244. See 42 U.S.C. § I 2117 (adopting the procedures of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
for Title I of the ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1994) (ADEA enforcement procedures). 
245. There is currently widespread concern over the enforcement problems in 
em.ployment discrimination cases as a whole, and congressional oversight hearings are 
ongoing. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 99. Some critics of the existing enforcement 
scheme have recommended an ALJ system for employment discrimination cases. See 
Oversight Hearings, supra note 99, at 22-6 (Testimony of Alfred W. Blumrosen, Thomas 
A. Cowan Professor of Law, Rutgers University) (recommending an ALJ system for 
employment discrimination cases). For a view opposed to an ALJ system for the EEOC, 
see Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 179-184 (Testimony of Janice Goodman, Vice-
President, National Employment Lawyers Association). The Dunlop Commission also is 
considering related issues, particularly whether there should be a specialized tribunal for 
workplace disputes and whether more integrated agency administration is appropriate. 
Dunlop Commission Fact Finding Report, supra note 99, at 113-14. Consideration of such 
changes is beyond the scope of this study, but given the current structure of the ADA, any 
enforcement change under Title VII will directly affect Title I enforcement. Accordingly, 
the issues addressed here are directly impacted by consideration of changes in employment 
discrimination enforcement as a whole. 
When Title VII was enacted, an enforcement model based on the NLRB system was 
initially contemplated but Congress rejected the model for enforcement through the federal 
courts. Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 42 (Testimony of David L. Rose). Efforts to 
amend the statute to provide for EEOC internal enforcement authority were rejected in 1972. 
Id. at 43. Among the reasons for rejection were concerns on the part of employers that the 
agency would exhibit pro-plaintiff bias. See H.R. REP. 88-914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., at 293 
(1964). 
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report, a more effective use of these resources would be increased 
government litigation, combined with mediation which will be more 
effective with a realistic threat of litigation. 
B. Early Intervention Programs 
Another possible change in the dispute resolution mechanisms under the 
ADA is implementation of an early intervention program similar to the 
system used by the EEOC during the Carter administration.246 Analysis 
of that program and several other early intervention programs will assist in 
determining whether such a system would be useful for ADA cases. 
1. The Rapid Charge Processing System 
In the late 1970s, the EEOC implemented the rapid charge process 
(RCP), which required Commission staff to conduct a limited preliminary 
investigation of charges filed and then schedule a fact finding conference 
with both parties. 247 The EEOC representative served as a modera-
tor/advisor, with the goal of encouraging settlement. The settlement, if 
reached, was embodied in an agreement signed by the parties and the 
EEOC. If no settlement was reached, the evidence from the investigation 
and the conference was used to make a determination of cause. If the 
evidence was insufficient for such a determination, the case was returned 
to the investigation process. A General Accounting Office report found 
that the system improved charge processing, and was effective.248 The 
report also criticized the EEOC both for obtaining settlements in cases 
without a reasonable basis to believe the charge was meritorious and for 
accepting settlements with little substance. 249 
246. This system, as constructed at the EEOC in the late 1970s, incorporates alternative 
dispute resolution. This article consdiers early intervention programs as those which assess 
charges at the time of filing or shortly thereafter, taking the action deemed appropriate based 
on that assessment. An early intervention program may or may not incorporate ADR. 
247. The system is described in EEOC Request for Comments, supra note 117, at 39023. 
In addition to using the system itself, the EEOC encouraged state and local agencies which 
had work-sharing agreements with the EEOC to use similar procedures, and many did so. 
Project on Equal Education Rights, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund & SRI 
International, The Settlement Solution: Assessing Mediation as A Tool in the Enforcement 
of Civil Rights 7-8 (1980) [hereinafter PEER Study). 
248. Id. 
249. Silver, supra note 224, at 543, citing Comptroller General, Further Improvements 
Needed in EEOC Enforcement Activities 11-19 (1981) (assessing the rapid charge process). 
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2. Washington Field Office Program 
The rapid charge processing system was abandoned with the change in 
administrations, but recently a pilot program in the EEOC's Washington 
Office has revived some of the features of the system.250 The system, 
entitled "Washington Field Office Charge Assessment, Planning and 
Resolution System," operates through initial assessment of the merits of a 
charge at the intake step of the procedure.251 Cases with no evidence of 
discrimination are investigated only through a letter to the Respondent 
requesting its position and supporting documentation. If the evidence of 
the Respondent accords with the charging party's evidence, the case is 
closed with a no cause determination after an interview with the charging 
party. 
In cases that appear stronger on intake, the agency makes early 
settlement efforts. Very strong cases are discussed bi-monthly with the 
legal department in order to develop the evidence necessary for a cause 
determination. Settlement efforts are made in those cases as well. 
Evaluation of the system established that upon implementation of the 
system, average processing time for cases decreased and cause findings 
increased. The settlement rate varied, decreasing in 1994.252 Evidence 
regarding the impact on protected groups was mixed. With respect to ADA 
cases, more were rated meritorious than their percentage in the system 
would suggest, but nationally, "merit resolutions"253 of ADA cases 
handled by the EEOC exceed merit resolutions of all cases. 
Director Reilly's assessment of the program is positive, but she 
recommends more structure in the settlement program. She also suggests 
that, absent settlement, cases assessed as low merit should be dismissed 
quickly with a right to sue letter indicating "insufficient evidence" or 
"cessation of administrative process" rather than no cause. Such a system 
would allow the agency to concentrate investigative resources on cases 
250. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 84-5 (Testimony of Susan Buckingham 
Reilly, Washington Field Office Director, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) 
(describing program). 
251. Id. The charge is coded at that time and the code, which reflects the assessment 
of the merits, indicates the method of additional processing. Id. 
252. Processing time also increased in 1994, but not to the level that preceded 
implementation of the system. Oversight Hearing, supra note 99. The assessment of the 
Field Office Director is that processing time increased because of staff turnover and 
concentration on some of the oldest cases. Id. 
253. Merit resolutions include settlements, determinations of cause, and withdrawals of 
cases where the charging party receives benefits. Id. 
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more likely to be meritorious, while not precluding plaintiffs in other cases 
from filing suit. 
3. Office of Civil Rights Program 
The Office of Civil Rights for the Department of Education, which is 
responsible for enforcing Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,254 also 
has utilized an early intervention program. The Office of Civil Rights 
complaint processing system includes a voluntary procedure known as early 
complaint resolution (ECR) which enables the recipient offederal funds and 
the complainant to attempt to resolve their dispute.255 An agency investi-
gator serves as a mediator in the process, which occurs prior to investiga-
tion and regardless of whether there is a civil rights violation. Unlike the 
EEOC's Rapid Charge Processing system, the Office of Civil Rights 
process is separate from the investigation. If ECR is unsuccessful, the case 
is assigned to a different investigator and nothing in the process becomes 
part of the investigation. Additionally, any settlement agreement reached 
requires the complainant to withdraw the complaint. The Office of Civil 
Rights is not a party to any agreement and does not endorse it. 
4. Analysis of Early Intervention Programs 
These early intervention programs promise, and in some cases deliver, 
a reduction in the backlog of cases.256 Cases are disposed of more 
quickly, which is of value to all parties. Nevertheless, efficiency is not the 
only goal of dispute resolution. Other values include justice and statutory 
intent, procedural fairness, and finality and enforceability of the result.257 
Early intervention methods which promote settlement through mediation-
like processes have been criticized both because they do not serve the 
254. Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color and national origin by 
recipients of federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). The Department of Education's 
responsibilities are limited to discrimination in education. Silver, supra note 224, at 487. 
The discussion of the procedure for the Office of Civil Rights is taken from Silver's article. 
255. Id. at 502. 
256. Settlement rates at OCR, EEOC and the state agencies studied ranged from 64% 
to 19.5% with most at the higher end of the range. PEER Study, supra note 247, at 47-49. 
257. Silver, supra note 224, at 519. Professor Silver has evaluated EEOC's RCP system 
and OCR's ECR procedure in light of these values. Id. at 519. In assessingjustice, she 
includes norm articulation and substantive fairness along with statutory intent. See id. at 
521-26 (analyzing whether the processes serve goal of justice). These goals enumerated by 
Silver combine to make up what this report has referred to as effective enforcement of the 
statute. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
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purpose of articulating nonns and developing coherent policy and because 
they focus on ad hoc individual justice, perhaps at the expense of systemic 
issues.258 Use of such methods will bring about change for more com-
plainants through settlement of individual cases, but without knowing the 
merits of the cases, it is difficult to know whether the results effect 
justice.259 If the use of early intervention settlements diverts agency 
attention from systemic problems, then overall results in tenns of achieving 
enforcement objectives may be negative.260 A third criticism is that such 
programs may cause respondents who have not discriminated to offer 
concessions to complainants to resolve the dispute.261 Because the ADA 
is a relatively new statute, development of norms of statutory interpretation 
is particularly important. Early intervention may diminish the opportunities 
for development of the law by effectuating settlements. If the settlements 
fairly resolve the issues between the parties, however, it is difficult to argue 
that they should be forced to litigate for purposes of developing the law. 
Where the early intervention and settlement occurs without investigation, 
as in the Office of Civil Rights procedure, assessment of whether the 
settlement is appropriate in light of the goal of eliminating discrimination 
is problematic.262 Furthennore, the agency's lack of involvement in 
approving or participating in the settlement leaves the weaker party in 
settlement negotiations, most often the charging party, more vulnerable to 
sacrificing legitimate positions for little compensation.263 EEOC's 
procedure, which is a part of the investigation process, is better in this 
regard. 
258. Silver, supra note 224, at 540. Because these programs incorporate mediative 
processes, the same criticisms are made of mediation. See further discussion of these issues 
and evaluation of the mediation alternative infra. 
259. Silver, supra note 224, at 540. 
260. Id. The PEER Study found that "preparing a case for mediation tends to discard 
either the opportunity to identify class or systemic issues or the opportunity to pursue them 
when known." PEER Study, supra note 24 7, at 128. Where mediation was used, the intake 
interviewer commonly convinced the complainant to eliminate class allegations and focus 
on individual complaints to facilitate mediation. Id. at 127. In addition, it is difficult to 
mediate class cases because the agencies do not have the means to identify and notify class 
members. Id. As a result, respondents have little incentive to agree to a class settlement 
since the class members will not be bound. Id. Furthermore, there is little incentive for the 
agency to raise class issues that might jeopardize settlement. Id. at 128. 
261. Silver, supra note 224, at 542-43. 
262. Id. at 544. 
263. Id. at 556 (discussing the impact of the inequality of bargaining power on the 
complainant). 
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Procedural fairness is related to the issue of substantive fairness. 
Procedural fairness requires the parties to have information about the 
process.264 An additional concern, however, is the possible imbalance of 
power in settlement negotiations.265 This may in part be mitigated by 
providing as much information as possible regarding rights and remedies 
to the parties, but may be exacerbated by either the presence of counsel for 
one party and not the other,266 or by an agency representative who gets 
credit for settlement.267 
An additional question about the viability of the early intervention 
procedures is whether they will result in enforceable agreements. A 
settlement agreement fashioned by the parties may be more likely to 
generate compliance than a judicial decision imposed on the parties.268 
While a written settlement agreement would provide a basis for a common 
law contract enforcement action, this may not be a satisfactory enforcement 
option for a charging party, the party most likely to be asserting noncompli-
ance. 269 Agency enforcement is preferable, but courts disagreed as to 
whether the EEOC could enforce agreements reached through Rapid Charge 
Processing.270 Instead of attempting to enforce settlement agreements, the 
Office of Civil Rights requires filing of a new complaint, with the time 
limit for filing calculated from the breach rather than the date of the 
underlying discrimination.271 Accordingly, Silver concluded that the early 
complaint procedures suffered from the lack of conclusive enforceability. 
In addition to the benefits noted above, the early complaint resolution 
procedures provided certain other advantages over litigation. Whereas 
litigation is a winner take all proposition, the early resolution procedures 
264. Id. 
265. See id. (discussing the impact of inequality in bargaining power). 
266. See id. (noting that both providing information and the presence or absence of 
counsel may impact bargaining power). Most likely, the complainant will be without 
counsel. Id. at 557. 
267. If the agency representative is internally rewarded for settlements, the incentive may 
be to press for settlement regardless of the merits of the case and the fairness of the 
settlement for the parties. See Silver, supra note 224, at 556 (discussing the impact of 
mediator credit for settlement on the process). 
268. Silver, supra note 224, at 575. 
269. Id. at 575. As Silver notes, the common law action will require significant 
investment ofresources, legal assistance, and time, the absence of which prompted charging 
party reliance on the agency initially. Id. 
270. See id. at 576-78 and cases cited therein (discussing cases deciding whether EEOC 
could enforce settlements reached through Rapid Charge Processing). 
271. Id. at 579-80. 
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provided an opportunity for each of the parties to achieve some benefit.272 
In addition, the complaint resolution procedures gave the parties substantial 
control over the process and the outcome.273 Furthermore, the mediative 
process may be more conducive to preserving relationships than litigation 
and the nonconfrontational nature of the process may facilitate settlement 
at an early stage in the dispute.274 In sum, these early intervention 
programs provide both advantages and disadvantages which must be 
balanced in determining whether their use advances the statutory goals. 
Because the programs incorporate forms of alternative dispute resolution, 
they will be considered further in the next section. 
Like the EEOC's Rapid Charge Process and the Office of Civil Rights 
Early Complaint Resolution Program, the early assessment program 
undertaken by the Washington Field Office offers some promise of 
reducing the backlog and speeding case processing. The Department of 
Justice already operates in similar fashion under Title III as it declines to 
investigate certain cases. All Title II cases are investigated by the 
appropriate agency, however. The drawback of such a system, which 
assesses and tracks cases very early in the investigation process, is its 
potential to ignore valid discrimination claims where the plaintiff is less 
articulate or less able to identify the evidence of discrimination for the 
investigator or intake officer.275 Also where a statute is relatively new, 
with little time for judicial development of the law, it is important not to 
screen out at an early stage cases that would develop the law or test 
innovative theories of legal interpretation. Accordingly, where an early 
assessment system is adopted, training of the investigators and intake 
272. Silver, supra note 224 at 584-85. 
273. Id. at 585-86. 
274. Id. at 587-88. 
275. In some cases, the complainant simply may not have access to the evidence 
necessary to establish the violation, such as evidence of differential treatment. Applicants 
for jobs are in particularly difficult positions to obtain such data. The Washington Field 
Office program appropriately declines to code code such cases as "no evidence" cases. 
Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 84 (Testimony of Susan Buckingham Reilly, 
Washington Field Office Director, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). 
A second problem is the potential for undue influence on agency personnel in 
prioritizing cases. Concern has been voiced in recent years over close relationships between 
personnel of regulatory agencies and the entities being regulated. See Edna Earle Vass 
Johnson, Agency "Capture": The "Revolving Door" BetweenRegulatedlndustriesand Their 
Regulating Agencies, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 95 (1983) (discussing these concerns). Without 
suggesting any Jack of integrity on the part of government officials, at any point in 
governmental processes where discretion must be exercised, the possibility of pressure from 
the regulated entity exists. Id. at 96, 98, 119. 
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officers to ask appropriate questions and develop evidence in support of 
alternative legal theories is essential.276 Given such training, however, the 
system offers an appropriate way to prioritize cases to allocate limited 
resources most effectively. In addition to early intervention programs, 
other uses of alternative dispute resolution should be analyzed for their 
dispute resolution potential. 
C. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
1. The Role of ADR in ADA Cases 
Given the statutory encouragement of ADR,211 it is appropriate to 
consider whether the agencies are currently using ADR effectively and 
whether additional use of ADR might contribute to enforcement efforts. 
Despite the statute's support of ADR, one might question whether ADR has 
a role to play in ADA disputes, particularly given the nature of the public 
rights involved.278 In addition to the dispute resolution function, courts 
also play a role in establishing norms-a process of giving "meaning to our 
public values."279 Critics of ADR argue that it limits this function of the 
courts.280 While this is a persuasive reason to maintain litigation as a 
276. The questions asked at the investigatory and intake stages need to be developed with 
the advice of agency lawyers. 
277. 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. V 1993). 
278. Some commentators have argued that ADR is inappropriate in cases involving 
significant public rights. See HENRY J. BROWN & ARlHUR L. MARRIOTI, ADR PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE 396 ( 1993) (arguing that cases involving fundamental human and civil rights 
should be litigated); Irving R. Kaufman, Reform/or A System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. l, 30 (1990) (noting that the risk 
of undermining public values by evading litigation is greater in cases serving remedial and 
social functions such as civil rights cases). See also Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, 
Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration 
from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993) (arguing that the 
public justice values underlying discrimination statutes are best preserved by de novo review 
of arbitral determinations of law in discrimination cases). 
279. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. l, 30 (1979). 
See also Daniel Misteravich, The limits of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Preserving the 
Judicial Function, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 37, 39-40 (1992) (arguing that courts 
perform not only function of dispute resolution but also function of creating rules which 
assert public values). 
280. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (stating 
purpose of adjudication is to give force to public values and purpose is not served by 
settlement); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 668, 671-72 (1986) (suggesting that in creating ADR systems we must 
preserve role of courts in establishing law particularly in cases involving significant public 
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primary enforcement strategy, it does not justify preclusion of ADR in 
ADA cases. A large number of ADA cases are backlogged at the 
investigation stage with potential to be backlogged at the litigation stage in 
the future. ADR offers some promise of quicker, inexpensive disposition 
of cases with greater satisfaction on the part of litigants. As persuasively 
noted by the Pound Conference Report: 
[t]he ultimate goal is to make it possible for our system to provide justice for all. 
Constitutional guarantees of human rights ring hollow if there is no forum 
available in fact for their vindication. Statutory rights become empty promises if 
adjudication is too long delayed to make them meaningful or the value of a claim 
is consumed by the expense of asserting it. 281 
Agency efforts at alternative dispute resolution thus far have concentrated 
on settlement negotiation and mediation. Both offer potential for effective 
resolution of ADA disputes.282 Given the large number of complaints, 
settlement - accomplished with or without mediation - is essential for 
effective enforcement of the statute.283 Nevertheless, as noted, caution 
must be used in adopting ADR techniques because of the need for judicial 
development of the law. In selecting cases for litigation and settlement, 
agencies must balance the interests of establishing the law and achieving 
benefits for victims of discrimination. This can be done through develop-
ment of enforcement policies by the agencies and ensuring that decisions 
rights and duties); Kaufman, supra note 278, at 30 (recognizing argument that settlements 
do not enforce public norms like trials). As suggested by Kaufman, resolutions through 
ADR have no greater impact on this function than settlements reached through other 
mechanisms. Id. at 29-30. 
281. National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administra-
tion of Justice, The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future 300 ( 1979), 
quoted in Kaufman, supra note 278, at 38. The mediation proposal herein will not unduly 
interfere with the law development function. See infra notes 319-21 and accompanying text 
(further discussing the impact of the mediation proposal on law development). 
282. Sander and Goldberg suggest a rule of presumptive mediation-i.e. that mediation 
should be the first ADR method of choice to promote settlement since it offers such 
potential for resolving disputes. Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the 
Forum to the Fuss: A User Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, IO NEG. J. 49, 
59 (1994). According to Sander and Goldberg, mediation has the greatest potential for 
overcoming obstacles to settlement except for differing views of facts and law and a 
plaintiffs belief that he or she may obtain a jackpot recovery. Id. They further suggest that 
a skilled mediator often can achieve settlement without resolving disputes over factual and 
legal questions. Id. 
283. "Settlements are the lifeblood of equal opportunity law." Oversight Hearing, supra 
note 99, at 12 (Testimony of Alfred W. Blumrosen, Thomas A Cowan Professor of Law, 
Rutgers University). 
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regarding settlement and litigation are made in accordance with established 
priorities.284 These concerns must be salient in establishing mediation 
policies. 
The pilot mediation projects and the Department of Justice grant for 
mediator training are steps in the right direction. Mediation is appropriate 
for ADA cases for a number of reasons.285 Mediation offers the promise 
of settlement with assistance of a neutral party trained to help the parties 
resolve their disputes. The advantages of mediation are many. It is a low 
cost alternative to litigation, with potential for resolving the dispute more 
quickly. 286 Thus, it has the potential to reduce agency backlogs of 
complaints if it is utilized during or prior to the investigative process.287 
Mediation has the ability to focus on the underlying interests of the parties 
and to accommodate those interests in a resolution agreeable to the 
284. Such policies and the decisions pursuant thereto should use available agency 
expertise. For example, currently when ADA cases in which cause has been found by the 
regional office are presented to the EEOC Commissioners for decisions regarding litigation, 
the Office of Legal Counsel, which contains significant ADA expertise, has no input into 
the recommendation. Conversation with EEOC Commissioner Rosalie Gaul! Silberman. 
See Kaufman, supra note 278, at 31 (suggesting that courts using ADR establish rules to 
exempt cases from arbitration that involve complex or novel legal issues to insure that the 
judicial role of law development be preserved); Misteravich, supra note 279, at 41-44 
(arguing that "hard cases,"those with no legal solution from precedent, statute or other legal 
standard, be reserved for the courts, citing JOHN BELL, POLICY ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL 
DECISIONS 25 (1983)). 
285. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act provides the necessary authority for use 
of voluntary mediation. 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1994) (authorizing government agencies to use 
ADR). In addition, companion bills have been introduced in Congress to encourage media-
tion of ADA Title I cases along with other discrimination cases, see 1993 H.R. 2016, I 03d 
Cong. I st Sess.; 1994 S. 2327, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. These bills contemplate mediation after 
reasonable cause has been found by the EEOC and after issuance of a right to sue letter to 
the charging party. Id. 
286. Speedy resolution benefits both the parties and the agency. Mediation can reduce 
staff time required for each case. See PEER Study, supra note 24 7, at 105-06. 
287. Empirical evidence regarding the efficiency of mediation is mixed. See Kenneth 
Kresse! & Dean G. Pruitt, Conclusion: A Research Perspective on the Mediation of Social 
Conflict, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY 
INTERVENTION, at 398-99 ( 1989). Kresse I and Pruitt note that there is "little evidence that 
mediation has had any appreciable effect in reducing court backlogs." Id. at 398. The 
PEER Study found that the EEOC substantially decreased its backlog during the time period 
in which RCP was used, but noted that a number of other reforms contributed to the 
reduction. See PEER Study, supra note 247, at I 00-04. The PEER Study concluded that 
mediation was not a major factor in reduction of the backlog, but did contribute to expedited 
processing of new charges. Id. at I 02. 
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parties.288 Compliance with a negotiated resolution of the dispute is more 
likely because the solution was designed and agreed to by the parties.289 
Mediation may be effective in preserving relationships between the 
parties that might be destroyed or at least severely damaged by the 
adversary process.290 Mediation increases the control of the parties over 
the dispute resolution process, which many students of mediation believe 
288. See Stephen B. Goldberg, Meditations of A Mediator, 2 NEG. J. 345, 348 (1986) 
(mediation can focus on underlying interests rather than legal issues and find ways to satisfy 
those interests); Craig McEwen, Note on Mediation Research, in STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, 
FRANKE.A. SANDER, & NANCY H. ROGERS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 155, 156 (2d ed. 1992) 
(noting that mediation can produce outcomes reflecting the parties' needs). 
289. See Kresse) & Pruitt, supra note 287, at 396-97; Janice F. Roehl & Royer F. Cook, 
Mediation in Interpersonal Disputes, in MEDIATION RESEARCH, supra note 287, at 34-35 
(empirical data show high rates of compliance with mediated agreements in many types of 
cases); JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION 36 (1984) (because parties in 
mediation create their agreement, parties are invested in its success and therefore are more 
likely to comply); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation-A Preferred Method of Dispute 
Resolution, 16 PEPP. L. REv. SS, S12 (1989) (indicating that mediated agreements are more 
durable because created by parties); Craig McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims 
Mediation in Maine: An EmpiricalAssessment,33 ME. L. REV. 237, 261 (1981) (showing 
by empirical study of small claims cases that compliance with mediated settlements is higher 
than compliance with adjudicated decisions). 
290. See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 289, at 10-11 (mediation reduces hostility and 
therefore likelihood that battle will continue beyond mediation process, while litigation 
focuses hostilities and hardens positions); Feinberg, supra note 289, at S 11. Mediation may 
also promote "cooperative problem-solving behavior that would make future disputes easier 
to resolve." Stephen B. Goldberg & Jeanne M. Brett, Disputants' Perspectives on the 
Differences Between Mediation and Arbitration, 6 NEG. J. 249, 253 (1990). See Feinberg, 
supra note 289, at SJ 1 (noting that mediation encourages cooperative behavior for the 
future). These attributes will be important in certain types of ADA disputes where an 
ongoing relationship is involved. Examples would include employment cases where 
employment will continue after resolution of the dispute, public accommodation cases 
involving regular customers, e.g., a doctor/patient relationship, and public entity cases 
involving regular consumers of government services. An example of the latter would be a 
dispute between a transportation agency and a group of commuters with disabilities. Where 
disability rights advocates are involved in a dispute, use of mediation may improve the 
ability of the defendant and the disability community to resolve later disputes. 
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increases self-esteem and competence.291 In addition, most studies of 
mediation reflect high satisfaction levels on the part of participants. 292 
Despite these advantages, mediation of ADA disputes raises concerns as 
well. As noted above, resolution of disputes through mediation may result 
in diminished ability to identify and resolve systemic discrimination 
problems.293 The primary function of agencies utilizing ADR may change 
from law enforcement to conflict resolution.294 Additionally, less power-
ful parties may be disadvantaged by the less formal procedures. 295 If 
291. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 289, at 11. Many advocates of mediation see the 
primary benefit of the process as self-determination. Id. at 35; Robert A. Baruch Bush, 
Efficiency and Protection or Empowerment and Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and 
Ethical Standards inMediation,41 FLA. L. REV. 253, 266-73 (1989) (arguing that mediation 
is unique in encouraging empowerment and self-determination). 
292. See Kaufman, supra note 278, at 22-23 (citing statistical data confirming participant 
satisfaction with ADR); Kresse) & Pruitt, supra note 287, at 395-96 (party satisfaction rates 
in mediation are usually 75% or greater even for those who do not reach agreement); 
Goldberg & Brett, supra note 290, at 250-52 (finding higher participant satisfaction rates 
with mediation than arbitration); McEwen & Maiman, supra note 289, at 254-60 (finding 
higher participant satisfaction rates with mediation than with litigation). Among factors 
influencing participant satisfaction are the level of control and privacy, see Kresse I & Pruitt, 
supra note 287, at 396, the belief that the mediator understood the dispute, the lack of 
formality, and the belief that important facts were heard. Goldberg & Brett, supra note 290, 
at 251-52. Data suggest that satisfaction level is not dependent on outcome. Id.; Kaufman, 
supra note 278, at 23. 
293. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text (noting that focus on mediating 
individual cases may divert attention from systematic discrimination). 
294. See PEER Study, supra note 247, at 9-10 (noting that mediation shifts agency's 
focus from law enforcement to dispute resolution). 
295. See Richard Delgado, et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of 
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 1359, 1398-99 (1985) 
(discussing various ways in which informal processes may disadvantage less powerful 
parties); Richard Abel, lnformalism: A Tactica/Equivalentto Law, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 
3 75, 383 ( 1985) (arguing that informalizing legal proceedings would disadvantage the poor 
and perpetuate inequality); William Simon, Legal lnformalityand RedistributivePo/itics, 19 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 384, 386, 388 (1985) (arguing that both informal and formal systems 
can harm the disadvantaged depending on the circumstances). Additionally, there is some 
evidence that mediation is more likely to result in agreement when the parties are of 
relatively equal power. Kresse! & Pruitt, supra note 287, at 404-05. A study of 600 small 
claims court cases in New Mexico evaluated outcomes of cases assigned randomly to media-
tion and adjudication. The results revealed that women fared better in mediation than in 
adjudication, although their subjective evaluation of mediation was more negative than their 
evaluation of adjudication. Minorities, who were predominantly Hispanic, fared worse in 
mediation than in adjudication. The minority disputants fared worse in mediation than 
whites also, although the differences disappeared when both mediators were mediators of 
color. Minority disputants were more enthusiastic about mediation than white disputants, 
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individuals with disabilities are disadvantaged in mediation, relative to 
litigation, then mediation is inconsistent with the goals of the statute. 296 
Related to the power issue is the need to ensure that the individual's 
disability does not preclude effective participation in mediation, which 
requires more direct involvement by the parties than litigation, where the 
parties' representatives play a more active role.297 Any mediation 
procedure adopted needs to take into account these concerns. 
2. Analysis of Other Mediation Systems in Civil Rights Cases 
In determining whether to utilize mediation under the statute, it is useful 
to consider other efforts to use mediation in the discrimination context. 
The discussion above relating to early complaint resolution procedures 
evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of the EEOC's Rapid Charge 
Processing system and the Office of Civil Rights' Early Complaint 
Resolution procedure, both of which involved mediation. In addition, local 
civil rights agencies in Chicago and Washington, D. C. have utilized 
mediation in discrimination cases. While there has been no systematic 
evaluation such as the PEER study, some data is available regarding these 
mediation programs. 
The District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority 
Business Development successfully mediates about one hundred cases per 
however, despite the objective monetary disadvantage. Presentation of Michele S. G. 
Hermann, What Happens When Mediation is Institutionalized to the Parties, Practitioners 
and Host Institutions?, Program of AALS Section on Dispute Resolution (Jan. 1994). One 
explanation of these differences may be that the parties are more interested in process than 
outcome. Id., Comments of Robert Baruch Bush. 
This disadvantage, if true, may contradict one of the perceived advantages of 
mediation, that it empowers the parties. See McEwen, supra note 288, at 156 ("No 
compelling evidence exists to resolve the debate between those who argue that mediation 
empowers disputants and those who argue that it harms disadvantaged parties."). It is 
possible that both are true. A party may be empowered (or feel empowered) by the process, 
yet objectively receive less relief than he or she would have received in litigation. As 
McEwen notes, definitions of empowerment may vary as well. Id. In one view 
empowerment may come only from legal advocacy, while in another it may come from 
more direct involvement in the dispute and its resolution. Id. 
296. In determining disadvantage, however, the empowerment potential of mediation 
should be considered and valued. In addition, in determining the benefits of litigation and 
settlement, the emotional cost of lengthy litigation should not be undervalued. Id. 
297. See Targeting Disability Needs, supra note 117, at 35-37 (discussing issues 
regarding the capacity of persons with cognitive impairments to participate in dispute 
resolution and techniques that might facilitate their participation). 
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year.298 Mediation is offered to complainants at the time the charge is 
filed. 299 When the program began in 1990, only about one third of 
respondents agreed to mediation, but that number has been increasing and 
the agency is beginning to see repeat customers among respondents and 
respondents' counsel. The settlement rate in mediation has been forty to 
fifty percent. There is one staff mediator, who not only is involved in 
meditations, but also recruits and trains volunteer mediators, who come 
primarily from other local mediation programs. The staff mediator is also 
responsible for educating respondents and potential respondents about the 
program. If a case is not resolved in mediation, it is transferred to the 
investigative unit. The mediation is confidential and nothing which occurs 
in mediation becomes part of the investigative file. The agency has a form 
for the settlement agreement which is used in all cases. In addition, the 
agency reviews all agreements to be sure that they are balanced and 
enforceable before closing the case.300 
The Chicago Commission on Human Relations (the Commission) uses 
mandatory conciliation301 for all cases in which it has found substantial 
evidence of a violation.302 The mediators, attorneys with a background 
298. Data regarding the D.C. Department of Human Rights and Minority Business 
Affairs, received from La Verne Fletcher, Acting Supervisor, Mediation. Successful 
mediation consists of resolving the dispute with an agreement between the parties. The 
agency handles cases alleging discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodation 
and education. The number of cases filed per year varies from 400 to 700. Id. Disability 
discrimination is covered by the law and the agency has mediated some disability 
discrimination cases, but separate data on those cases is not available. 
299. Almost all complainants agree to mediate, which may be a result of the fact that 
mediation occurs within a few weeks of filing while investigations take twelve to fifteen 
months to complete. Id. If complainant agrees to mediate, the respondent is then served 
with the complaint and given the option to mediate. 
300. To date, the agency has not had any complaints about failure to honor settlement 
agreements. If such a complaint were raised, however, the agency would attempt to resolve 
the dispute, and if unable to do so, would either reopen the case or use the office of the 
corporation counsel to enforce the agreement. 
30 I. If the complainant fails to attend the conciliation conference without good cause, 
the complaint may be dismissed and/or the complainant may be ordered to pay the 
conciliator's fees. Amendments to Rules and Regulations Governing the Chicago Human 
Rights Ordinance, Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance, and the Chicago Commission on Human 
Relations Enabling Ordinance, section 230. l OO(b) (Amended January 27, 1993) (hereinafter 
Amended Rules). If the Respondent fails to attend, a default judgment may be entered 
against the Respondent. Id. In addition, the failure to attend will be considered in 
determining the amount of attorney's fees awarded ifthe complainant prevails at hearing. 
Id. Respondent also may be ordered to pay the conciliator's fees. Id. 
302. Information regarding the procedure was obtained from Miriam I. Pickus, Deputy 
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in discrimination law and training in mediation, are paid by the Commis-
sion,303 and no fee is charged to the parties for mediation. Approximately 
fifty percent of the cases mediated settled at this stage,304 and seventy-
seven percent of the disability cases conciliated settled.305 If no settlement 
is reached at the conciliation conference, the case is scheduled for an 
administrative hearing. 
In disability cases, the Commission also uses a procedure known as a 
disability evidentiary conference.306 The conference, which serves both 
factfinding and settlement purposes, is employed when the Commission 
determines, based on a preliminary investigation, that the respondent's 
facilities are not fully accessible to the complainant.307 At the evidentiary 
conference the conciliator attempts to resolve the dispute, but if no 
settlement is reached the conciliator submits to the Commission's 
compliance staff a recommendation on whether the staff should find 
substantial evidence of a violation.308 
Commissioner of the Chicago Commission on Human Relations and from the Rules and 
Regulations Governing the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance, the Chicago Fair Housing 
Ordinance, and the Chicago Commission on Human Relations Enabling Ordinance (herein-
after Chicago Rules). The Commission has jurisdiction over discrimination in employment, 
public accommodation, and housing in the City of Chicago, including discrimination based 
on disability. 
303. Compensation for the attorneys is below the market rate, but the Commission has 
had no difficulty in obtaining attorney/mediators. 
304. These statistics are for the twelve month period preceding September 1994. 
305. The actual numbers of disability cases are small, however. Letter from Miriam 
Pickus (Sept. 13, 1994). From 1991 to 1993, the Commission found substantial evidence in 
36 disability cases involving employment and public accommodation. Id. Twenty-eight 
were settled, with four cases stiJJ pending as of September 1994. Id. For all disability cases 
for the time period from 1991 through 1993, the Commission closed 72 employment cases, 
41 by settlement agreement, a settlement rate of 57%. Id. Fifty-three public accommoda-
tion cases were closed, 35 by settlement agreement, a settlement rate of 66%. Id. These 
settlements include those reached at a conciliation conference, cited above, as well as 
settlementsduring investigation, either through a Disability Evidentiary Conference, see infra 
notes 306-08 and accompanying text, or without such a conference. Id. 
306. See Chicago Rules, supra note 302, at Subpart 525. Like the conciliation 
conference, the Disability Evidentiary Conference is mandatory and failure to appear subjects 
the parties to the same penalties. Id. at § 525.125. 
307. Id. Prior to the conference, the respondent is required to submit an affidavit with 
evidence of undue hardship. Id. Like the ADA, proof of undue hardship eliminates the 
accommodation obligation under the Chicago Ordinance. Id. at § 520.100. The complainant 
files a responsive affidavit. Chicago Rules, supra note 302, at § 520.100. 
308. Id. at § 525.115. For settlement statistics which include settlements reached at 
Disability Evidentiary Conferences, see supra note 305. If the staff finds substantial 
evidence, it may waive the normal conciliation conference and proceed directly to an 
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In accessibility cases, the Commission can use the city's Office for 
People with Disabilities to perform a site survey and determine what 
changes would make the facility accessible. These technical experts even 
prepare blueprints for the design change, which saves money for the 
business and facilitates settlement of accessibility disputes. 
Under the Chicago Rules, settlements are written, signed by the parties 
and the conciliator, and presented to the agency's compliance staff for 
approval.309 Approval, which results in an order approving the settlement 
and dismissing the complaint, is granted if the settlement is knowing and 
voluntary, unambiguous, and consistent with the ordinance.310 The 
Commission retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement and the parties 
must acknowledge in the agreement the Commission's jurisdiction to seek 
judicial enforcement.311 
These two procedures, Chicago and the District of Columbia, have some 
common elements and some significant differences, but both have been 
relatively successful in settling cases. The District of Columbia's voluntary 
procedure, offered early in the investigation process has employed 
significant educational efforts to increase participation. Complainants are 
encouraged to participate by the promise of rapid processing through 
mediation. Respondents' participation rate has increased through education-
al efforts and successful participation in the procedure. Chicago's 
mandatory procedure has a high rate of settlement for mandatory mediation, 
but that may be attributable to the fact that it is employed after a finding 
of substantial evidence or for the Disability Evidentiary Conference, after 
a finding of a technical violation. 
Both procedures are cost free to the parties, except for their representa-
tion, should they choose to use it. Both procedures provide for agency 
approval and enforcement of settlement agreements to ensure consistency 
with the statutory mandate. Because no systematic study of the meditations 
has been done, there is no evidence regarding whether complainants are 
disadvantaged by the process in any way. 
administrative hearing. Chicago Rules, supra note 302, at § 525.120. 
309. The description of settlement procedures, including enforcement procedures is taken 
from Chicago Rules, supra note 302, at §§ 230.130, 230.140. 
310. As a condition of approval, the Commission may require compliance reports. Id. 
at § 230.130. 
311. To obtain enforcement of the agreement, a party must notify the Commission in 
writing. The Commission investigates, and if it finds substantial evidence of a violation of 
the agreement, it must notify the parties in writing and have the city's Corporation Counsel 
seek judicial enforcement of the order approving the settlement. Id. at § 230.140. 
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These procedures contain some elements that contrast with procedures 
that have achieved less success in participation. A mediation pilot project 
at the Illinois Human Rights Commission which charges the participants a 
filing fee to participate in mediation has resulted in very limited participa-
tion.312 The Department of Justice pilot project, where the charges are 
dismissed before mediation, also has resulted in limited participation.313 
Under the latter procedure, respondents have limited incentive to engage in 
mediation because of the removal of the threat of government action. 
Additionally, the Department of Justice project has been unable to engage 
in educational efforts about mediation prior to agreement to participate 
because the Privacy Act restricts the agency's ability to disclose the names 
and addresses of the parties to the grantor, which is prepared to engage in 
such education, before they agree to participate in mediation.314 
The results of the EEOC pilot mediation project also yield useful 
information. Respondents were less likely to agree to participate than 
complainants. The cases included large numbers of discharge cases in 
which agreements to mediate were particularly difficult to obtain. The 
settlement rate of the EEOC project was similar to those of the Chicago 
and District of Columbia agencies. 
Finally, the Better Business Bureaus/ADA Coalition of Connecticut 
(BBB/ ADA CC) Center for Dispute Settlement has mediated disability 
discrimination cases referred by the Connecticut Commission on Human 
Rights and Opportunities (CCHRO), the state agency enforcing Connecticut 
anti-discrimination laws.315 The program was initiated in April 1994 as 
a pilot program involving one CCHRO office and cases alleging only 
disability discrimination. The CCHRO has recently expanded the program 
to include all CCHRO offices, all types of discrimination, and a number of 
312. In few cases have both parties agreed to mediation according to Professor Lamont 
Stallworth, Chicago Center for Employment Dispute Resolution. 
313. Meeting with Department of Justice, Public Access Section (Mar. 28, 1994). 
314. Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994) (preventing disclosure of records without written 
consent of person to whom record pertains, with limited exceptions). 
315. Information regarding this program was obtained from Suzanne Ghais, Connecticut 
Better Business Bureau, presentation at Collaborative Approaches: A Conference on 
Disability Aging and Dispute Resolution, Washington, D. C. (Mar. 31, 1995); telephone 
conversation with Paulette Hotton, President, Better Business Bureau of Connecticut; and 
telephone conversation with Rick Gomez, Human Rights & Opportunities Representative, 
Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities. See also BBB/ADACC 
Center for Disability Dispute Settlement Mediation Agreement. The governing statute was 
amended in 1994 to encourage voluntary use of alternate dispute resolution and to authorize 
the Commission to use mandatory mediation. P.A. No. 94-113 (May 25, 1994); P.A. No. 
94-238 (June 7, 1994). 
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different ADR service providers. In addition, the BBB/ ADA CC is offering 
mediation in disability discrimination cases which have not yet been filed 
with any agency. 
The pilot program is similar to other programs described. The CCHRO 
first screened the cases and referred those deemed appropriate to media-
tion. 316 If both parties agreed, the case was assigned to a volunteer 
mediator trained by the Center on disability law.317 If an agreement was 
reached in mediation, it was recorded on an agreement form, containing 
standard provisions for enforcement, a nonadmissions clause, and 
nonretaliation provisions. The agreement was reviewed by the Center to 
ensure that it was administratively correct and then forwarded to the 
CCHRO for review for enforceability and systemic discrimination problems. 
Upon approval by the CCHRO, the case was closed, with the CCHRO 
retaining the right to reopen the complaint or sue for enforcement based on 
noncompliance with the agreement.318 
Because of the scope of the state law, the cases referred for mediation 
were employment discrimination cases. In the first year of the program, 
there were five meditations, three of which resulted in settlement. As 
noted, the satisfaction of the agencies involved and the parties has led to 
expansion of the program. Also educational efforts have been expanded to 
increase participation in the program. The expanded program is similar to 
the pilot program in process, but includes additional ADR service providers 
trained and certified by the CCHRO. The parties may choose a service 
provider from the CCHRO list or any other provider. The ADR program 
is combined with an early assessment program which classifies cases for 
investigative purposes. Unlike the pilot program, the expanded program 
gives the agency the option to mandate the use of ADR in cases deemed 
appropriate. Future assessment of the effectiveness of this program may 
316. The agency withheld from mediation cases that appeared to raise issues with 
precedential impact or affect large groups of individuals. This determination and a post-
settlement review help preserve the Jaw development function and the enforcement role for 
systemic litigation. 
317. If the complainant agreed to mediate, the charge was sent to the respondent, along 
with information regarding mediation. If the respondent agreed, then the CCHRO sent a 
joint request for mediation to the BBB/ ADA CC Center. The Center then contacted the 
parties and provided additional information regarding the mediation process. The parties 
were charged a $60.00 fee for mediation, with financial aid available to parties unable to pay 
the full fee. 
318. If no agreement was reached, the case was returned to the CCHRO for 
investigation and did not lose its investigation priority by virtue of referral to mediation. 
The mediation process was confidential and nothing that occurred in mediation is admissible 
in any subsequent litigation. 
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provide useful information for designers of the recommended ADA 
mediation program. 
3. An ADA Mediation Proposal 
The review of these existing programs and mediation research supports 
the use of mediation by the ADA enforcement agencies. Mediation of 
ADA cases offers the potential to reduce the backlog of cases, reach 
satisfactory results for the parties, and effectuate the purposes of the statute. 
Successful mediation at the administrative level also may reduce the 
number of cases judicially litigated. Furthermore, in mediation the parties 
take responsibility for resolving their own dispute, reducing reliance on 
government enforcement. A mediation program should be designed 
carefully, however, to minimize the disadvantages of mediation discussed 
above and to ensure active participation. Ideally, the mediation program 
should strive for a high settlement rate, a high compliance rate, and party 
satisfaction. The program cannot lose sight of the statutory goals as well 
and it is particularly important to maintain the focus on protection of the 
rights of individuals with disabilities. 
Initially, the concern that mediation will interfere with the law develop-
ment function must be addressed. While judicial development of the law 
is particularly important with a recently enacted statute, the mediation 
program proposed will not interfere with that function. The proposed 
program is voluntary, so many cases will not be mediated.319 Of those 
cases mediated, many will not settle.320 Accordingly, there will be many 
cases available for judicial litigation. In addition, the program proposes 
that the cases be screened on intake and at that point, the agencies can 
identify cases raising issues that the agency has targeted for law develop-
ment, investigating those cases for litigation purposes while referring other 
cases to mediation.321 Thus, the law development function will be 
preserved, at the same time that quicker resolution is available for many 
319. In the EEOC pilot project, 87% of charging parties and only 43% of respondents 
offered mediation agreed to mediate, which would leave well over half of the cases in which 
mediation is offered for litigation. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 
102, at 3. 
320. Only 52% of the mediated cases in the EEOC Pilot Program settled, again leaving 
a large percentage of cases for litigation. See id. 
321. See Letter from Richard T. Seymour, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under 
Law, to FrancesM. Hart, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, regarding Comments 
on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Sept. 20, 1993) 5-6 (hereinafter Lawyers Committee 
Comments) (on file with author). 
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parties through mediation. The program design set forth below is 
calculated to minimize other disadvantages of mediation and they will be 
discussed further in the course of the program analysis. 
This Article makes a series of broad recommendations regarding program 
design.322 An extremely important element of designing the program, 
however, is input from those who will be potential users of the system. 323 
In the course of this study, many representatives of various groups have 
been consulted.324 Further, more extensive consultation will provide 
significant benefits. To be effective the program must meet the needs of 
the parties to ADA disputes.325 In addition, disputants are more likely to 
use the procedures if they are involved in their design.326 Involvement of 
leaders of organizations representative of those likely to utilize the 
procedures in the design will enable them to educate and motivate their 
constituents to participate in mediation, enhancing the likelihood of success 
of the project.327 
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)328 provides a mechanism 
for incorporating the input of representatives of potential disputes in the 
design of the mediation program. FACA permits establishment of an 
advisory committee where the head of the agency involved determines that 
it is in the public interest in connection with the performance of the 
agency's duties.329 FACA governs the procedure for establishment and 
operation of the committees.330 Use of an advisory committee pursuant 
322. For useful information regarding program design, see Administrative Conference 
of the United States, Systems Design Work Group, The Dispute Systems Design Pre-Design 
Organizational Checklist (June 30, 1993) (hereinafter Pre-DesignChecklist);Administrative 
Conference of the United States, Dispute Systems Design Working Group, Operational 
Aspects of Designing Dispute Resolution Systems (Feb. 1994) (hereinafter Designing 
Systems). 
323. Examples of such groups are the various groups that represent individuals with 
disabilities, the Better Business Bureau, the Equal Employment Advisory Council, the 
Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and labor organizations. 
In employment cases where the employees are represented by a union, unique issues arise 
which must be taken into account in program design and settlement. See infra note 350. 
Accordingly, the involvement of labor organizations is important to the process. 
324. While the report owes much to the ideas and information from the various people 
consulted, the recommendations herein are solely those of the author. 
325. See WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRETT, AND STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING 
DISPUTES RESOLVED 65 ( 1988). 
326. See id.; Designing Systems, supra note 322, section I, at 4. 
327. URY, BREIT & GOLDBERG, supra note 325, at 76. 
328. 5 U.S.C. app. II (1994). 
329. 5 U.S.C. app. II, § 9(a){2) (1994). 
330. 5 U.S.C. app. II,§§ 7-13 (1994). 
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to FACA will insure effective input into the design process through the 
exchange of ideas among representatives of various groups participating on 
the committee. The communication and commitment inherent in the 
advisory committee process provide advantages over mere solicitation of 
written comments, which should enhance both the development of the 
mediation project and subsequent participation in the process. 
The successes and failures of prior projects as well as mediation research 
should guide the design of the system. As in the consideration of an ALJ 
system, an initial question is whether a common mediation system should 
be established. For the reasons discussed in connection with an ALJ 
system, use of a common mediation system is a sensible approach. 
Although the agencies lose some control, the development and use of 
expertise on disabilities in general, and the ADA, in particular, is a 
significant benefit of a common system. Furthermore, a common system 
will coordinate the enforcement efforts of the diverse agencies involved in 
ADA enforcement. The enforcement agencies should establish a joint 
committee composed of representatives from each agency to design a 
mediation program that will be effective in cases under all titles of the 
ADA.331 The following discussion addresses significant issues that must 
be determined in designing the program. 
a. "Voluntary or Mandatory Mediation 
A significant question to be addressed is whether mediation should be 
voluntary or mandatory. The ADA authorizes voluntary mediation.332 
Neither the ADA nor the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act clearly 
authorizes mandatory mediation, however. The legislative history of the 
331. The primary enforcement agencies which should be involved in the design of the 
program include the EEOC, the Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation, 
and the Federal Communications Commission. The Title II investigative agencies also can 
provide input into the design of the process, in addition to referring cases to the program and 
participating in the educational effort. These agencies include the Departments of 
Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, 
Interior and Labor. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.190 (1995). 
The EEOC's recent endorsement of ADR and prospective adoption of mediation is 
consistent with this proposal. Indeed, the program proposed by the EEOC appears to 
incorporate many of the elements suggested infra. See supra notes 124-39 and 
accompanying text. 
332. See42U.S.C. § 12212(Supp. V 1993). Thissection,section513,encouragesADR 
where appropriate and authorized by law. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act also 
authorizes agencies to use voluntary dispute resolution proceedings. See 5 U.S.C. § 572 
(1994). 
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ADA indicates that the encouragement of alternative dispute resolution was 
not intended "to preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be 
available to persons with disabilities."333 The conference report on the 
ADA states that "it is the intent of the conferees that the use of ... 
alternative dispute resolution is completely voluntary."334 This legislative 
history strongly supports the conclusion that ADR should be voluntary. 
Mediation does not preclude any rights and remedies, however, for if no 
agreement is reached in mediation, all other rights and remedies are still 
available. In addition, both congressional statements reference arbitration, 
directly or indirectly, suggesting congressional concern about compulsory 
arbitration rather than mediation. Accordingly, it might be argued that 
mandatory mediation is permissible. 
Nevertheless, the lack of any exhaustion requirement under Titles II and 
III suggests that plaintiffs could not be compelled to mediate cases under 
those titles. Since there is no requirement to file an administrative 
complaint or to wait for administrative action, the plaintiff could not be 
compelled to delay judicial action pending mediation. Title II complaints, 
where investigation is required, could not be dismissed for failure to 
mediate. In addition, dismissal of a Title III complaint for failure to 
mediate may affect the remedies available since only the Department of 
Justice can sue for damages under Title III. With respect to cases under 
Titles I and IV, which involve mandated agency procedures, mandated 
mediation may be an option. The EEOC's Rapid Charge Processing system 
implemented under Title VII required participation in a mediation 
conference.335 Since Title I adopts Title VII procedures, and nothing in 
the ADA expressly precludes mandatory mediation, it may remain an option 
for the EEOC. 
Even where mandatory mediation is permissible, a determination must 
be made as to whether it is appropriate in ADA cases. The case for 
mandatory mediation is based on a belief in the value of the process. 
Parties that would not voluntarily mediate may settle in mandatory 
333. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PuBLIC LAW 101-336, THE AMERICANS WITII 
DISABILITIES ACT, VOL. l 516-17 (Comm. Print 1990); H.R. REP. No. 485 III, lOlst Cong., 
2d Sess. 513 (1990). Congress notes agreement with the Supreme Court's decision in 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59 (1974), (holding that arbitration award 
did not preclude judicial litigation of Title VII claim). 
334. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 596, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1990), quoted in Stephen L. 
Hayford, The Coming Third Era of Labor Arbitration, 48 ARB. J. 8, 16 (1993). 
335. See PEER Study, supra note 247, at 150. 
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mediation and be satisfied with the process.336 Mandatory mediation may 
increase the mediation's efficiency impact.337 Nevertheless several 
concerns arise in connection with mandated mediation. If settlement is not 
reached or would have been reached without mediation, mediation may 
simply increase the parties' costs.338 In addition, if individuals with 
disabilities are disadvantaged in mediation,339 then compulsion to mediate 
should be avoided.340 A large scale mediation program may become so 
routinized that the benefits of mediation are lost.341 Given the risks, and 
the probable need for legislative change to compel mediation of claims 
under Titles II and IIl,342 the first effort should be voluntary media-
336. See Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Mandated Participation and 
SettlementCoercion: Dispute Resolution as it Relates to the Courts 12-13 ( 1991) (hereinafter 
SPIDR Report). Reluctance to mediate may result from lack of knowledge about the process 
or fear of appearing weak. Id. If the parties truly have no interest in settlement, however, 
mandatory mediation wastes the time and resources of the parties, the mediator, and the 
agency. Some of the difficulties that existing mediation projects have had in obtaining 
participation suggest consideration of mandatory mediation. 
337. See id. at 2, 12-13. (noting that larger scale program may achieve more benefits 
more efficiently). 
338. See id. at 1, 13 (noting that mandated processes add costs where either trial or 
settlement is inevitable). The emotional costs to the parties may also be increased. See id. 
at I. 
339. See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text (noting that less powerful parties 
may be disadvantaged by less formal dispute resolution methods). 
340. See PEER Study, supra note 247, at 151 (noting that mediation makes greater 
demands of time, expertise and emotion on complainant than traditional investigation); 
SPIDR Report, supra note 336, at 1-2 (mandatory dispute resolution must serve interests of 
parties, judicial system and public, and program should not harm historically disadvantaged 
groups). 
341. See SPIDR Report, supra note 336 at 13-14 (bureacracy may routinize mediation 
causing loss of high quality and flexibility through rigid procedures and brief mediation 
sessions). 
342. Legislative change would also be necessary to authorize agencies to impose 
effective penalties for respondents' failure to participate, such as payment for the mediator 
or payment of plaintiffs' attorneys fees. The ADA does not currently authorize the 
enforcement agencies to impose penalties for noncompliance, but Congress could authorize 
agency imposition of monetary penalties with appropriate safeguards. See Atlas Roofing Co. 
v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm 'n, 430 U.S. 442, 446 (1977) (holding that 
it is constitutional for Congress to authorize federal agency to impose monetary penalties 
with contests heard by administrative agency); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) 
(holding it constitutionally permissible for administrative body to hear and decide claims for 
compensation with appropriate safeguards). 
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tion.343 Ongoing assessment of the voluntary mediation efforts should 
reveal whether mandatory mediation might be effective.344 
b. The Timing of Mediation 
Another important issue is the timing of the mediation. If mediation 
takes place early in the investigative process, before positions harden, 
settlement may be more Iikely.345 On the other hand, at that point, the 
parties may be insufficiently aware of the strengths and weaknesses of both 
their own position and that of the other party to be motivated to settle. 346 
The systems discussed above used both models with some success. So long 
as mediation is not used as a delaying tactic or to impose costs on a party 
with fewer resources, there seems to be little reason to limit access to 
mediation. A combination of early intervention techniques and use of 
mediation could reduce the backlog and speed case processing, providing 
benefits to the parties as well as the govemment. 347 
343. Another reason to implement voluntary mediation initially is the additional cost of 
a mandatory mediation project. 
344. Should mandatory mediation be considered, the SPIDR Report's criteria for 
mandatory mediation should be followed. See SPIDR Report, supra note 336 at 2-3. These 
criteria are: I) funding comparable to litigation; 2) absence of coercion to settle in the form 
of reports to the trier of fact and financial disincentives to trial; and 3) availability ofa high 
quality program that is readily accessible, permits party and attorney participation and 
provides clear procedures. Id. The program should be created with input from all 
stakeholders and monitored for quality. Id. Case assessment by a person knowledgeable 
about dispute resolution procedures, procedures for motions for exclusion and clearly defined 
requirements for participation and sanctions for noncompliance are also essential features. 
Id. 
345. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 57 (1986) (early 
intervention by mediator may prevent polarization and limit hostility). 
346. Id. at 57-58. This may create particular problems for complainants who may have 
insufficient access to information to evaluate the strength of their cases. For this reason, the 
Lawyers Committee suggests that some investigation take place before referral to ADR. See 
Lawyers Committee Comments, supra note 321, at 2. The proposal here contemplates only 
preliminary intake information, carefully collected to increase the likelihood of correct 
identification of issues. Such limited investigation may prove insufficient to facilitate 
effective mediation. A requirement of more extensive investigation, however, would utilize 
more agency resources, thus raising the cost of mediation. This issue should be addressed 
in the evaluation of the program. The design of mediation program should be altered if 
necessary to increase the fairness of the process and the probability of settlement. 
347. This approach has just been adopted by the EEOC. See supra notes 124-39 and 
accompanying text. The Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities also 
has implemented such a system. See supra notes 315-18 and accompanying text. The 
mediation system and early intervention program each could be implemented alone as well. 
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Such a system could operate as follows. 348 When complaints are filed, 
investigators or intake officers should be trained to ask questions that would 
enable the agency to classify the case in several ways.349 This interview, 
whether done in person or by telephone, should reveal the nature of the 
dispute; whether it turns primarily on factual issues, legal issues or both; 
whether it involves novel legal questions; whether technical expertise such 
as engineers, architects, medical or vocational experts might be useful; 
whether systemic problems may exist; and whether the case appears 
frivolous or unsupported by any evidence.350 When the interview reveals 
348. Each agency handling ADA cases would have to adapt this proposed process to its 
particular needs and staffing patterns. This Article attempts to sketch out broad outlines of 
how such a process might work. 
349. Training particular employees to perform this function, rather than having it done 
by the investigator or intake officer assigned to the case, has certain benefits. More 
intensive training of fewer people will make the system function more efficiently than 
limited training of all staff. As noted, infra, relatively accurate assessment of cases at this 
stage is crucial to the success of this endeavor. The relative accuracy of the assessments 
should be a part of the employees' evaluation to insure accountability. If the employees 
who made the assessment also investigated the cases, they might have an incentive to ignore 
information that cast doubt on the accuracy of their initial assessment. Also, investigators 
might be reluctant to refer for mediation cases that they thought would settle, desiring to 
retain credit for the settlement. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note I 02, 
at 7. Of course, if the ultimate goal is settlement of those cases that can be settled fairly to 
all parties, the matter of credit for the settlement is irrelevant. If the mediation process is 
a better vehicle for achieving a fair settlement which is satisfactory to the parties, however, 
then referral to mediation should be encouraged. 
350. At this stage, the agency should attempt to determine whether there are class or 
systemic issues involved. If such issues are apparent, the agency should consider whether 
referral to mediation is appropriate. While systemic issues are not per se inappropriate for 
mediation, it is essential that the plaintiff class be adequately represented in mediation and 
that the mediation deal with the systemic issues rather than allowing an individual to settle 
for individual relief, leaving the class issues unremedied. Thus, mediation might be 
appropriate where there is counsel, a disability rights organization or a labor organization 
to represent the group and deal with the systemic issues. Where no such representative is 
available, the agency should consider continuing the investigation and leaving any settlement 
negotiations until the agency has taken the case as an advocate. For discussion of class 
issues and agency mediation, see PEER Study, supra note 247, at 126-34. 
Another significant issue that should be considered at this point is whether the 
complainant can effectively participate in mediation. This is particularly important in cases 
involving individuals with cognitive impairments, some of whom may not have the capacity 
to participate in mediation. See Targeting Disability Needs, supra note I I 7, at 35-36. 
Agencies should be extremely cautious in determining that an individual does not have the 
capacity to participate in mediation, however, to avoid falling into the very stereotypes that 
the ADA was designed to eliminate. See Targeting Disability Needs, supra note I I 7, at 35-
36. The agency should explore ways to mediate effectively with the individual before 
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issues that the agency has decided have priority for purposes of develop-
ment of the law, the case can be diverted from the mediation track and 
litigated by the agency, thereby preserving the law development function 
of the agency and the courts. Great care should be taken in developing the 
questions to be asked and in training the investigators to ensure that cases 
are correctly classified initially.351 The importance of this task cannot be 
overestimated because it will determine the success of the system. 
Nevertheless, the initial classification should not be determinative if a later 
investigation reveals additional information. 
Like the Washington Field Office system at the EEOC, the classification 
should then determine the additional resources expended on the case by the 
agency. At this stage, mediation should be offered to the parties. The time 
period for mediation should be limited352 and, absent settlement, the case 
should be returned to its place in the investigation queue.353 Initially, 
mediation should be offered in all cases, except those targeted for litigation 
concluding that mediation will not be effective. See Targeting Disability Needs, supra note 
117, at 35-36. 
In employment cases, the presence of a union representative should be ascertained at 
this point as well. Union representation, with the accompanying collective bargaining 
agreement, raises unique issues for settlement. For consideration of these issues, see Nancy 
Segal, The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution to Resolve ADA Issues in the Unionized 
Workplace, presented to the 21st Annual Conference of the Society of Professionals in 
Dispute Resolution; and Ann C. Hodges, The ADA in the Unionized Workplace, 48 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 567 (1994). 
351. Investigators must take particular care with unsophisticated or inarticulate 
complainants who may themselves be unaware of the evidence relevant to establishing a 
violation of the law. Each agency should develop appropriate questions, investigation 
techniques and guidelines for classification for the sections of the ADA under its 
jurisdiction. 
352. Time limits will discourage the parties from using mediation for delay purposes, and 
further the goal of speedy case processing. The time period for mediation, however, must 
be adequate to allow for scheduling the mediation and thoroughly exploring settlement 
possibilities with the mediator. The EEOC pilot project used a sixty day time period, which 
seems appropriate if resources permit. 
353. To insure that agency employees do not discourage mediation, they should not be 
penalized for any additional time that the investigation takes as a result of the "time out" for 
mediation. The mediated case should be given the same priority that it had before the 
parties opted to try mediation to avoid discouraging the parties. In addition, to encourage 
participation in mediation, the classification for further investigation purposes should not be 
revealed to the parties. The agencies should not deny mediation based on the agency's view 
of the merits upon the intake interview. This issue, however, should be addressed in 
evaluation of the project. The results of the evaluation should assist in a determination of 
whether charges that appear meritless and/or charges that appear to be clear violations should 
be withheld from mediation. See Lawyers' Committee Comments, supra note 321, at 2. 
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for law development purposes. Should analysis of initial results of 
mediation suggest that some cases are more amenable to mediated 
settlements,354 the agencies should consider special efforts to convince 
parties in those cases to try mediation. For example, cases involving 
reasonable accommodation in employment and access to facilities and 
services under Titles II and III seem particularly appropriate for media-
tion. 355 In most such cases there are a range of options to resolve the 
dispute, precisely the kind of case where mediation works well. The 
mediator can explore the various options with the parties, searching for a 
solution which is satisfactory to all. 
Cases involving issues such as discharge from employment or disability 
of an individual present more difficulties. These cases are susceptible to 
mediated solutions, however, and should not be excluded.356 An employer 
who adamantly refuses to reemploy a discharged individual might be 
willing to pay back pay and provide a positive reference to avoid 
litigation.357 Similarly, a dispute over whether an individual is disabled 
could be resolved by settling the underlying issue, providing accommoda-
tion in employment for example, without determining whether a statutory 
disability exists. Mediation also offers potential to settle large cases such 
as those involving transportation systems.358 Use of negotiated 
354. Initially, the program should mediate a range of cases, enabling analysis of 
effectiveness in various types of disputes. 
355. These cases involve fact-based and case specific application of standards and, 
therefore, are particularly appropriate for alternative dispute resolution. See Administrative 
Conference of the United States, Recommendation 86-3, Agencies' Use of Alternative Means 
of Dispute Resolution, 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1995), reprinted in Administrative Conference 
of the United States, Agency Arbitration, Studies in Administrative Law and Procedure 88-1, 
at 77 (stating that arbitration is appropriate where legal norms have been established); 
President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, ADR Workgroup, Alter-
native Dispute Resolution and the ADA, submitted in response to EEOC's Request for 
Comments, at 3-4 (noting whether disagreement is factual or legal and whether relationships 
of parties changes as result of dispute resolution are important factors in determining 
appropriateness of dispute for ADR). 
356. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 6(of135 mediated 
settlement agreements, 99 were in discharge cases). 
357. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 4 (in pilot program 
51 % of cases included monetary relief, 17% included reinstatement or change in 
employment status, and 37% included references). 
358. Disputes regarding the ADA's transportation provisions may be less susceptible to 
mediation for reasons other than size of the dispute and number of interested parties. Many 
of the statutory transportation requirements are quite specific, leaving less room for the 
flexibility of mediated solutions. See, e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 12162 (Supp. V 1993) (discrimina-
tion to purchase new rail passenger cars unless one per train is accessible to individuals with 
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rulemaking and mediation in environmental disputes has demonstrated that 
even large, multi-party disputes can be resolved through alternative 
processes. 359 
To ensure that a voluntary mediation system is utilized, the parties must 
be motivated to participate. First, the charges must be retained by the 
agencies pending mediation.360 Second, written material describing the 
process, along with its advantages and disadvantages should be prepared for 
distribution to the parties. 361 Education is essential to convince the parties 
to disputes to use mediation and to ensure satisfaction with the process by 
creating realistic expectations about the process and potential results.362 
This education must be undertaken by the agencies involved and their 
disabilities). However, these disputes should not be precluded from mediation. Even where 
the statutory requirements have not been complied with, a mediated solution with a timetable 
for compliance may be preferable to litigation. The Federal Transit Administration has 
taken a similar approach in negotiating compliance agreements for ADA requirements 
relating to complementary paratransit and key station accessibility. See Federal Transit 
Administration, Office of Civil Rights, Informal Compliance Process ( 1993). The legality 
of agency approval of a mediation agreement that conflicts with specific statutory 
requirements is questionable, however. 
For the same reasons, Title IV cases may be less susceptible to mediation. See 47 
U.S.C. §§ 225(c),(d) (Supp. V 1993); 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.603, 64.604 (1995) (discussing 
telephone and voice relay services). 
359. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (1994); Administra-
tive Conference of the United States,NegotiatedRulemakingSourcebook( 1990); GOLDBERG, 
SANDER & ROGERS, supra note 288, at 345-56 (discussing use of negotiated rulemaking by 
federal agencies); LINDA R. SINGER, SETILING DISPUTES 140-50 (1990) (describing 
successful mediation of complex environmental disputes and negotiated rulemaking). 
360. Retention of the charges is necessary to provide the threat of agency litigation, 
which in turn provides an incentive for respondents to participate in the process. In 
addition, it facilitates review of the settlement agreement and enforcement if necessary. 
361. The Department of Justice is initiating this process with its grant for mediator 
training, which includes production of a consumer guide to mediation services. 
362. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 5 (recommending 
development of appropriate informational materials about process to enable parties to make 
informed decisions and have realistic expectations); PEER Study, supra note 24 7, at 152-53; 
see also Designing Systems, supra note 322, Section III at 1. La Verne Fletcher of the D. 
C. Department of Human Rights suggests that the mediation process begins when the 
complaint is filed. The mediator must sell mediation to the parties. Other alternative 
dispute resolution professionals consulted in the course of this study support the importance 
of education in convincing parties to participate effectively in the process. See also Lee 
Russell, Center for Dispute Resolution, San Diego, California (telphone conversation, 
October 8, 1994) (noting that education, which begins with first contact with parties, 
increases comfort level in uncomfortable situation-conflict, thus, improving likelihood of 
productive participation); see also BROWN & MARRIOIT, supra note 279, at 121-23. 
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personnel, who must have a clear understanding of the process and a 
commitment to its use.363 
In addition to educating the parties to particular disputes, the agencies 
can make potential users of the process aware of its benefits by making 
presentations to groups such as disability organizations, employer 
organizations, government agencies, and business groups.364 Persons who 
have successfully used the procedure may become proponents to others.365 
Successful mediations should be publicized to the extent possible to 
encourage others to utilize the process.366 The process of dispute settle-
ment also is likely to be more effective if the users are trained.367 
Training of potential disputants through the use of technical assistance 
grants, such as the joint training undertaken by the EEOC and the 
363. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note l 02, at 4, 5 (uneven training 
of EEOC staff may have adversely impacted ability to obtain agreements to mediate); 
Designing Systems, supra note 322, section III, at I, 4. The Department of Justice Pilot 
Project has had limited success in obtaining agreements to mediate which may be due, in 
part, to the failure to undertake an educational effort. See supra note 314 and accompanying 
text. The EEOC project, which included an educational effort, was more successful at 
obtaining agreements to mediate, although it also experienced some difficulty which required 
extending the project to reach the targeted number of mediations. EEOC Report on ADR 
Pilot Program, supra note l 02, at 2-3. Use of agency personnel for education will avoid the 
Privacy Act problems that created difficulties in the DOJ Pilot Project. 
If external mediators are used, they too could be a part of the educational process. 
See MOORE, supra note 345, at 53-54 (education by mediator about process enhances 
probability of successful mediation). 
364. The D. C. Department of Human Rights has utilized educational presentations to 
increase participation in mediation. The presentations might even include simulated 
mediations or other demonstrations of the procedure. See URY, BREIT & GOLDBERG, supra 
note 325, at 76 (recommending real or simulated demonstrations to overcome skepticism of 
potential participants). The Federal Trade Commission has used radio public service 
announcements to publicize the benefits of dispute resolution to consumers. Information 
from ACUS. 
365. See URY, BRETT & GOLDBERG, supra note 325, at 76 (suggesting that designers or 
users of system are its most effective proponents). For example, businesses successfully 
involved in mediation might be willing to speak about their experience to business 
organizations. A potential source of support is the Better Business Bureau, which has been 
a leader in establishing ADR programs and has been working in ADA education. 
366. URY, BRETT & GOLDBERG, supra note 325, at 77. Because of privacy protections 
and confidentiality, permission of the parties to publicize particular disputes would be 
necessary. Yet, statistical data could also be used for publicity purposes. 
367. URY, BRETT & GOLDBERG, supra note 325, at 78-79 (participants need skills to use 
new procedures effectively). 
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Department of Justice, will serve the dual purpose of training potential 
users and creating advocates of the system.368 
Early mediation serves the goal of speedier resolution, which should help 
reduce the backlog. Because of the investigation backlogs in most 
agencies, mediation should not cause delays in the process if cases are 
simply referred for mediation and, if no settlement is reached, inserted back 
in their rightful place in the investigation queue. Those who decline 
mediation at an early stage should not be precluded from choosing 
mediation later, should they decide to do so. Agency investigators and 
attorneys should be alert to the possibility of later mediation, even after a 
cause finding. Cases not ripe for early settlement might be excellent 
candidates for later mediation as the facts develop and the parties become 
more aware of the evidence. 
c. The Source of Mediators 
The next crucial question is the source of the mediators. Since there is 
no charge to parties for the investigation process, any charge for mediation 
would discourage its use.369 Thus, the option should be cost free to the 
parties.37° Cost to the agency, training, and availability for timely 
mediation are essential factors to be considered in determining the best 
source of mediators. 
There are several potential sources of mediators. First, agency 
employees could be trained in mediation. If agency employees are used, 
the mediation could be separate from the investigative process,371 or a part 
of the process.372 The second possible source of mediators is employees 
368. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (describing EEOC and Department 
of Justice training in ADA and ADR). These and future trainees might also serve as 
advocates for individual disputants, helping balance the power in the process. See infra 
notes 423-25 and accompanying text (noting that technical assistance grants could be source 
for training individuals to serve as advocates). 
369. Of course, the parties pay their own costs, such as attorneys fees, in either process. 
Should the case be litigated, attorneys' fees for mediation should be recoverable to the same 
extent as attorneys' fees for the other aspects of the administrative process. New York 
Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 61 (1980). 
370. The cost to the parties for mandatory mediation, if adopted, should also be 
equivalent to regular case processing. SPIDR Report, supra note 336, at 16. 
371. See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text (describing D.C. Department of 
Human Rights mediation process). 
372. See supra notes 301-311 and accompanying text (describing Chicago Commission 
on Human Relations mediation process). 
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from other agencies who are trained in mediation.373 Third, the process 
could use mediators from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 
which currently mediates labor disputes and cases under the Age Discrimi-
nation Act.374 The final alternative is outside mediators.375 There are 
advantages and disadvantages to each system. Regardless of the source of 
mediators, efforts should be made to include mediators with disabilities in 
the process. 
One advantage of using agency employees to mediate is their familiarity 
with the law and with the resulting remedies if the case was litigated. 
Moreover, the agency would retain more control over the process if the 
mediators were agency employees. Most agency employees are not trained 
in mediation, however, and some may not be well-suited for such a role. 
Furthermore, employees at most agencies are stretched to the limit, and 
imposition of additional duties will require additional personnel. Some 
parties may prefer mediators unconnected with the agency, fearing 
disclosure of information that might facilitate settlement to an agency with 
statutory investigative responsibilities.376 Thus, use of agency mediators 
may result in lower settlement rates or settlements without full information. 
373. See Inter-agency Pilot Project on Sharing Neutrals, a paper describing the project 
of the Administrative Conference of the United States and a number of federal agencies. 
(hereinafter Inter-agency Pilot Project) (on file with author). For further discussion of the 
project, see infra notes 378-83 and accompanying text. 
374. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 172, 173 (1994) (discussing creation and organization ofFMCS 
and its responsibility for mediating labor disputes); 34 C.F.R. § 110.32 (1995) (referring age 
discrimination complaints to FMCS for mediation); 5 U.S.C. § 7119 (1994) (providing that 
FCMS will assistfederal agencies and their employee representatives in resolving negotiation 
impasses); Linda R. Singer & Ronald A. Schechter, Mediating Civil Rights: The Age 
Discrimination Act (1986) (evaluating the Age Discrimination Act Mediation program); 
Jerome T. Barrett & Lucretia Dewey Tanner, The FMCS Role in Age Discrimination 
Complaints: New Uses of Mediation, 32 LAB. L. J. 745 (1981) (describing FMCS role in 
mediating age discrimination compliants); information from representatives of the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service. 
375. Both the EEOC and Department of Justice pilot projects used outside mediatiors. 
See supra notes 105, 149 and accompanying text. 
376. For example, see the comments of the Equal Employment Advisory Counsel, an 
association of major corporations, suggesting that respondents would have a disincentive to 
be candid with agency officials who might ultimately sue the respondent. See Letter from 
Jeffrey A. Norris to Frances M. Hart (Sept. 6, 1993) at 3 (in Comments of Equal Employ-
ment Advisory Council in Response to EEOC's Request for Comments on Alternative 
Dispute Resolution) (on file with author). 
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This concern is greater where the mediation is part of the investigatory 
process than where mediation is separate and confidential.377 
An alternative is to use employees from other agencies to mediate cases. 
This system would use a common corps of mediators for all titles as 
suggested above. The Administrative Conference and a number of federal 
agencies have begun a pilot project to promote sharing of mediators among 
federal agencies.378 The mediators in the project are federal employees 
trained in mediation who will mediate cases for their own or other agencies 
on a collateral duty basis. 379 These mediators are available for external 
as well as internal disputes. 380 Agencies who use mediators must also 
contribute mediators or other resources to the project.381 One advantage 
of using these mediators is the low cost. In addition, the mediators are 
trained and experienced.382 There are two significant limitations to the 
use of these or similar mediators. The mediators are located in the 
Washington metropolitan area only,383 and they are not specifically trained 
in the ADA. The latter concern is remediable. The former, however, is 
377. Even where mediation is confidential, however, the parties may not be convinced 
that the information disclosed in mediation will not be revealed to agency investigators 
and/or attorneys. An additional drawback of using agency employees is that the employees 
with ADA expertise at many of the agencies are located in Washington, D.C., while the 
disputes that must be mediated are not limited to Washington. While the EEOC has 
investigators at various regional offices, the employees handling ADA cases at other 
agencies are primarily, if not exclusively, in Washington. Thus, the mediators or the parties 
would have to travel, adding to the costs, unless mediation can be done by telephone. Tele-
phone mediation is possible, but probably less effective. See PEER Study, supra note 247, 
at 157 (mediating in a conference setting is often more efficient). A review of the various 
mediation techniques in MOORE, supra note 345, and FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 289, 
reveals that effectiveness may depend on face to face meetings. 
378. See Inter-agency Pilot Project, supra note 373, at I (describing pilot project). 
379. Id. 
380. Interagency ADR Working Groups, Pilot Project on Sharing Neutrals, ADR 
NETWORK, Vol. II, No. I, at I, 12 (June 1994). 
381. Inter-agency Pilot Project, supra note 373, at I, n. l. 
382. See Inter-agency Pilot Project, supra note 373, at 2 (describing qualifications 
required for mediator participation). Because the mediators are expected to mediate internal 
EEO complaints, their experience will be somewhat relevant to ADA disputes. See Pilot 
Project on Sharing Neutrals, supra note 380, at 12 (agencies are increasingly using 
mediation in EEO disputes). The project anticipates expanding the corps of available 
neutrals by using less experienced mediators as co-mediators, enabling them to gain 
experience to mediate alone. See Inter-agency Pilot Project, supra note 373, at 2 
(describing use of co-mediators). 
383. Inter-agency Pilot Project, supra note 373, at I. The mediators will work within 
a sixty mile radius of Washington, D.C. Id. 
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problematic and, as in the case of agency employees, the mediator or the 
parties would have to travel for a face to face mediation. 
The agencies might use mediators from the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service (FMCS), an experienced mediation agency.384 FMCS 
mediators are stationed around the country, avoiding the geographical 
problems of using employees located in Washington. There is some debate 
among mediation scholars, however, as to whether the approach to 
mediation used successfully in labor disputes is appropriate in civil rights 
disputes.385 In labor disputes, the mediated settlement (as well as the non-
mediated settlement) reflects the power of the parties. A labor contract 
negotiation is, in essence, a power contest. By way of contrast, mediation 
of a civil rights dispute involves the external standards of the statute. On 
that basis some might argue that FMCS mediators are inappropriate for the 
task of rights-based mediation, at least without some assurance that the 
mediators could make the transition in mediation approach.386 FMCS 
mediators do have some experience in mediation of cases involving 
statutory civil rights under the Age Discrimination Act.387 A study of the 
mediation program found it difficult to evaluate, however, because of the 
unavailability of data. 388 FMCS mediators would require ADA training. 
A second concern about use of FMCS mediators is their availability. 
Currently, the first priority of the FMCS is mediation of labor disputes. 
Absent contrary congressional direction, these disputes are likely to 
continue as first priority because of the number of people impacted by such 
disputes, their immediacy,389 and the inclinations of the mediators who 
384. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 172, 173 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 6103 (1988); 34 C.F.R. § 110.32 
(1995); 5 u.s.c. § 7ll9 (1994). 
385. See Moore, supra note 345, at 40-42 (discussing this debate in general terms). 
Moore characterizes the debate as a distinction between focus on process, rather than 
substance. As Moore notes, however, not all labor mediators are of the process school. 
Some scholars, as well as FMCS representatives, believe that mediation techniques transcend 
subject matter. 
386. This Article does not attempt to take a position on the debate among mediation 
scholars on this issue, but merely raises the question. It is important, however, to insure that 
the statutory rights are not sacrificed to mediation in a general sense. One way to deal with 
the concern about mediation approach would be in the assignment of mediators to ADA 
cases. Information from FMCS. 
387. 42 U.S.C. § 6103 (1988); 34 C.F.R. § 110.32 (1995). 
388. See Singer & Schechter, supra note 374, at 11, 16, 19 (noting that conclusions of 
study are tenative and general because of restrictions on access to necessary data). Cf 
Barrett & Tanner, supra note 374, at 752, 754 (concluding that mediation is successful 
because about half of complaints are resolved). 
389. Telephone Interview with Pete Swanson, ADR Mediator, FMCS (Jan. 12, 1995). 
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presumably joined the agency with a goal of mediating such disputes and 
are experienced at doing so. Accordingly, without a significant infusion of 
additional mediators, mediation of ADA cases in a timely manner might be 
difficult, if not impossible. 
The final option is the use of outside mediators. The two pilot projects 
have trained a group of mediators in ADA issues and the recent Department 
of Justice grant contemplates training an additional ninety mediators. 
Because of these three projects, a group of mediators trained in both 
mediation and the ADA exists and will soon increase in size. Use of 
outside mediators would minimize training costs390 and avoid the need to 
increase government employment. In addition, the group is not limited to 
Washington, D.C., although at present it is not nationwide. There are 
mediators in many areas of the country, however, that might be trained to 
mediate ADA cases.391 The use of outside mediators relinquishes some 
governmental control over the process and requires agency monitoring of 
nonemployees to ensure quality work. While the controls that exist for 
employees, such as evaluation which may impact pay and promotion, are 
not present for outside mediators, the desire to continue to mediate may 
provide a substantial incentive to comply with quality standards. Use of 
outside mediators from the private sector furthers the goal of minimizing 
government bureaucracy. 
Unless a sufficient number of mediators are willing to work pro bono, 
these mediators must be paid with government funds. Because local civil 
rights agencies have had some success using pro bono mediators, the 
Even if the FMCS does not mediate ADA cases, the agency might be able to assist in 
training mediators for the task. Id. 
390. Training of additional mediators might be necessary if the volume of cases is large 
or if trained mediators are not available in all relevant geographic areas. The EEOC and 
DOJ Pilot Projects each were limited geographically to several large cities, but the 
forthcoming training project is expected to be more national in scope. 
391. See Amy Hermanek, Title Ill of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Implementa-
tion of Mediation Programs for More Effective Use of the Act, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 457, 474-
80 ( 1994) (recommending use of community mediation dispute resolution programs for Title 
III disputes); Letter from Gene Valentini to EEOC (Sept. 17, 1993) at 1 in Comments of 
South Plains Association of Governments in Response to EEOC Request for Comments 
(suggesting use of mediators from federal and local government agencies as means of 
handling more cases and fostering accessibility to mediation) (on file with author). These 
mediators could be accessed through a contractual arrangement with one or more dispute 
resolution agencies or by maintaining a roster of trained mediators. In addition, the 
Administrative Conference maintains a roster of neutrals available for use in agency 
disputes. See THOMAS R. COLOSI & CHRISTOPHER B. COLOSI, Administrative Conference 
of the United States, Mediation: A Primer for Federal Agencies 12 (1988). 
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possibility should not be overlooked.392 Pro bono mediation of ADA 
cases may assist private mediators in increasing their experience and 
expanding their potential client base. This same advantage may encourage 
some mediators to handle ADA cases at low cost. The agencies also could 
explore using grants to existing mediation agencies.393 These agencies 
often have sources of volunteer or low cost mediators.394 There are a 
number of additional ways to fund mediation that are consistent with 
government spending regulations, and limited, of course, by the agencies' 
budgets.395 
Use of each source of mediators will require some training.396 It goes 
without saying that the mediators should be trained in mediation skills. 397 
In addition, essentials of any training program for ADA mediators include 
the following. The mediator must have a general understanding of various 
392. The D.C. Department of Human Rights uses volunteer mediators. Community 
dispute resolution centers frequently use volunteer mediators quite successfully. See Susan 
J. Rogers, Ten Ways to Work More Effectively with Volunteer Mediators, 7 NEG. J. 201 
(1991) (offering useful suggestions for effective use and motivation of volunteer mediators). 
Professor Lamont Stallworth, a dispute resolution professional from the Chicago Center for 
Employment Dispute Resolution, has suggested that neutrals may have a professional 
obligation to take several cases each year pro bono. ADR Needed for Civil Rights 
Enforcement, 144 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 284, 284 (November 11, 1993). Lawyers trained 
in mediation might fulfill pro bono obligations by mediating cases. 
393. Such grants were used for the pilot projects. Some organizations already have 
initiated private mediation services for ADA cases. For example, the Trade Winds 
Rehabilitation Center, Inc. in Gary, Indiana, has an ADA mediation program. See Trade 
Winds Rehabilitation Center, Inc., Northwest Indiana Americans with Disabilities Act 
MediationProject(l995) (describing ADA mediation program). 
394. See supra note 392 (discussing sources of volunteer mediators). 
395. See George D. Ruttinger, Acquiring the Services of Neutrals for Alternative Means 
of Dispute Resolution and NegotiatedRulemaking, Report to the Administrative Conference 
of the United States, 877-902 (Nov. 19, 1986) (discussing various methods ofacquiring and 
paying neutrals for use in government ADR). The process is complicated by the fact that 
a number of different agencies are involved in ADA enforcement and potentially in ADA 
mediation, should a common corps of mediators be used. 
396. Insuring that neutrals are qualified is particularly important when the parties do not 
have a choice as to which neutral to use. See Linda Singer, SETILING DISPUTES 170 ( 1990) 
(citing Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SP/DR) Commission on Qualifica-
tions, Qualifying Neutrals: The Basic Principles (1989)). The SPIDR Commission on 
Qualifications emphasizes competent performance over formal qualifications such as degrees 
and specialized training. Id. 
397. For one listing of such skills, see Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution 
(SP/DR) Commission on Qualifications, Qualifying Neutrals: The Basic Principles, 17-19 
(1989) (among requisite skills are abilir; to listen actively, ability to analyze problems, 
identify issues and frame issues, and sensitivity to values of the disputants). 
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types of disabilities and the impact that such disabilities have on the lives 
of individuals. 398 In particular, the mediator must understand the impact 
of disabilities on the dispute resolution process and the ways to make the 
mediation accessible to individuals with disabilities.399 The mediator 
should have an understanding of the ADA.400 While the mediator is not 
a legal advisor to the parties, the mediator must be aware of the legal 
context in which the dispute arises and the standards that would be 
applicable if the case were litigated.401 The mediator must be knowledge-
able about available resources in the community at the national, state and 
local level which can aid in reaching a satisfactory settlement.402 These 
398. Targeting Disability Needs, supra note 117. This publication, which was written 
by the American Bar Association Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law and 
the Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly and published by the American 
Association of Retired Persons for the National Institute for Dispute Resolution is an 
excellent source for alerting mediators and mediation programs to issues relating to the ADA 
and the source of many of the training recommendations herein. 
399. Targeting Disability Needs, supra note 117 at 22-37 (discussing how various 
disabilities affect dispute resolution and suggesting ways to make dispute resolution 
accessible to individuals with disabilities). 
400. See Qualifying Neutrals: The Basic Principles, supra note 397, at 19 (recommend-
ing consideration of performance criteria including knowledge of the process that will be 
used to resolve dispute if no agreement is reached and awareness of legal standards that 
would be applicable if cases were litigated); Lawyers Committee Comments, supra note 321 
at 3 (stating that mediators without knowledge of law cannot effectively demonstrate 
strengths and weaknesses of parties' positions and probable outcome of litigation). 
401. Some mediation scholars suggest that subject matter expertise is irrelevant in 
mediation. See Stephen B. Goldberg, A Qualified Mediator's Skills Don't Depend on 
Experience, NAT'L L.J., April 11, 1994, at Cl4 (arguing that mediator does not need 
expertise in subject matter of dispute). An expert mediator certainly could resolve an ADA 
dispute without ADA expertise. Nevertheless, training in the ADA should be required for 
several reasons. Under the proposed program, the mediated agreements will be reviewed 
by the agencies for consistency with the statute. Also, the knowledgeable mediator can 
assist in settlement by previewing the possible outcomes of a trial, causing the parties to 
view their case more realistically. Id. Finally, because statutory rights are involved, the 
mediator should be sufficiently knowledgeable to alert unsophisticated parties to statutory 
issues. Thus, training in the ADA should be required, although extensive expertise should 
not. See President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, ADR 
Workgroup, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the ADA 6 (Dec. 2, 1992) (on file with 
author) (listing training necessary for ADA dispute resolvers). 
402. See Targeting Disability Needs, supra note 117, at 38-39 (discussing available 
resources). Targeting Disability Needs not only lists resources, but offers suggestions on 
how such resources might be used. Through the technical assistance programs, the agencies 
have identified resources as well. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
A Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, Resource Directory (1992). The information should be updated on a 
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resources may have ideas for solutions to accessibility or accommodation 
problems or may offer services that will assist in providing solutions. Use 
of such resources may make the difference between settlement or no 
settlement. Furthermore, in addition to specific ADA training, mediators 
of statutory civil rights cases need to be aware of mediation techniques for 
dealing with power imbalances. This issue will be discussed further below. 
None of the sources of mediators discussed is unquestionably superior 
to the others, assuming adequate training and a sufficient number of 
mediators to handle the cases in a timely fashion. Use of outside 
mediators, however, may enhance the acceptability of the mediation process 
to the parties, require less training, and provide necessary geographical 
diversity. Furthermore, development of a cadre of experienced private 
ADA mediators may encourage disputants to use mediation without filing 
charges with the agency, thereby, freeing agency resources and reducing 
governmental enforcement expenditures. As discussed below, however, the 
agency must retain some control over the process to ensure protection of 
statutory rights. The issue of protection of rights raises several other issues 
which must be considered in designing a mediation program. They include 
the following: 1) agency review and approval of settlements; 2) enforceabil-
ity of settlements; 3) imbalances of power; 4) the role of attorneys m 
mediation; 5) the need for and use of experts; and 6) confidentiality. 
d. Agency Review and Approval of Settlements 
Because the issues involve statutory rights and the mediation referral 
contemplated is a part of the agencies' processes, the agencies should retain 
a role in the settlements. Whether or not the mediator is an agency 
employee, the referring agency should review settlement agreements 
reached in mediation for consistency with the statute, and approve the 
agreements that meet established criteria.403 The range of acceptable 
continual basis. Local area disability rights organizations or government agencies dealing 
with civil rights or disability issues might have, or be willing to compile, information about 
local resources for use in mediation. Furthermore, business groups may provide such 
resources. For example, a number ofnational companies have formed Project Access, which 
provides information to businesses on compliance with the ADA and resources for issues 
relating to employment of individuals with disabilities. See Peter David Blanck, 
Communicating the Americans With Disabilities Act, Transcending Compliance: A Case 
Report on Sears, Roebuck and Co. 21 (Washington, D.C.: The Annenberg Washington 
Program in Communications Policy Studies of Northwestern University, 1994) (describing 
Project Access) (on file with author). 
403. See Lawyers Committee Comments, supra note 321, at 3 (arguing that EEOC 
should be involved in each ADR proceeding to insure consistency with purposes of Civil 
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agreements should be wide because the facts of cases and the strength of 
cases varies widely. Nevertheless, to the extent possible, the agencies 
should ensure that charging parties with strong cases are not being coerced 
to settle for little because of their lack of power and money, and that 
respondents are not coerced to pay significant sums to charging parties in 
frivolous cases to avoid large litigation costs or bad publicity. In addition, 
this review process can be used to identify repeat offenders who may have 
systemic discrimination problems which are being settled with individuals. 
The effective use of agency review for this purpose will help prevent 
sacrificing the goal of resolution of systemic discrimination to the goal of 
speedy resolution of individual disputes. Upon discovery of systemic 
problems, the EEOC and the Department of Justice can utilize their 
litigation authority to remedy the systemic discrimination. 
While review of settlements will add to the agency workload, the 
reduction in investigations should make up for the additional work. To 
minimize the added burden, the agencies could create either guidelines for 
settlement approval or settlement agreement forms containing required 
language.404 To avoid significant limitations on the creativity of the 
parties and the mediator, however, guidelines or settlement forms should be 
extremely flexible, with few rigid requirements. One useful requirement, 
however, would be language regarding enforcement of the settlement.405 
Development of guidelines regarding settlement could provide other 
benefits as well. These guidelines could assist the mediator and the parties 
in determining what appropriate settlements might be. Such a guide would 
be particularly useful for parties operating without representation in the 
mediation process.406 
Rights laws). Because the agencies enforcing Titles I, II and III have the authority, on their 
own or through the Justice Department, to litigate violations of the statute, they also have 
the authority to approve or reject settlements of disputes. The FCC can accept settlements 
as final judgments or take action to enforce the statute despite the settlement. Dubroof, 
supra note 185. The EEOC signed agreements reached through the rapid charge processing 
procedure. Silver, supra note 224, at 579. 
404. The D.C. Department of Human Rights has used a settlement agreement form for 
mediated settlements. The Federal Transit Administration has established guidelines for 
voluntary compliance agreements. See Informal Compliance Process, supra note 358, at 
Attachment II. 
405. See discussion of enforceability infra notes 407-414. 
406. To be most useful to the mediator and the parties, the guidelines should include 
what a full remedy would be if the case were successfully litigated. See PEER Study, supra 
note 247, at 152-53 (recommending such guidelines to inform parties in order to inject 
realistic assessments into negotiations). The risk of such guidelines is that individuals with 
weak cases and no legal advice might rigidly adhere to unrealistic expectations about 
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Another possible approach is to require the mediator or the parties to 
submit a brief statement to the agency in support of the proposed settlement 
agreement. Such a statement could summarize the facts and the factual and 
legal disputes, providing information that would enable the agency to 
determine whether to approve the agreement. Given the confidential nature 
of mediation, agreement of the parties to the statement should be required 
before the statement is submitted to the agency. However, such a 
requirement might hinder negotiations by requiring negotiations over the 
statement in addition to the settlement agreement. It is unclear whether 
agreement to such a statement would be a stumbling block in negotiations 
and whether it would be valuable to the agency. Thus, the agencies should 
consider experimenting with this requirement. 
e. Enforceability of Mediated Agreements 
The goal of mediation is to settle cases. These settlements, however, 
achieve the statutory goal only if they are enforceable. While studies of 
mediation indicate that compliance with agreements is widespread,407 a 
successful mediation program should result in enforceable agreements to 
help ensure such compliance. Judicial decisions in cases involving 
enforcement of settlement agreements under Title VII, on which the 
enforcement provisions of Title I of the ADA are based, have reached 
varying results.408 There is disagreement over whether federal courts have 
jurisdiction to enforce such agreements. Recently, the Tenth Circuit held 
that an action to enforce a settlement agreement in a Title VII case was an 
action for breach of contract under state law, over which the federal court 
had no jurisdiction.409 Other courts have found such actions to be 
enforceable under Title VIl.41° Courts have split on whether exhaustion 
settlement. 
407. See supra note 289 and accompanying text (noting high compliance rates). 
408. See cases cited infra at notes 409-12 and accompanying text. 
409. See Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that federal 
court had no jurisdiction over suit to enforce private settlement of Title VII claim). Unlike 
the cases cited supra note 410, Morris did not involve a predetermination settlement 
agreement and therefore, according to the court, did not implicate the statutory enforcement 
scheme. 39 F.3d at 1111-12 n.4. 
410. See, e.g., EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 467 U.S. 1204 ( 1984) (holding conciliation agreement enforceable); EEOC v. Henry 
Beck Co., 729 F.2d 301, 306 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that because contrary holding would 
enable respondents to use concilation as a delaying tactic impairing enforcement ofTitle VII, 
settlement agreement negotiated under rapid charge processing procedures was enforceable 
by EEOC); James v. Texas Dept. of Human Serv., 818 F. Supp. 987, 990 (N.D. Tex. 1993) 
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of administrative remedies is required before filing suit to enforce a 
settlement agreement.411 
To ensure enforceable agreements, the ADA could be amended to make 
failure to comply with a mediated settlement agreement unlawful. Barring 
such amendment, the agencies should be willing to seek enforcement of 
such agreements in order to make the mediation program a success. If, as 
is the case in most mediation programs, noncompliance is rare, enforcement 
will not be a strain on agency resources. The agencies should also support 
individuals seeking judicial enforcement where requested. As the Fifth 
Circuit noted in Safeway Stores, lack of enforceability would undermine the 
statutory scheme, allowing respondents to use conciliation to delay and 
possibly make proof of discrimination more difficult, seriously prejudicing 
the complainants and the agency.412 The ADA's encouragement of ADR 
strongly supports enforceability of mediated settlement agreements. The 
arguments for enforcement are compelling and should be made forcefully 
by the agencies.413 
(holding action to enforce settlement agreement actionable under Title VII and therefore, 
federal court has jurisdiction); Sherman v. Standard Rate Data Serv., Inc. 709 F. Supp. 1433, 
1440 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding that federal court has jurisdiction over private action to 
predetermination settlement agreement); Kiper v. Louisiana St. Bd. of Elementary and 
Secondary Educ., 592 F. Supp. 1343, 1359 (M.D. La. 1984) (holding that federal court has 
jurisdiction over action by aggrieved employee to enforce conciliation agreement). Some 
courts have recognized a distinction between enforcement of conciliated agreements after a 
cause finding and enforcement of agreements negotiated prior to determination. See also 
EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F. 2d 605, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that EEOC 
may not seek enforcement of settlement agreement without investigation and determination 
of reasonable cause). Other courts have found no distinction. See Eatmon v. Bristol Steel 
and Iron Works, 769 F.2d 1503, 1511 (I Ith Cir. 1985) (finding no distinction between 
conciliation agreements and predetermination settlement agreements for purposes of 
jurisdiction over enforcement actions). To the extent that the courts recognize a distinction, 
an agreement reached in mediation as contemplated herein would be a predetermination 
settlement agreement. 
411. Compare Blank v. Donovan, 780 F.2d 808, 809 (9th Cir. 1986) (settlement 
agreement negotiated pursuant to Title VII complaint not enforceable where Title VII 
administrative requirements have not been exhausted) and Parsons v. Yellow Freight Sys., 
741 F.2d 871, 874 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff seeking to enforce settlement 
agreement resulting from Title VII proceeding must exhaust administrative requirements 
before filing enforcement action in court) with Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 
769 F.2d 1503, 1508 (I Ith Cir. 1985) (no exhaustion required prior to enforcement action 
based on settlement agreement) and Sherman v. Standard Rate Data Serv ., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 
1433, 1441 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (exhaustion of administrative remedies not required before 
action to enforce Title VII settlement agreement). 
412. 714 F.2d at 573. 
413. Questions about enforceability may discourage participation in the process. 
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In addition to active enforcement, the agencies have two other roles to 
play in the enforcement area. First, review of the agreement should include 
review for enforceability. As noted above, enforcement language could be 
drafted by the agencies as a guide for the mediator and the parties. Also, 
the agreement to mediate should include agreement that any settlement 
reached is enforceable by the agency.414 While such agreement would not 
confer jurisdiction on the federal courts, it would at a minimum allow the 
agency to seek enforcement on a contractual basis. Second, education 
about mediation should include information about enforcement of mediated 
agreements so that the decision about whether to mediate is an informed 
one. 
f Power Imbalances 
Because mediations in ADA cases often will involve an individual with 
a disability and a business or government entity, concern about power 
imbalances surface. The complainants may be at a disadvantage in this 
informal procedure because of the historical discrimination they have 
endured and their lack of resources.415 All power imbalances cannot be 
eliminated in mediation and these imbalances are also present in investiga-
tion and litigation proceedings. Nevertheless, steps can and should be taken 
to ensure that power imbalances do not adversely affect either party in 
ways unique to mediation.416 
The current debate in the dispute resolution community, with respect to 
the role of the mediator, affects this issue.417 One view of mediation 
limits the role of the mediator to obtaining a settlement on any terms 
agreeable to the parties. Under this view, the mediator should not impose 
upon the parties his or her own view of the merits of the case, the merits 
414. The mediated settlement agreements in the EEOC pilot project were enforceable by 
the agency. R. Gaul Silberman, Susan E. Murphy, & Susan P. Adams, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution of Employment Discrimination Claims, 54 LA. L. REV. 1533, 1557 (1994). 
415. In a given case, however, the disadvantaged party might be the small employer 
faced with a disability rights organization. 
416. While prejudice certainly is not unique to mediators, the informality of mediation 
may increase the chance that these prejudices have an influential impact. Delgado et al., 
supra note 295, at 1386. Mediation lacks certain protections against acting on bias that are 
present in the judicial setting. Trina Grillo, The MediationAlternative:Process Dangers for 
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1588-90 (1991). 
417. For discussions of these views of mediation, see Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency 
and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and Ethical 
Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253, 259-62 (1989); MOORE, supra note 343, at 
34-35, 40-42. 
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of any proposals offered, or the merits of the settlement reached. Under an 
alternative view, the mediator plays a more active role in informing the 
parties of the applicable law and attempting to settle the dispute in light of 
the legal rights of the parties. The clear view of some people is that the 
latter approach, identified as "rights-based mediation," is most appropriate 
for ADA mediation.418 A third view is that mediation is not the most 
appropriate vehicle for dispute resolution, where the goal is efficiency or 
protection of rights.419 Instead, mediation is effective and should be 
employed where the goal is empowennent.420 This report does not 
attempt to resolve, or even enter, this debate. As proposed here, mediation 
attempts to further all three goals-efficiency, protection of rights, and 
empowerment of the parties. 
Mediation in the statutory rights context, however, should not be 
undertaken without the parties' and the mediators' awareness of the 
statutory rights involved. Accordingly, the agencies' education role should 
include learning about statutory rights and remedies.421 Such education 
will alleviate much of the power disparity that results from lack of 
knowledge or information. Additionally, education of the mediators about 
statutory rights and disabilities will reduce their biases. Furthermore, there 
are mediation techniques that can be used to deal with imbalances of power 
while remaining neutral, as the mediator is required by ethical standards to 
do.422 
In addition to the use of adequately trained mediators, monitored to 
ensure acceptable performance, the agencies can assist in balancing power 
by encouraging parties to bring a representative or advocate to the 
mediation.423 One trained group of potential advocates for complainants 
exists as a result of the joint EEOC/DOJ training. The training could be 
repeated or expanded, and technical assistance grants could be used to 
418. Targeting Disability Needs, supra note 117, at 9-10. 
419. Bush, supra note 417, at 262-66. 
420. Id. 
421. See supra notes 361-68 and accompanying text. This education can be accom-
plished primarily through written materials, many of which have already been created by the 
agencies' technical assistance programs. The recent Department of Justice grant for 
mediator training, for example, contemplates the development of a consumer's guide to 
mediation. The key is insuring party access to these materials through an organized effort 
by agency personnel. 
422. See Targeting Disability Needs, supra note 117, at 30-31 (discussing mediation 
techniques for balancing power while remaining neutral); MOORE, supra note 345, at 280-82 
(discussing mediation techniques for dealing with parties with unequal power). 
423. See Targeting Disability Needs, supra note 117, at 31 (noting that advocate may 
assist in balancing power). 
1088 THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1007 
encourage disability and business organizations to provide such training.424 
In addition, the agencies might consider maintaining lists of organizations 
providing advocacy services for the use of parties seeking representa-
tion.425 Alternatively, a staff person knowledgeable about the ADA could 
serve as a resource for unrepresented parties. The staff person should be 
limited to providing information, and barred from giving legal advice.426 
One or more of the individuals who do initial screening of cases could 
perform this function. In addition to the efforts mentioned, the agencies 
424. Some training efforts have been initiated already. For example, in February 1995 
the Department of Rights of Virginians with Disabilities presented a selfadvocacy workshop 
on Titles II and III of the ADA designed to teach individuals with disabilities, family 
members and advocates about ADA rights and responsibilities to enable them to achieve 
compliance for themselves and others with disabilities. Information from program brochure 
for Access to Programs and Services: A Self Advocacy Workshop on Titles II & III of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 
425. See PEER Study, supra note 247, at 184. At one time, the EEOC maintained lists 
of attorneys for referrals of charging parties. Where one party has an attorney and the other 
does not, the party without legal representation may be at some disadvantage. In a given 
dispute, either party could be disadvantaged by lack of representation. See Comments of the 
Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association Concerning the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission Request for Comments Regarding Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution and 
Negotiated RulemakingProcedures, (Sept. 10, 1993), at 2; CommentsofNational Federation 
of Independent Business in Response to EEOC Request for Comments, Letter from John J. 
Motley, III, (Sept. 22, 1993), at l (both on file with author). Some systems have limited 
the role of attorneys to minimize this problem, and avoid legalization of the process. See 
MOORE, supra note 345, at l 07-08; Grillo, supra note 416, at 1597; PEER Study, supra note 
247, at 36. The better approach would allow attorneys, however, encouraging the unrepre-
sented party to obtain representation or using mediation techniques to balance the power 
differentials. Lawyers may serve as protectors of rights and provide a buffer between 
adverse parties. Grillo, supra note 416, at 1597-1600. There is insufficient research to 
indicate whether lawyers help or hinder settlement prospects. Moore, supra note 345, at 
108. 
The EEOC Pilot Program revealed a concern for fairness on the part of the parties 
where the other party appeared with an unanticipated representative. The outside evaluator 
recommended that the agency develop criteria for who may participate in a mediation 
session and at what point such decisions must be made. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot 
Program, supra note 102, at 5. While barring attorneys is not recommended, guidelines as 
to number of representatives permitted and a time limit for notifying the mediator of such 
representatives are appropriate. Each party should then be notified as to who will be 
representing the other party to avoid surprises and resulting fairness concerns. 
426. The staff person should be someone who will have no role to play in the mediation, 
investigation, or litigation of the case, however. This function might also be performed by 
technical assistance staff. Use of any agency staff for such a function might generate 
accusations of agency bias, however. 
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should carefully monitor settlements reached through mediation to ensure 
that neither party is disadvantaged by the mediation process.427 
g. Confidentiality 
Another issue, mentioned briefly above, is whether the mediation is 
confidential or whether the information revealed in mediation is available 
to the agency for its investigation should mediation be unsuccessful. 
Allowing the use of information from the mediation for investigative 
purposes would conserve resources, as the investigator would not have to 
duplicate the mediator's efforts. Balanced against this efficiency goal is the 
impact of lack of confidentiality on settlement agreements. Although 
candid participation in mediation increases the probability of settlement, a 
party might be unwilling to disclose information that might aid in a 
settlement if the information could be used in the investigation to the 
party's detriment.428 Candid participation in mediation should increase the 
probability of settlement.429 Additionally, confidentiality minimizes the 
possibility that a party will participate in mediation only as a form of 
discovery.430 Also, the confidentiality of mediation may be an incentive 
for the parties to choose mediation over litigation.431 
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act requires confidentiality in 
dispute resolution proceedings, with limited exceptions.432 It might be 
argued that mediation in the course of investigation, like that conducted 
under the rapid charge processing procedure, is not a dispute resolution 
proceeding covered by the Act. Even if such an argument were to prevail, 
427. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Project, supra note 102, at 5 (recommending such 
monitoring). 
428. See Philip J. Harter, Neither Cop nor Collection Agent: Encouraging Administra-
tive Settlements by Ensuring Mediator Confidentiality,41 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 324 ( 1989) 
(indicating that fear that disclosure may be used to party's detriment will discourage candor). 
429. Moore, supra note 345, at 160 (noting that confidentiality is considered to be a 
necessity in mediation); SINGER, supra note 359, at 171-72 (indicating that candid 
participation allows development of satisfactory solutions). The parties need to know that 
information disclosed to the mediator in caucus sessions will not be disclosed to the other 
party absent authorization. See Recommendation 88-11 of the Administrative Conference 
of the United States, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 357, 358 (1989) (confidential caucus sessions 
encourage candor including raising sensitive and creative ideas). 
430. Id. 
431. See FOLBERG, & TAYLOR, supra note 289, at 35 (suggesting that unlike litigation, 
matter in mediation can be discussed privately); SINGER, supra note 359, at 172. 
432. See 5 U.S.C. § 574 (1994) (preventing neutrals and parties in ADR proceedings 
from disclosing confidential communications with limited exceptions and barring 
admissibility of improperly disclosed communcations). 
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however, the rationale supporting the Act's confidentiality provisions is 
persuasive, outweighing efficiency concerns, and should be followed in the 
mediation process recommended here.433 Nevertheless, confidentiality 
should not bar agency review of the settlement agreement recommended 
above. 
h. Technical Experts 
ADA mediation may require the use of technical experts to facilitate 
settlement. Engineers, architects, rehabilitation experts, and experts in 
particular disabilities are among those whose expertise might be required 
in a given case. Training of mediators in resource availability will aid in 
bringing expertise into mediation. Selection of mediators with expertise is 
another method.434 Agencies should seek to ascertain whether mediators 
have such expertise and assign cases to them on that basis. In addition, 
regardless of the mediator source utilized, the agencies should encourage 
individuals with the required expertise to train as mediators. Government 
employees with related training, knowledge and/or experience could be 
encouraged to train as mediators. Technical assistance grants or FMCS 
could be used for such training.435 
Where the mediator is not the source of expertise, cost of the expert 
becomes an issue. While the parties to the dispute could agree to use and 
pay an expert, provision of technical assistance at no cost would facilitate 
resolution of the dispute in many cases.436 While some assistance is 
available pro bono, other experts charge for their services. To facilitate 
settlement, the agencies could utilize several methods of obtaining experts. 
As in the case of mediators, some experts, both within and outside the 
government, might provide services at little or no cost. 437 Alternatively, 
the agencies could set aside funds for technical assistance on an ad hoc 
basis when deemed necessary by the mediator. A third alternative is to 
433. See Harter, supra note 428 (discussing confidentiality issues). 
434. In labor arbitration, the parties to a dispute requiring technical expertise frequently 
select an arbitrator with such expertise. 
435. As a part of the training, the technical experts could serve as co-mediators, 
providing their expertise while learning mediation techniques. 
436. For example, the actual construction cost of making a business accessible might be 
small, but an architect might be needed to determine how to access the facility most easily 
and to draw up plans for doing so. Without the architect's expertise, the parties may be 
unaware of the low cost option for accessibility and unwilling to pay for the architect's 
services without some assurance that a resolution of the dispute will result. 
43 7. The agencies could work out a worksharing arrangement with government agencies 
employing individuals with relevant technical expertise. 
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employ one or more trained experts to be utilized in mediation. The 
problem with the latter approach is the difficulty of finding one or even 
several individuals with expertise in the broad range of areas likely to be 
needed in ADA disputes. Nonetheless, to the extent possible, expertise 
should be available at minimal cost to the parties. 
i. Monitoring and Evaluation 
The proposal for a mediation program set forth above is based on the 
best current information available. The key to a successful program, 
however, is continued monitoring, evaluation, and revision where necessary 
to accomplish the goals of the program.438 The broad goals of any change 
in the dispute settlement process, as set forth above, include effective 
enforcement of the statute and efficient resolution of disputes. The 
mediation program should be evaluated against these broad goals. 
To add to the information provided by the existing pilot programs, the 
proposed program should be structured to enable empirical evaluation based 
on specific criteria established prior to the commencement of the pro-
gram. 439 These criteria should be developed with the assistance of the 
recommended advisory committee. Moreover, employment of a profession-
al evaluator, similar to the EEOC pilot program, will assist in creating an 
evaluation system that will provide the data necessary to determine whether 
mediation meets the statutory goals and will be cost effective on a larger 
scale.440 
The evaluation process should include the parties, the mediators, and 
agency personnel at all levels who have any involvement with the 
process.441 Data collected from the program results should include: the 
settlement rates, both overall and by the type of case, use of party 
438. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Implementing the ADR Act: 
Guidance for Agency Dispute Resolution Specialists 55-58 (1992) (providing guidance in 
evaluating ADR programs); Administrative Conference of the United States, Dispute 
Systems Design Working Group, Performance Indicators/or ADR Program Evaluation 1 
(Nov. 1993) (noting importance of program evaluation). For a useful guide for evaluation, 
see ELIZABETII ROLPH & ERIK MOLLER, Evaluating Agency Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Programs: A Users' Guide to Data Collection and Use (1995). 
439. See Designing Systems, supra note 322, section I, at 8-9. 
440. As noted in Implementing the ADR Act, supra note 438, at 58, evaluation issues 
should be considered in planning the project. 
441. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 5, 6 (showing that 
revaluation process included parties, mediators and agency personnel); PEER Study, supra 
note 24 7, at 13 (indicating that evaluation process included administrative agency personnel, 
interest groups, professional associations, attorneys, complainants, and respondents). 
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representatives, and use of technical expertise; party satisfaction, overall 
and broken down by the type of case and representation; comparison of 
mediated settlements with settlement guidelines, settlements reached 
through other processes, and litigation results;442 an assessment of 
mediator quality;443 the impact on systemic litigation; any changes in the 
case backlogs; the comparative processing time of mediated cases and other 
cases; the rate of compliance with the mediated agreements; agency 
approval rates of mediated settlements; and the relative costs and benefits 
of the mediation project.444 
Collection and analysis of this data from the program should assist in 
answering the following issues: (1) whether the mediation program is 
consistent with statutory goals; (2) whether the mediation program 
adversely impacts systemic litigation of ADA issues; (3) whether the 
mediation program reduces case processing time and the backlog; (4) 
whether mediation reduces the cost of case processing for the parties and/or 
the government; (5) whether at a particular point in the investigative 
process mediation is most effective; (6) whether mediation is more effective 
for certain types of cases; (7) whether mediation disadvantages disabled 
individuals or other historically disadvantaged groups; (8) whether the 
process is equally fair and effective for represented and unrepresented 
parties; (9) whether the results of mediated settlements, settlements reached 
through other processes, and litigation in similar cases are comparable; (10) 
what are the best sources of qualified mediators; (11) whether the parties 
comply with mediated settlements; (12) whether a common group of 
442. This comparison will facilitate the determination of whether particular groups are 
being disadvantaged by mediation. 
443. For useful discussions on selection and evaluation of mediators, See generally 
Christopher Honeyman, Five Elements of Mediation, 4 NEG. J. 149 (1988) (discussing 
mediator selection by Wisconsin Employment Relations Commision); Christopher 
Honeyman, On Evaluating Mediators, 6 NEG. J. 23 ( 1990) (discussing various methods of 
evaluating mediators). See also SPIDR Commission on Qualifications Report, supra note 
397 (discussing qualifications and selection of mediators). 
444. These criteria should incorporate the question of whether settlements are reached 
in cases in which mediators believe that discrimination occurred. See supra note 116 and 
accompanying text. The mediation program should not be a means by which individuals 
obtain relief they would not be entitled under the statute from respondents desirous of 
avoiding litigation and bad publicity. Nor should it allow respondents who have violated 
the law to settle a case cheaply to the disadvantage of the complainant. Instead, it should 
provide rapid, effective relief for complainants whose rights have been violated. 
Additionally, if mediation resolves only those cases that would otherwise settle in the 
investigation process, then it adds little of benefit, unless early settlement saves investigation 
resources at least equivalent to the resources expended in mediation. 
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mediators is effective in handling disputes under the various titles of the 
ADA and achieves promised efficiency; (13) whether availability of 
technical expertise affects settlement; and (14) whether agency approval of 
mediated settlements is effective and necessary. In addition, the program 
can test some of the specific proposals set forth herein for effectiveness, 
providing a basis for retaining or altering them in the future. 445 
This analysis of the program, along with analyses of the other pilots, will 
establish a base of knowledge that will enable design of the most effective 
continuing mediation program. In addition, if the programs demonstrate 
that mediation is a fair and satisfactory method of resolving disputes, 
parties in the future will be encouraged to participate in mediation in 
greater numbers. More participants in the mediation process may lead not 
only to expansion of agency-sponsored mediation, but to the growth of 
private mediation of ADA disputes, which will reduce agency caseloads 
without detracting from statutory goals. A determination of whether 
mediation disadvantages disabled individuals is particularly important in 
ensuring that the statutory goal of elimination of discrimination is not 
compromised by mediation and in encouraging complainants to participate 
in mediation. 
An important caveat is that the evaluation of the program and evaluations 
of mediators, whether agency employees or outsiders, should avoid 
overemphasis on settlement rates. The goal of statutory enforcement should 
not be outweighed by the goal of settlement, which is probable if settlement 
rate is the crucial factor in evaluations. Because settlement is the goal of 
mediation, mediators will likely measure their own success by settlement. 
The agencies should counterbalance the resulting tendency to push for 
settlement at all costs by reassuring mediators that there are cases that will 
not, and should not, settle, and recognizing that fact in the evaluation. 
Furthermore, systematic evaluation on an ongoing basis should be 
continued throughout the program. Such evaluation will provide the data 
needed to alter the program as necessary for successful mediation, or to 
eliminate it if it no longer meets its goals. 
445. The program could use several sources of mediators and compare their effectiveness 
or evaluate the impact of the educational programs on participation rates and power 
imbalances. The program might vary the timing of mediation in the investigation process 
and compare the effectiveness of mediation when used earlier and later in the investigation 
process. 
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j. Scope of the Program 
The recommended mediation program could be initiated as a larger pilot 
program than has been tried thus far, encompassing a range of ADA cases. 
Such a pilot would permit the agencies to try the mediation proposal on a 
limited, low cost basis. The proposed pilot would add to the information 
provided by the EEOC and DOJ pilot programs in several ways. The 
EEOC program analyzed all cases mediated, revealing limited information 
about mediation of ADA cases. In addition, because the only issues 
mediated were discharge, discipline, and terms and conditions of employ-
ment, the program excluded many ADA cases from mediation, including 
reasonable accommodation cases, which would appear to have significant 
potential for mediated solutions. The DOJ pilots will mediate few, if any, 
Title II cases, and no mediation program has included Title IV cases. 
Thus, an additional pilot would enable more accurate assessment of the 
effectiveness of mediation for various types of ADA cases. As a result, any 
permanent program could be targeted at those cases in which mediation is 
most effective. In addition, the proposed program will test the efficacy of 
using a common group of mediators for all ADA cases. 
Alternatively, based on the previous pilot programs446 and other 
mediation research set forth in this report, the program could be implement-
ed on a larger scale, with careful monitoring and evaluation to allow 
modification for effectiveness. Given the EEOC's forthcoming mediation 
program, initiation of the joint ADA program recommended seems 
appropriate. 
4. Other Uses of ADR 
Adoption of a mediation program should not end ADR efforts of ADA 
agencies. As noted above, the use of ADA mediation by the agencies is 
likely to spur private mediation, particularly if private mediators gain 
experience in ADA mediation through a government program.447 The 
agencies could continue to use technical assistance to encourage organiza-
tions such as dispute resolution centers to establish ADA mediation 
446. If completed as anticipated, the prior pilots will mediate 850 ADA cases and 267 
employment discrimination cases, some of which were ADA cases. 
447. For an article supporting the use of private mediation in Title III cases, see 
Herrnanek, supra note 391. See infra Section IV, 4a. (discussing agency review of privately 
mediated settlements). 
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programs.448 Growth of private mediation will reduce dependency on 
government resources for statutory enforcement. 
a. Arbitration 
In addition to mediation, private arbitration is growing, particularly in 
the employment arena.449 The growth in arbitration was spurred by the 
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 450 
In Gilmer, the Court held that an individual employee who had signed an 
arbitration agreement as a part of his application for registration with the 
New York Stock Exchange was bound to arbitrate a statutory claim of age 
discrimination.451 The Gilmer Court, following a recent trend of Supreme 
Court's decisions favoring arbitration of statutory disputes, rejected the 
argument that arbitration is procedurally and substantively inadequate to 
resolve such disputes.452 
Gilmer was based on the Federal Arbitration Act,453 which reflects a 
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.454 Commentators 
on Gilmer have speculated about whether it will be applied to require 
arbitration under employment agreements, because the Federal Arbitration 
Act states that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other class of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. "455 There is disagreement in 
448. The Department of Justice grant is one example of how such a grant might be used. 
See discussion of the grant supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text. 
449. See Loren K. Allison & Eric H.J. Stahlhut, Arbitration and the ADA: A Budding 
Partnership, 48 ARB. J. 53 ( 1993) (noting increasing use of arbitration of statutory 
employment discrimination laws); see also Thomas J. Piskorski & David B. Ross, Private 
Arbitration as the Exclusive Means of Resolving Employment-Related Disputes, 19 EMP. 
Ra. L.J. 205, 205, 216-17 (1993) (noting that employers are increasingly considering 
arbitration to resolve employment disputes). 
450. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
451. Id. at 26. 
452. Id. at 27-32. The Court did examine the arbitration procedures at issue, however, 
finding them satisfactory. The court suggested that in the absence of certain protections, 
arbitration of statutory claims might inadequately protect statutory rights. Id. 
453. 9 U.S.C. § I (1994). 
454. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I, 24 (1983)). 
455. 9 U.S.C. § 1. For discussions of this issue, see, e.g., James A King, Jr. et al., 
Agreeing to Disagree on EEO Disputes, 9 LAB. LAW. 97, 107-14 (1993) (discussing scope 
of FAA exemption for employment contracts and arguing that it should be read to exclude 
only contracts of employees actively engaged in transportation); Stephen A Plass, Arbi-
trating, Waiving and Deferring Title VII Claims, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 779, 791, n.66, 793 
1096 THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1007 
the lower federal courts about the scope of the exemption.456 With 
respect to the ADA, the legislative history supports a conclusion that an 
arbitration agreement should not preclude a statutory forum.457 Regardless 
(1992) (noting court's avoidance of issue of scope of the FAA); James A. Burstein & 
Kenneth D. Schwartz, Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation: The Supreme Court 
Endorses Arbitration of Age Discrimination Claims, 17 EMP. REL. L.J. 173, 181-83 (1991) 
(discussing arguments for and against narrow interpretation of FAA' s exclusion for 
employment contracts); Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without 
Unions, 66 CHI. KENT L. REV. 753, 753-54 ( 1990) (noting that Gilmer leaves issue of scope 
of exclusionary clause unresolved). 
456. See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 473 
(11th Cir. 1987) (holding that collective bargaining agreements are contracts of employment 
within meaning of FAA exemption); United Elec., Radio and Machine Workers v. Miller 
Metal Prods., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954) (holding that exclusionary clause exempts 
all employment contracts from FAA coverage); Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 827 F. 
Supp. 76, 78 (D.C. Mass. 1993) (holding that insurance sales agent required to arbitrate 
gender discrimination claim pursuant to arbitration clause in her agent contract, which is not 
excluded under FAA exemption for employment contracts); Williams v. Katten, Muchin & 
Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430, 1438 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that lawyer required to arbitrate 
claim of race, gender and religious discrimination because agreement not excluded under 
FAA exemption for employment contracts); Dancu v. Coopers& Lybrand, 778 F. Supp. 832 
(E.D. Pa. 1991) (noting that FAA exemption for employment contracts excludes workers 
actively involved in interstate transportation and not plaintiff who was involved in consulting 
services related to state and local government), aff'd without published opinion, 972 F.2d 
1330 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting narrow reading of employment contract exemption). 
457. See Legislative History, supra note 333, at 516-17 (stating "the Committee believes 
that the approach articulated by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 
applies equally to the ADA and does not intend that the inclusion of section 513 be used to 
preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be available to persons with disabilities"); 
Hayford, supra note 334, at 15-17 and authorities cited therein (discussing congressional 
statements indicating that use of ADR in ADA cases should be voluntary). In Alexanderv. 
Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974), the Supreme Court held that an employee was 
entitled to pursue an action in federal court alleging race discrimination under Title VII 
despite an arbitration decision finding that he was discharged for just cause. The issue of 
race discrimination had been raised before the arbitrator, but was not mentioned in the 
decision. Id. at 42. The Court found that the employee was entitled to a trial de novo 
because the two proceedings differed significantly. Id. at 56-58, 60. The Gilmer Court 
distinguished the Gardner-Denverdecision on several grounds. 500 U.S. at 33-35. First, 
the employees there, unlike Gilmer, had not agreed to arbitrate statutory claims and thus, the 
arbitrator had no authority to resolve such claims. Second, the Court noted the absence of 
the tension between collective and individual rights in Gilmer, which involved a nonunion 
workplace. The final differentiating factor was that the Gardner-Denvercase was decided 
under Title VII, not the Federal Arbitration Act. The ADA was passed before Gilmer was 
decided, however. See Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC 
Enforcement,23 STETSON L. REV. 53, 92 (1993) (suggesting that Gilmerdecision may have 
changed congressional understanding of legal limits on arbitration between passage of ADA 
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of how the courts decide the issue, the agencies will be faced with the 
question of whether to investigate and litigate cases where a private ADR 
proceeding has been conducted or agreed upon. The Court in Gilmer 
expressly noted that Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate did not preclude his 
filing of an EEOC charge or EEOC involvement in combating discrimina-
tion.458 
Arbitration of employment discrimination claims has generated 
substantial controversy.459 Arbitration may be imposed on unwilling or 
unknowing employees. 460 Additionally, the statutory rights and remedies 
may be unavailable in arbitration.461 For example, arbitration may 
eliminate discovery462 or restrict the arbitrator's authority to award 
damages. Furthermore, some arbitrators may be inclined to favor 
employers, since employers are likely to be repeat customers, while 
employees are not.463 The agencies should be alert to these concerns in 
and Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
458. 500 U.S. at 28. It is not clear, however, what the impact of a private arbitration 
award or settlement would be on the EEOC's ability to obtain individual relief. Livingston, 
supra note 457, at 95-96. 
459. Several members of Congress have introduced legislation to overturn the Gilmer 
decision and bar employers from requiring arbitration of discrimination claims. See H.R. 
4981, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.; S. 2405, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.; Legislation Bans Mandatory 
EEO Arbitration, 146 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 561 (Aug. 29, 1994) (citing concern over 
mandatory arbitration of discrimination claims, including particular concerns about 
arbitration in securities industry, members of Congress introduced companion bills to 
prohibit compulsory arbitration). 
460. See Jennifer R. Dowd, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements in Age Discrimination 
Suits: Gilmerv. lnterstateJohnson Lane Corp., 33 B.C.L. REV. 435, 455 (1992) (noting that 
after Gilmer, employees must be careful what they sign and with whom to avoid inadvertent 
waiver of judicial forum for vindication of statutory rights); Legislation Bans Mandatory 
EEO Arbitration, supra note 459, at 562 (describing legislation to ban compulsory 
arbitration of discrimination claims imposed by employers on employees as condition on 
employment). The Court in Gilmer rejected the argument that unequal bargaining power 
required a holding that employment arbitration agreements are not enforceable. 500 U.S. 
at 33. The court indicated, however, that fraud or overwhelming economic power might 
justify a refusal to enforce the agreement. Id. 
461. See Peter M. Panken, et al., Avoiding Employment Litigation: Alternative Dispute 
Resolution of Employment Disputes in the 90 's, C779 ALl-ABA 63, 72 (LEXIS) ( 1992) 
(arbitrator may be less likely than jury to award significant damages). 
462. See Jenifer A. Magyar, Statutory Civil Rights Claims in Arbitration: An Analysis 
o/Gilmerv. lnterstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 72 B.U. L. REV. 641, 655 (1992) (arbitration 
proceedings may eliminate discovery, particularly important in civil rights cases which are 
often difficult to prove without discovery). 
463. See Panken, supra note 461 (noting that an arbitrator must be fair to major clients 
which, in nonunion context, are employers, not employees); AAA President Predicts 
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deciding whether to proceed in a case where an arbitration agreement 
exists. In addition, some of the same concerns exist with respect to 
settlement agreements reached through private mediation. These cases 
reach the agencies when the charging party, dissatisfied with the arbitration 
decision, private arbitration or mediation agreement, or mediated settlement, 
files a charge. 
In considering the appropriate approach to these cases, the agencies 
might look to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) precedent 
regarding precedent to arbitration. The NLRB has a policy of deferral to 
arbitration in cases where the unfair labor practice claim filed with the 
NLRB overlaps with a contractual right subject to arbitration.464 The 
NLRB will defer to an arbitrator's award which meets its Spielberg 
standards, which require fair and regular proceedings to which all parties 
agreed to be bound, and a decision which is not repugnant to the purpose 
and policies of the statute.465 Additionally, the issue in the unfair labor 
practice case must have been presented to and considered by the arbitrator, 
a criterion which is met if the contractual and statutory issues are factually 
parallel and the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant 
to the unfair labor practice.466 The requirement that the proceedings be 
fair and regular has been interpreted to incorporate minimum due process 
standards,467 while the absence of repugnancy to the statute means not 
"palpably wrong as a matter of law."468 
The NLRB also defers to the arbitration proceeding where the arbitration 
has not yet occurred, but retains its right to review the award under the 
Spielberg standards.469 The criteria for prearbitral deferral, first articulat-
ed in Collyer Insulated Wire, are: (1) the parties must have an established 
and productive collective bargaining relationship; (2) the parties must be 
willing to arbitrate the dispute; and (3) the meaning of the contract must be 
Upswing in Use of ADR, Individual Employment Rights (BNA) 3, (July 20, 1993) (noting 
concern for bias in favor of repeat customers). If the employer is paying the cost of the 
arbitration, that fact might influence the arbitrator as well, subconsciously if not consciously. 
464. See PA'JRICK HARDIN ET AL., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1016-17 (1992) 
(describing the NLRB's deferral policy). 
465. See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955) (setting forth standards for 
deferral to an arbitration award). 
466. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984). 
467. Hardin, supra note 464, at 1061. 
468. Inland Steel Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 1091, 1091 (1982). 
469. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984) (deferring allegation that 
employee was threatened with discipline for filing grievances to grievance and arbitration 
procedure, retaining jurisdiction to review the case for consistency with Spie/bergstandards 
after dispute was resolved in arbitration). 
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central to the dispute.470 In addition to deferring to arbitration awards, the 
NLRB has deferred to prearbitration settlements.471 The NLRB's deferral 
policy is controversial, particularly prearbitration deferral, and the agency 
has expanded and contracted the cases subject to deferral over the 
years.472 Critics of the policy argue that the NLRB has abandoned its 
duty to enforce statutory rights. 473 The agency's rationale for deferral 
includes furthering the national labor policy favoring arbitration, requiring 
the parties to use their agreed-upon method of dispute resolution, deferral 
to arbitral expertise in contract interpretation, and conservation of the 
agency's resources.474 
Where the statute does not mandate investigation of each charge filed, 
agencies have the authority to allocate investigative resources, declining to 
investigate cases where a resolution of the matter was reached in another 
forum. This also applies where agency litigation is discretionary, which is 
the case under Titles I, II and III. The requirement of a Title II investiga-
tion could be satisfied through the review of the arbitrator's award or 
mediated settlement and any evidence the parties desired to present 
supporting their claim that the resolution was inconsistent with the statute. 
Such review under Title IV would also serve to determine whether the 
470. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842 (1971) (setting forth criteria for 
deferral). 
471. See Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union 520 v. NLRB, 955 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 61 (1992) (upholding NLRB's authority to defer to settlement 
agreements where settlement was reached through collective bargaining process that was fair 
and regular, parties agreed to be bound by settlement, outcome was not "palpably wrong" 
in that both sides compromised to some degree, unfair labor practice and contractual issues 
were factually parallel, and both parties were generally aware of relevant facts). 
472. See generally Hardin, supra note 464, at 1017-68 (detailing various changes in 
NLRB deferral policy). See also Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union, 520 v. NLRB, 955 
F.2d at 746 (criticizing NLRB for lack of coherent rationale for its policy deferring to 
prearbitral settlements). 
473. See the dissents of Members Fanning and Jenkins in Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 847-
50 (arguing that it was inappropriate to cede jurisdiction of statutory claims to arbitrator who 
may be reluctant to decide statutory issues and may provide only partial remedy for 
violation). 
474. See Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 839 (supporting deferral based on national labor policy 
favoring arbitration, statutory policy of encouraging parties to resolve disputes by their 
agreed upon methods, and skill and expertise of arbitrators in deciding issue arising under 
collective bargaining relationships); UnitedTechnologies,268 N.L.R.B. at 558, 559 (citing 
United Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. 879 ( 1973), enf'd sub nom., Machinists Lodges 700, 
743, 1746 v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 23 7 (2d Cir. 1975) (reemphasizing factors supporting deferral 
in Collyer and adding rationale of conserving agency resources)). 
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statutory requirements were met and thus whether the dispute resolution 
could be accepted by the agency as a final judgment in the matter.475 
Because the NLRA provides no private right of action, deferral by the 
agency is a final determination of the charging party's case. By contrast, 
under Titles I, II, and III of the ADA, an agency determination not to 
proceed based on an arbitral award or settlement does not preclude judicial 
action by the employee.476 Nevertheless, the agencies should approach 
deferral with caution. The benefits of deferral are similar to those under 
the NLRA, but the balance of power may be quite different. Deferral to 
a union negotiated arbitration procedure leaves the dispute to be resolved 
through a procedure agreed upon by two relatively equal parties. In a 
discrimination dispute, the arbitration agreement may well have been 
imposed on an employee with little knowledge of the consequences and 
minimal effective bargaining power.477 In addition, there may be an 
imbalance in representation of the parties. Thus in considering deferral, the 
agencies should emphasize, whether on an ad hoc basis or through 
regulatory guidelines, criteria that ensure fairness to all parties.478 
The agencies should consider developing and publishing the criteria that 
they will consider in determining whether to take action in cases where an 
arbitration or mediation agreement has been executed by the parties.479 
The criteria should include the circumstances under which the agency will 
475. As noted, these issues, particularly those involving agreements to arbitrate, are most 
likely to arise in employment discrimination cases. In communications and transportation 
cases, the statute sets forth clear minimum standards that must be met and there is little 
flexibility for either a mediated or arbitrated solution. If such a proceeding took place, the 
agency substantive review of the resolution would be relatively straightforward because the 
statutory standards are specific. 
476. If courts follow Gilmer, however, the action may be effectively precluded. 
477. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 933 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(refusing to enforce agreement to arbitrate on basis that plaintiff employees did not 
knowingly waive their right to judicial forum). Deferral of individual discrimination cases 
under the NLRA also has been more controversial than deferral of cases involving disputes 
over changes in working conditions. See Hardin, supra note 464, at I 022-25 (detailing shifts 
in NLRB deferral policy in individual discrimination cases and the arguments for and against 
deferral). 
478. These cases are most likely to arise in the employment context. 
479. See Estreicher, supra note 455, at 790 (suggesting that the EEOC issue regulations 
setting forth minimum procedural requirements for arbitration of Title VII and ADEA 
claims). Because the issue is most likely to arise in employment cases, the development of 
such guidelines should be a higher priority for the EEOC than for other enforcement 
agencies. The other agencies could defer action unless and until the issue arises with some 
frequency. 
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defer action on the case until the dispute resolution mechanism is 
completed.480 Publication of such criteria would aid the parties in 
establishing arbitration and mediation procedures that would survive agency 
scrutiny. Encouraging fair procedures would promote efficiency by 
increasing the number of cases in which the agencies could decline to act 
on the basis of a private dispute resolution. In addition, it would serve the 
goals of the statute by encouraging employers and businesses to establish 
dispute resolution mechanisms that would fairly consider claims.481 
The NLRB's criteria provide a starting point. The mediation or 
arbitration procedure should be voluntary, fair and regular, and provide the 
rights and remedies that would be available in a statutory proceeding.482 
Procedures imposed on all employees as a condition of employment should 
be suspect, but not automatically rejected. Fairness should include the 
notice of the procedures, right to representation, a neutral arbitrator or 
mediator chosen by both parties with equal knowledge of the backgrounds 
of the candidates, a right to at least some discovery,483 a right to compel 
witnesses, and a written opinion.484 All remedies available under the 
statute should be available to the arbitrator. 
In addition, like the NLRB, the agency should do a substantive review 
to ensure that the discrimination issue was actually considered by the 
arbitrator485 and that the decision or settlement is not inconsistent with the 
480. Given the current backlogs at all agencies other than the FCC, deferral will not 
cause substantial investigative delays. 
481. Pursuant to its statutory authority, 15 U.S.C. § 2310, the Federal Trade Commission 
has established minimum requirements for informal dispute resolution procedures which 
must be exhausted by consumers prior to judicial action. See 16 C.F.R. pt. 703 (1995). 
482. Many of the criteria set forth are relevant only to arbitration, where the neutral 
party has the authority to impose a decision on the parties at interest. 
483. If the discovery were required to be as extensive as in litigation, one of the 
advantages of arbitration would be lost. Nevertheless, a party, typically the employee, 
should not lose the case because of inaccessibility of necessary evidence. An example of 
such evidence would be comparative data regarding treatment of similarly situated 
employees to establish discrimination. 
484. The final report of the Dunlop Commission encourages development of private 
arbitration for employment disputes and sets forth many of these same criteria for fairness. 
Dunlop Commission Final Report, supra note 99, at 25-34. The Commission recommends 
that employers not be permitted to make agreement to arbitrate public law claims a condition 
of employment. Id. 
485. Actual consideration, rather than factual parallelism is a preferable standard and one 
used by the NLRB before the Olin decision. See Suburban Motor Freight, 247 NLRB 146, 
147 (1980) (requiring that unfair labor practice issue be presented to and considered by 
arbitrator as condition of deferral). 
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statute.486 Finally, the agency should ensure that the case does not 
involve systemic issues which were ignored or not adequately treated in the 
arbitration or mediation. Where the award or settlement meets these 
criteria, the agency should decline to proceed further with the investigation 
and should not litigate the case. If the award or settlement does not meet 
the criteria, then the agency might still decline to proceed further based on 
other adequate grounds. 487 This procedure will encourage private dispute 
resolution and conserve resources without diminution of protection of 
statutory rights. 
b. Other Forms of ADR 
The agencies should remain alert to other opportunities to use ADR. 
Litigation of ADA cases may provide opportunities for other ADR methods 
such as summary jury trials488 or early neutral evaluation.489 Agencies 
486. Consistency should require application of appropriate legal standards, but mere 
recitation of the proper standard should not be sufficient for deferral. Many arbitrators have 
little or no expertise in statutory discrimination. In a 1975 survey of members of the 
National Academy of Arbitrators, only half of respondents indicated that they stayed abreast 
of Title VII law and only 14% believed that they could accurately define basic employment 
discrimination terms. Harry Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: 
An Empirical Study, 28 PROCEEDINGS OF TIIE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 59 
(1976), cited in LAURA J. COOPER & DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION: A 
COURSEBOOK 75 (1994). Nevertheless, 72% of respondents felt competent to decide legal 
issues in discrimination cases. Id. Furthermore, arbitrators in employment discrimination 
cases do not have the political or personal accountability of judges and therefore, caution 
should be exercised in deferring the their interpretations of the law. Malin & Ladenson, 
supra note 278, at 1230-38. Careful review of conclusions oflaw still preserves the benefits 
of deferral as many cases turn on factual issues, where deference will be greater. 
The suggestion of the Dunlop Commission that the EEOC implement a training 
program and adopt standard training requirements for arbitrators hearing discrimination cases 
is valuable and would go far in addressing this problem and insuring that cases would 
survive a substantive review by the agency. See Dunlop Commission Final Report, supra 
note 99, at n.13. 
487. For example, the Department of Justice might decline to litigate because the case 
did not involve a pattern or practice of discrimination or an issue of general public 
importance. 
488. A summary jury trial involves abbreviated presentation of the case to a nonbinding 
jury. Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial: An Effective Aid to Settlement, 77 
JUDICATURE 6 (1993). 
489. Early neutral evaluation involves a neutral assessmentofthe merits of the claim and 
is designed to narrow and define issues as well as to facilitate settlement. BROWN & 
MARRIOTT, supra note 278, at 20. Implementing the ADR Act, supra note 438, at 30-31 
suggests factors to be considered in determining the appropriate form of ADR, such as "the 
relationships among the disputants, their need for control over the process, the utility of an 
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should also consider that ADR may be used creatively in settlement of large 
systemic cases. For example, if a settlement requires ongoing action by the 
defendant, the agreement could include use of ADR to resolve disputes that 
arise over the course of implementation of the settlement.490 The potential 
for ADR is limited only by lack of creativity in its use and consistency with 
statutory goals. 
CONCLUSION 
The ADA enforcement agencies are working to achieve effective dispute 
resolution under the statute. With the exception of Title IV, agency 
enforcement is marked by large investigative backlogs and long delays. 
The significant resource investment required to establish an administrative 
adjudication solely for ADA cases does not promise sufficient benefit in 
resolving these problems. Additional resources would be better allocated 
to systemic litigation and establishment of an alternative dispute resolution 
system for ADA cases. A joint voluntary mediation program should be 
established by the agencies, after consultation with an advisory committee 
of representatives of potential disputants, to provide an alternative for 
parties to ADA disputes. This mediation program could operate effectively 
as part of an early intervention program, which identifies in the intake 
process cases appropriate for various types of investigation, ADR, and 
litigation. 
Mediation promises quicker resolution of disputes with high satisfaction 
levels and empowerment of the parties, reducing the governmental 
enforcement burden. The proposed mediation program should be carefully 
monitored, evaluated, and modified as necessary, to ensure that the program 
is achieving the promised benefits, improving enforcement of the statute 
and moving the nation forward in its goal of eliminating discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities. In addition, the agencies should look 
for other opportunities to use ADR creatively to achieve enforcement goals. 
independent analysis of the merits, the urgency to resolve the dispute and the desire for 
privacy." Id. at 30. 
490. For an example of this type of use of ADR, see Peter David Blanck, On Integrating 
Persons with Mental Retardation: The ADA and ADR, 22 N.M. L.REv. 260 (1992) 
(illustrating use of ADR in settlement of class action against state of Wyoming by class of 
plaintiffs with mental retardation seeking improvement of conditions at state training school 
and establishment of framework for integration into community). 
